

***In the arts, practical should not be
drive too up the flowers and leaves of the theory,
but keep them near the soil of experience.
Clausewitz - War, vol. 1, p. XVI.***

Introduction

World War and its impact on society and military affairs. - The modern nature of the war and preparation for it. – The purpose of the work is to study the activities of the General Staff. - General staff and criticism. - The growth of the importance of the General Staff before the World War. - World War and the General Staff. - The need for the existence of the General Staff. - The method of work is a historical path. - The choice of a historical object of study. - The need to choose an example from the world war. - The reasons that prompted to dwell on the study of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. - Konrad and his work: "From my service in 1914-1918". – His assessment in our literature. - Difficulties of the work undertaken.

“Great wars are like an earthquake. Many of the phenomena of war are easy to understand for those who were eyewitnesses of the destruction that has been going on for several years in a space that has been subjected to an earthquake ... After great wars, as after an earthquake, the whole world, all political systems, all human ideas tremble convulsively” - to such are the conclusions reached by the bourgeois pacifist Nidti. Unfortunately,

this "earthquake" that we have experienced has not yet destroyed the world capitalist economy to its foundations, nor has imperialism been deprived of its suffocating Anaconda embraces of mankind.

Today, just as in 1914, we are on the verge of future wars, and we will have to go through more than one, perhaps, "convulsions" of imperialism, until only historians speak of it as a system of public relations that once existed. relations. Such "earthquakes", however, do not pass without a

trace for mankind, and as a result of them, we have entered an era of new

social relations, into a number of new "representations" in all areas of life, not excluding, of course, the military area.

Everyone knows the consequences of the world war for military affairs, and here it would perhaps be superfluous to prove that today it is necessary to closely reconsider firmly, it was, the established foundations of the military system before the imperialist war, to approach them critically and look for new forms for the vitality of this system.

Since, according to Plekhanov, "each stage in the development of the productive forces corresponds to its own system of armaments, its own military equipment, its own diplomacy, its own international law," it is quite natural and even necessary to revise the entire military system from the point of view of the new relations that are taking shape in the modern world. us society.

The world upheaval has revealed the enormous importance of technology in military affairs, but at the same time it has shown that a new fighter

is also coming onto the stage of history. As the representative and defender of the new revolutionary proletariat, which is taking power into its own hands, the "new fighter" sweeps aside the old fixed forms of the military system and demands new ones capable of responding to the social relations that are now taking shape on the

surface of the globe. We have already noted that a number of wars are ahead, fierce wars, because the contradictions that exist between the capitalist form of the world economy and the emerging new economic structure are so great that great sacrifices and struggle are indispensable. The bourgeoisie does not sleep, and modern alchemists sit in various laboratories and workshops, looking not for the elixir of life, but sharpening their brains to discover substances and tools aimed at the destruction of mankind.

The war has become more complicated, the war - this former chivalrous duel, is now not such a simple and delicate type of social relations. Now, more than ever, according to Clausewitz, "war is not fun, war is not a game, not a risk to win; not a matter of free inspiration. War is a serious means to achieve important goals. Therefore, it is not

necessary to prove that it is necessary to prepare for this type of social relations seriously, with full effort.

and resources throughout the country. "War cannot be waged," says Bernhardt in his book "On the War of the Future," "like robbers or soldiers play. It will demand tension from the whole people, lasting for years, never weakening, if they want to end the war victoriously. It seems that when preparing for war, no one thinks to end it with his own defeat."

Anticipating such a result of the war, it is better not to start it, it is better not to experience this "horrific and exciting drama." But since this drama is inevitable, one must be prepared for it, come out with full knowledge of one's role, put one's whole being into it, and only then can one count on success, on a decisive victory, and not on the pitiful laurels of the Treaty of Versailles, which is now spreading all over the world. all seams. We will not continue to prove the need for serious preparations for war, since this is known even without us. Our task is to consider the activities of that military system, which should correspond to the new relations of society.

emerging due to contemporary development of productive forces. However, we must warn you that such a broad task would be beyond our capacity, and, in order not to mislead the person who opens this book, we will stipulate in advance that the reader will not find here exhaustive answers to all questions related to the modern military system.

Our modest desire is only the desire to try our hand at highlighting the activities of the organism that controls the military system, connects it with other types of state machine, gives it life, inspires and leads it to victory or defeat.

In other words, we intend to unfold before the reader the life of that apparatus of the military system, which has long been called the General Staff, and even now has not yet lost this name.

The question is not new. Many pages have been written on it both before the imperialist war and after it. But at the same time, the question is also burning for our contemporary reality. There is no need to talk much about the importance of the General Staff for the military system - it has long been given the name "brain of the army"). Is this definition of general right or wrong?

headquarters - we will not disassemble for now, but we take what is left to us in inheritance.

As befits the "brain of the army", the General Staff before the World War was the inspiration for the entire military system of this or that state. His influence in all the armies was almost unlimited, and before the word "general staff" more than one gray-haired head, whitened by experience, stopped with reverence, fearfully raised and on the very first lines the hand of a critic broke off. Even after the revolution, Lemke's work "250 Days at the Tsar's Headquarters" appeared as "a trial of the General Staff." The high institution pressed with its authority even after death, and, despite the fact that sometimes the centers of this "brain" were shaken, if not almost paralyzed, not noticing that the substance had long been decomposing, the "brain" continued to exist in the cranium of the military systems - the general staff was considered inviolable. The access of the "uninitiated" to this institution was difficult, and, as is known, the Russian General Staff received the name "black clergy" even in everyday life. There, "behind the monastery wall", the druids with white aiguillettes created a strategy, prepared the state for war, forged an instrument called the army, which, unfortunately, did not turn out to be suitable for the real situation everywhere. Let the reader not think that we want to say that the general staff in most states played "robbers" or "soldiers". No, we are far from such slanders and must pay tribute to each "brain" according to its merits.

We are not going to write the history of the General Staff, even more - we do not risk doing this, because the reader will find classical works on this subject, and not our pale sketches. It is known from the works of the classics that the competence of the General Staff should only cover the army. However, the true nature of the war gradually expanded the range of its activities, and before the world war we already reckon with the fact that the "brain of the army" revealed the desire to get out of the skull of the army and move into the head of the entire state organism.

That this is so, we will later prove, but for now we ask the reader to take our word for it. Imperialist tendencies turned out to be characteristic of the "Army Brain" as well. For him, his box was already cramped and

its substance spread throughout the rest of the state organisms, seeing in them something like "Morocco" or "Asia Minor". The policy of colonial conquest turned out to be tempting not only for the environment of state institutions and the supreme power, but also for the general staff. The General Staff

thundered everywhere, bringing with it, of course, militarism and Marinism, more and more crushing the population with the weight of taxes in glorification of the bloodthirsty god of war, continuously and systematically frightening them with all the horrors of the latter. We will be told that it was his duty; maybe unpleasant - we will not mind, because they themselves were engaged in this craft. We only want to note: did the General Staff have the right to strive to become the "brain of the state"? Has he shied away from his "direct" duties and taken up a position unusual for him? We will try to look for the answer to this below - in history.

One way or another, but 1914 put the general staff of most states before a serious test and forced them to move from the field of preparing for war to conducting it. A four-year period of mutual extermination under the direct supervision of the general staffs led to a redrawing of the map not only of Europe but also of the rest of the world. With the Treaty of Versailles, and a number of other peace treaties, the vanquished and the victors appeared on the scene, and in their ranks, of course, the corresponding general staffs.

The "greatest spasm" also seized the head of the military system, in particular, its "brain" - the General Staff. Fair or not - the question is subject to special coverage - the wrath of the winners fell on the latter. As you know, in a fit of indignation, the victors of Versailles included the German General Staff among the perpetrators of the world catastrophe, pronouncing a severe sentence of its eternal destruction. The brilliant German General Staff - this model for all headquarters like it, this military idol of peacetime, was not only thrown off its pedestal, but turned into oblivion.

Following the German general staff, the Austro-Hungarian one also left the stage. This

was done with the vanquished, but the earthquake of the period of the imperialist war left traces on the heads of the victors as well.

Already during the war itself, the general staffs of the Entente armies were taken under control, and with the end of hostilities, a number of reforms fell to their lot.

Here is not yet the place to go into detailed discussions on this issue, we will return to it later, but now it is important for us to state that the development of the productive forces of our day has also influenced the general staff.

The imperialist war, which entailed a reassessment of all past values, forced us to reconsider the role and essence of even such a highly authoritative institution as the General Staff, and determine its place in the military system of the state, as well as its tasks in preparing the state for war. The conquered

countries, which nevertheless, however, on a minimal scale, were recognized as having the right to defense, were forbidden by the victors to have a general staff as the governing body of the army. In other words, it is considered possible in modern defense conditions to do without a general staff, forcing the army to have a "brain" in some other body. To what extent this is feasible and conceivable for our day, and whether this does not lead to the existence of a "hidden" general staff - this is still an unresolved question. Evidently, even the initiators of this paragraph of the peace treaty concluded at Versailles, and even more so those who were obliged to submit to the power of Entente diplomacy, do not believe that it is viable.

We are much more moderate in our demands and calmer in our conclusions than the high-born and polished, but at the same time seized by the sadism of torture diplomats of the highly cultured and civilized countries of the West, sitting at the table in Versailles, in relation to the armies of the central states of Europe who admitted their defeat. We are more modest and do not demand the destruction of the "brain of the army", even if the army is defeated, recognizing that no army can live without this brain. We will not argue about the name, but we believe that under one name or another, the General Staff, as a governing body, should exist.

To prove the validity of this proposition is one of the tasks of our work. We say - one, because further we intend to reveal what in the conditions of our days should be the "brain of the army", what place it should take, on the one hand, in

system of state administration, and on the other hand, in the military system itself and, finally, how its work should proceed.

As you can see, the scope of our work is quite wide and, perhaps, may be beyond our strength. We are afraid that we will not fulfill what we plan; we are horrified by the possibility of raising ourselves in our dreams higher than what is given to us by knowledge, strength, time and experience, but nevertheless our contact with the work of the General Staff inspires hope to cope with the task set to a sufficient extent.

We are overwhelmed by the proud thought that our pen will contribute its small share to the elucidation of this issue of great importance and that the one who opens our book will not waste time in listening to the story of the General Staff.

But our hesitation does not end there. We are approaching the choice of the method of presenting our thoughts, the choice of the path by which we could present our thoughts on the modern general staff with greater clarity and instructiveness to the reader.

We have two roads before us - the theoretical path and the path of historical research. We will not hide the fact that we have never been particularly inclined towards the first and have always strived to move in the real world, closer to life, trying to avoid "philosophical" reasoning. So we think to do now, inviting the reader to follow us along the path of history.

We believe that it is not necessary to prove the usefulness and necessity of studying this or that issue in military affairs by means of historical examples. Clausewitz says that "much more would be the merit of someone who could teach the conduct of war by historical examples alone" and "let him who feels the inclination to undertake it, equip himself for this good deed, as for a long journey." That history is the best teacher in practical matters, and

military affairs entirely belongs to such, is not subject to much dispute, and we would consider it a crime to take the reader's time if we were to prove it.

We want to agree on something else, namely, on the very method of using military history in our work. It has been said above how little inclination we have for "philosophical" reasoning, and therefore we will be quite consistent if we reject the thought

use military-historical examples only as proof of our theoretical propositions.

Our desire is directed to the knowledge of life as it develops in reality. We intend to trace the life of the "brain of the army" using a concrete historical example and from it draw the conclusions and teachings we need for our day. In other words, we turn to the so-called applied method of studying military affairs.

We consider it necessary to clarify that we do not intend to dwell on a specific analysis of the historical example we have chosen without introducing amendments for modernity, since this would be only a military-historical study, but by no means an applied study that we need.

Even an example from our immediate experience cannot serve as an immutable model for the future.

"Each war is presented as an unknown sea, full of underwater rocks and stones," teaches Clausewitz, and, of course, for practical conclusions about a future war, one cannot confine oneself to one interpretation of specific examples, even if only from the past war, without taking into account modern conditions of life.

The same Clausewitz advises us to take examples from the history of the era close to us, and Moltke says: "We cannot ignore the experience of previous wars, but we must remember that it cannot serve as a scale for the present. Decades and even centuries are separated from these wars, during which both the political and strategic situation has changed ... Therefore, in order to achieve the desired result, the only means left is to try to foresee the course of future events and delve into the current situation. This instruction will be taken into account by us in the process of our work and our sincere

desire will steadily follow this path. Thus, we are faced with the choice of that historical example, which we intend to subject to operation for the

purpose of study. Here, as already noted above, it is desirable, on the one hand, to trace the "brain of the army", the functional activity of which

is described quite fully, and on the other hand, so that this "brain" is more or less close to us in time, since the thinking of these brains also corresponds to a certain historical era. The older the era of history, the less useful it will be for us to study the people who lived in it.

brains.

However, it must be admitted that in the historical times that are close to us we will not find a detailed description of the work of the General Staff. This indicates to us the need to turn to the era of Moltke, but no matter how it bribes us in its detailed coverage, we must still state that for our time, the era of Moltke) in his own words, "cannot serve as a scale for the present time." We do not at all want to say that it is of little use - no, the Moltke era has not yet lost its freshness, but the development of the productive forces of our time is such that Germany in Moltke's time has largely lagged behind the life of our days. Therefore, it is desirable to turn to a historical epoch that is closer to us, and such, of course, will be the experienced imperialist war, from the beginning of which we are

already twelve years away. We must study the historical example from the experience of the World War, so as not to enter the path of obsolete or erroneous conclusions. For this war, the general staffs of the armies of Europe were intensively preparing, for decades they forged weapons and prepared the tools of the army, and in it (in the war) the general staffs experienced both the sweetness of victory and the bitterness of defeat, and some met their death.

Twelve years from the beginning of the World War is still a short period of time to be able to get a fairly complete history of the war, "the history of various government agencies and, in particular, the history of the General Staff. The "official histories" of the war have only just begun to appear in their first volumes, and the time is still far off when it will be possible to study the history of the General Staff with sufficient completeness from them. The archives of various armies still hide a lot of precious material, and it is difficult to say when it will be opened for wide study. Living witnesses of the gigantic work in preparing the "greatest convulsion" of Europe partially reveal in their memoirs the secrets of their souls, prompted by various reasons - either self-justification, or

self-praise and rarely from a pure heart. Many figures have already left the stage of life, taking with them all the justifications for their exploits or blunders. The historian can only understand the manuscripts left by them and build conjectures and assumptions about those passions and unrest that overwhelmed the authors at the moment of fixing their assumptions and instructions on

paper. In particular, the publication of documents from the history of the General Staffs is intruded by some other incoming data. No matter how decisive the world battle of 1914-18 was, many works of the former general staffs have not yet lost their relevance for our days, and therefore are not published by the states participating in the war. We pointed out above that the future promises us wars) the foreseeing of which forces many general staffs to be restrained in publishing their works, not only in their ideological part, but even in their executive part. One does not have to look far for an example of such restraint. Suffice it to point out that while the German General Staff, long before the World War, published Moltke's works on the war of 1870, not being afraid to reveal all his plans and assumptions and even the details of his work in Western Europe, the same General Staff kept silent about the work of its chief to develop a plan for war with Russia. In all published correspondence we find only a brief mention that in 1860 Moltke was working on a memoir on the deployment of the Prussian army in case of war with Russia. Only for the first time in 1920, i.e. 60 years later, Kuhl's "German General Staff" shed some light on the assumptions of Moltke and other chiefs of the general staff on the plan for war with Russia. So it was before, so it is now. Most of the general staffs that participated in the world war keep a

vow of silence, and only the defeated, in a fit of anger and self-justification, lift the veil over what was done "behind the monastery wall." Wiped off the face of the earth by the Treaty of Versailles, the German General Staff, for the purpose of self-justification, partially publishes

its activities, but we will not find an integral and coherent work, except for Kuhl's book on the work of the General Staff in the period of preparation for the World War. As for Kuhl's work, the wise general in

In a fictional form, he tries to describe to us the activity of the "brain of the army", without, however, fully revealing its functional work. With a tendency to self-justification, we see in Kuhl's work the activities of the General Staff, outlined in brush strokes, from which it is impossible to draw any concrete conclusions about the merits of the work of the German General Staff. The uninitiated in the work of the General Staff in peacetime can believe in the authenticity of those methods, as it is, according to the description. Kulya, was carried out at Wilhelm's headquarters, but someone who is knowledgeable in this work will shake only the annual one and say: "General, it was more honest not to write at all than to tell fiction." Only by comparing the works of other, more outspoken colleagues of Kuhl in uniform, can his description of the work of the German General Staff be supplemented. Partially published documents on the work of the German General Staff before the World

War, the history of the war in the "Reichsarchiv" and excerpts from the memoirs of former leaders, unfortunately, do not give us the opportunity to take the main example for study of the work of the German General Staff - this highly valuable example of such institutions.

His happy opponent, the French General Staff, is also silent about his work before the World War, and if his activities during this period are sometimes covered, it is only fragmentary, episodic, relatively little documented and mainly from a critical side. We do not intend to base our judgments on unconditional agreement with certain conclusions of the critics; we are drawn to come closer to the original documents and try our hand at critical analysis ourselves.

A similar position with the French General Staff is taken by its ally, the British General Staff. As for the Russian General Staff, we

will not hide what a grateful example it is for the practical study of military affairs. We are strongly tempted by the idea of delving into the primary sources into the study of the work of this former military institution that has gone into eternity.

systems.

But, unfortunately, we don't have time for that. The practical activity with which we are connected restricts our free use of archival materials. In addition, we feed a large

the hope and confidence that this work will be done for us by senior officials in the former general staff, who, moreover, directly went through it in the main department of the general staff, forming part of the brain matter of the former old army. Our service in the former General Staff took place on the periphery, consisting only in the transfer directly to the troops of the plans of the Russian General Staff. To give a true, unvarnished history of the Russian General Staff - should be the task of its former senior representatives, now working in the Red Army, so that the latter, having learned all the mistakes and blunders of the General Staff of the old army that went to the grave, would not repeat them, but, on the contrary, take into account for its victorious development on the world wrestling arena. Partially, such work has already been done by Zaionchkovsky

in his work "Preparing Russia for World War". We have not yet said anything about another dead person -

about the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, and we did this not out of forgetfulness, but out of a desire to please our reader a little. If some of the dead, like the German General Staff, for example, harbor the hope of "awakening again", then the colleague of the German General Staff who fell with him - the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, apparently lost all prospects of ever resurrecting as a special institution of the former once the armies of the Habsburg Empire. The World War forever erased this obsolete state formation from the map of Europe, and every sane person does not have to think about the former Austria-Hungary, or about the former army, and even more so about the general staff of the latter. The former chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, Konrad von Getzendorf, who, before his death, published a classic work on his

activities as chief of the general staff, apparently categorically came to this conclusion. "From my service in 1914-1918" - this is how these candid memoirs of the "former" person are titled. Seized by the desire to justify himself, merciless not only to his German allies, but also to the leaders of the Austria-Hungary of his day, the former chief of the general staff left us his work for the glory of the former Austro-Hungarian army.

Conrad tells us that the purpose of the work pursued by him is to depict events in their true light, as they were drawn to him, and leaves wide scope for criticism. According to the former chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, his work is by no means history, but is "biographical", as he puts it, in nature. In other words, we are again dealing with a product of "memoir" literature, however, which stands out sharply in a positive direction by the documents that are given in it. This is the whole value of Conrad's work, described by the German reviewer Kuhl as a "monument".

S. Dobrorolsky, in his review of Konrad's work ("War and Peace", No. 12), says: "All his work in the aggregate, so far in the form of four volumes, in terms of the solidity of work, in terms of the depth of military thought, is quite worthy of the outstanding reputation enjoyed by the field marshal Konrad von Hetzendorf and beyond the borders of his fatherland. Her work can be equated with the military scientific work of the old man Moltke and considered a serious contribution to military literature.

However, not all reviewers agree on tastes and others look at this work differently. So V. Novitsky, in his review of the 4th volume of Konrad's memoirs in Voenniy Zarubezhnik, No. 28-29, gives the following description of the heap: "We have before us a voluminous fourth volume containing about a thousand pages; the previous three volumes have about two thousand, totaling 3,000 pages. If we take into account that the fourth volume embraces a period of time lasting only 3 months (wars), then we should expect that the author will give us several thousand more pages in the near future. And therefore, taking up with a certain eerie feeling the reading of this "ledger", the reader is already ironically disposed to its content from the spot; the first few pages he read not only strengthen his mood, but also arouse various perplexities. The author clutters up his presentation with such a huge number of petty facts, insignificant conversations quoted verbatim from both sides, and various documents that he completely includes in the text, that in places it is difficult to distinguish among this useless material the course of events or the evolution of ideas and moods that he wants to reveal at this time. Especially difficult to read and understand the situation are these countless letters,

telegrams and orders given from the first to the last word and often not of any interest for assessing the events taking place around. And if the author put all this in appendices, and included only the essence of each document in the text or quoted its most important part, then his book would greatly benefit from this.

Despite the honorable and well-deserved name of the reviewer, we cannot in any way agree with his arguments, because we see the value of Conrad's work not in his personal reflections after the war, but in these "countless letters, telegrams and orders." Konrad tried to give all his documents to the judgment of criticism, from which one can also learn the mistakes of the former chief of the Austrian general staff. As for the pettiness of the facts cited, insignificant conversations and an abundance of documents, we believe that the reviewer knows better than we do the work of the chief of the general staff in general, without regard to any army, what petty conversations and facts it is made up of and what an abundance of various documents is accompanied by. The work of the chief of the general staff of the modern army does not at all pass in the utterance of only high matters, but rather petty, which it was even with Napoleon himself, who was both a commander and chief of staff. Oddly enough, Austrian critics, on the contrary, accuse Konrad of lacking the ability to work in detail, attributing to him only "soaring" in the field of lofty ideas. The same view of Conrad is held by the Germans (Cramon). Thus, we are more inclined to dwell on Kuhl's assessment of Conrad's work; as a "monument"; we do not say that it can be equated with the works of Moltke - this is perhaps excessive, but that the work of the former chief of the Austrian General Staff is a valuable contribution to military literature - this cannot be denied. Indeed, it is a "monument", but only to use this monument as a work of art, you need to skillfully. "What the wise man understands" – the old chronicler once taught that we allow ourselves to advise everyone who turns to reading the work of Conrad, in the amount of 3,000 pages, interrupted by his death. Above, we indicated that Conrad left wide scope for critics, however, immediately hinting quite transparently that criticism

should be respectable, scientific, and not narcissistic, not prophesying in hindsight. A pedantic and neat German, free from work and, apparently, not in need of getting a piece of bread, he selected materials so that, with small chronological explanatory inserts, he would present them to the reader, revealing, even if in hindsight, his moods about certain events and accompanying paper records. The published memoirs cover Konrad's activities as chief of the general staff in peacetime, on the eve of the war, and end with a

description of the first operation, the so-called Lublin-Lvov battle. Conrad's detailed description of the work of the general staff in preparation for war bribed us to follow this example, what should be the work of the general staff in peacetime in

our days.

We notice the smile of the reader that in order to consider such a serious issue, we stopped at the study of the "defective" "brain of the army", and what is more, such an army, which since the time of the great French revolution has won the worldwide privilege - "to be forever beaten." In the mind of the reader, the figures of Melas, Mack, Benedek immediately appear, and, finally, the famous gofkriegsrat passes. Is it worth paying attention to this "sick brain", what is the use of its study, will there not be only one harm from studying negative examples?! These are the questions that naturally arise in the reader of these lines.

"Tell me who you are familiar with, and I will tell you who you are," folk wisdom broadcasts, and, let's not hide it, acquaintance with the work of the Austrian General Staff, according to the wise saying just mentioned, can cast a rather gloomy shadow on us. Our reputation as a military man could be greatly damaged if only we recognized the immutability of any kind of "folk wisdom". However, we are brave, and we regard each wisdom, even "folk", in our own way, regardless of "what Marya Alekseevna will say." We will not deny that the study of positive examples, those where military glory shines brightly, is

more inciting to imitate these

great examples of history, inspires, and the aspiring military practitioner often leads to the camp of ardent admirers. But we should not forget the "humiliated and offended", whom fate bypassed and who experienced only thorns in their life path. We are not embarrassed by the role of the narrator of "bitterness and sorrow", because in the latter we will find a lot of instructive information for our days and for the future. We are aware that this role is very difficult, since the glory and brilliance of the historical example speaks for itself, attracting the reader to itself, even if the example itself was not so vividly sketched with a pen. Another thing is to interest the reader in the study of the causes and associated shortcomings that led to military failures. Here, the very fact of the latter does not appeal to the ambitious heart of a warrior, and only the brilliance of the presentation or the usual pity for the hero of the story can force the reader to delve into the study of the deeds of the unlucky commander or the pernicious military system.

We can by no means pretend to attract the attention of the reader with the sparkles of our pen - we are far from such self-delusion. We appeal, on the one hand, to his "good heart" to listen to the story of the late Austro-Hungarian General Staff, and on the other, we invite him to be convinced that great benefit can be drawn from the study of this "degenerate" for our practical work. It was considered "good form" not to talk about the "dead", but we

are not supporters of "good form" in our lives, and even more so in literature, and at this time we are filled with the desire to benefit from the dead, than, according to the custom of our ancestors, to steal him in a cemetery, give him time to rot there, and then start excavating as a lover of antiquity. The operation we are now undertaking will make it possible to use it for practical activity, and the work on mummies will plunge us into a field of archeology to which we do not feel inclined.

We do not dare to assure the reader that we will turn out to be an experienced operator and do not "cut up" the corpse, being unable to extract from it all that it can give. The laurels of Professor Pavlov in his scientific work on the human brain can by no means be disputed by us.

The essence of our study refers to the "higher side" of knowledge of the "essence of war", being one of the main foundations of the "theory

big war." Let's not hide the fact that we are seized by a series of doubts and hesitations, a lack of confidence in our abilities to test our pen in researching this "theory". We always stop

with admiration before the modesty of such a philosopher of war as Clausewitz, who regarded his immortal work only as a "formless mass of ideas", like "grains of noble metal", and hoped that "perhaps a more powerful head will appear, which these individual grains will be fused into one ingot of precious metal. After the death of this modest but truly powerful head, there were many ambitious people who tried to become higher than Clausewitz - we noticed such people but once during our lives and not so long ago. It cannot be said that they succeeded in their endeavor, often becoming in a ridiculous position. Although ambition is also characteristic of us, however, it is not to such an extent that we can make claims about the

categorical nature of our judgments in the study of the work of the General Staff. We warn in advance that our positions may be erroneous, that we have little experience in military affairs, and especially in the "theory of a big war." We have well assimilated the judgment of the same Clausewitz about "immature critics", who think that "in these matters, everyone who takes up the pen, considers beyond doubt, like twice two four, and worthy of printing everything that just then wanders into his head." "But if he. - the old man continues, - like me, he thought about the subject for years, constantly comparing it with military history, then he, of course, would be more careful with criticism.

We have neither long-term reflection on the "subject" (military), nor sufficient experience, nor broad erudition in military history, and therefore we cannot even claim that our work will fully satisfy the one who will turn over its pages.

The task we have set for ourselves is extensive, and technically For reasons we do not consider it possible to put it in one book.

True, we have heard that with "a kind of eerie feeling" they start reading "ledgers" and are "from the spot attuned ironically to their content." We do not close our eyes to the fact that our work will suffer the same fate, especially since it was written with a pen, which in our reviews is estimated by literary "bravos" as a tool for creating pamphlets full of sarcasm.

We do not imagine ourselves to be scientists, but we adhere to a special epic calmness in the order of presentation of our thoughts, because everyone has his own genre not only to wage war, but also to master the pen. In our work, the reader will find neither the epic of "pure historians", nor "delicate" phrases, nor the borrowing of other people's thoughts, without reference to their authors. Our pages are sketched out in a fit of feelings and excitements with which we were seized when they were created.

If he who takes our work into his hands agrees with our premises, then we invite him to follow us, sacrificing time, and we leave him to judge all the shortcomings and modest merits of our reasoning about the general staff.

Chapter I

Austria-Hungary at the beginning of the XX century

Territory and population of Austria-Hungary. - Occupation of the population of the monarchy. - A country's economy. - Military industry. - Austro-Hungarian trade. - Budget. - Austrian imperialism. – The internal position of the monarchy is the struggle of nationalities. - Labor movement. - State structure. - Bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. - The identity of Franz Joseph. - Franz Ferdinand: his character and views. - The foreign policy of Austria-Hungary. - Alliance with Germany. Union and relations with Italy. - Balkan issue. - Austria-Hungary and Russia. Austria and Italy in the Balkans. - The hopeless situation of Austria-Hungary and its inevitable death.

“The fire of shots in Sarajevo, like lightning on a dark night, for a moment illuminated the future path. It became clear that the signal had been given for the disintegration of the monarchy, ”the former prime minister of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy Chernin writes so figuratively in his

memoirs. The premonition did not deceive this diplomat, and the monarchy, as a state association, left the stage and receded into the realm of history. A few more years will pass, and the memory of this once powerful monarchy will increasingly be erased, going into the distance.

centuries.

Future humanity, of course, lost a little with the disappearance of this remnant of the gloomy Middle Ages and will hardly remember its former life with regret. We ourselves would not like to awaken thoughts about the former Habsburg monarchy in the memory of contemporaries, if only we had not set ourselves the task of studying the “brain of the army”. It is impossible, of course, to investigate the “brain” without touching the corpse itself.

the Habsburg empire, because the way of this state was reflected in the army, and, consequently, in its "brain matter" - the general staff.

In hoary antiquity, the Habsburg monarchy was born, experienced a period of revival, the highest rise of its glory, and, finally, by the middle of the 19th century, began to lose its

luster. We are not going to write the history of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but we will get acquainted with its state by the beginning of the 20th century, and if we deviate into historical times, then only with the aim of

clarifying this or that issue. On the territory of 675.887 sq. kilometers of the former Habsburg Empire lived a whole conglomerate of various nationalities. 47,000,000 Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Slavs, Romanians and other nationalities were included in the course of history into one state association.

According to the data of 1900, the population was distributed according to the mother tongue, as indicated

in Table No. 1. In addition, out of 1,737,000 inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina occupied in 1878, there were: 690,000 Serbs, 350,000 Croats [1], 8,200 Jews and

689,000 Mohammedans. The data presented characterize the diverse composition of the population, which has long been a hallmark of Austria-Hungary. The name of the "patchwork" monarchy could not be more true to the former Habsburg empire.

It cannot be said that all "flaps" are equal. The monarchical principles of building a state on the banks of the Danube could not, of course, recognize the self-determination of each of the nationalities. In the historical struggle for this self-determination, only the Hungarians managed to defend their independence and not only escape from German oppression, but also follow in the footsteps of their oppressors themselves. The rest of the nationalities were slaves of these two carriers of the cultures of Austria-Hungary.

Table No. 1

Национальности	В Австрии		В Венгрии	
	Абсол. числ.	%	Абсол. числ.	%
Немцев	9.171.000	36	2.135.181	11,1
Венгров	—	—	8.742.301	45,4
Чехов	5.955.000	23	—	—
Поляков	4.259.000	16	—	—
Русин	3.376.000	15	429.447	2,2
Словаков	1.193.000	3	2.019.641	10,5
Итальянцев	727.000	3	—	—
Сербов и кроат	711.000	3	2.730.749	14,2
Румын	231.000	1	2.799.479	14,5
Прочих	519.000	—	397.761	2,1
ВСЕГО	26.151.000	100	19.254.559	100

The "industrial revolution", which laid the foundation for the formation of a new capitalist society in the countries of Western Europe in the 18th century, slowly penetrated the life of Austria-Hungary. For a long time it retained its agrarian character, preferring to receive industrial products from outside than to develop their production at home. However, industry still powerfully invaded the conservative society of Austria-Hungary and, although slowly, but won more and more space for itself.

By occupation, according to table No. 2, per 10,000 inhabitants turned out to be employed in 1900:

The above table, without unnecessary comments, characterizes the economy of Austria-Hungary. As can be seen, industry was more developed in the Austrian half of the state. Large-scale factory production was developed mainly in Lower Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Voralberg, in areas that were deprived of salt, oil and fuel. Iron production was concentrated in Lower and Upper Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Extreme, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia; mechanical engineering is predominantly in Vienna, Venek Neustadt, Prague, Brunn and Trieste. In Hungary, the industry is less developed, however, and here its products gradually began to satisfy the needs of the local market.

Mining in both Austria and Hungary gradually developed, fully providing the industry with raw materials and fuel. However, the distribution of mountain wealth, especially fuel, did not correspond to industrial centers, and therefore it was difficult to supply the latter with fuel material.

Agriculture and cattle breeding were developed mainly in Hungary, and this half of the monarchy was its breadbasket. Although the Austrian lands also developed agriculture strongly, they still could not do without the help of Hungary or import from abroad, and Russia and Romania were not the last suppliers of bread for Austria-Hungary. As for the purely military industry, such in Austria-Hungary, as it developed, gradually fell under the control of German, and then English capital.

Table number 2

	В Австрии		В Венгрии	
	Абсол. числ.	%	Абсол. числ.	%
Земледел. и лесоводство	5.238 ч.	52,38	6.842 ч.	68,42
Рыболовство	5 »	0,05	1 »	0,01
Индустр. и др. видами промышленности	2,472 »	24,72	1.352 »	13,52
В горном деле	206 »	2,06	85 »	0,85
Торговлей	413 »	4,13	289 »	2,89
На службе путей сообщения	583 »	5,83	229 »	2,29
Наемным трудом	—	—	554 »	5,54
Военной службой	101 »	1,01	79 »	0,79
Чиновников, учителей	330 »	3,30	297 »	2 97
Свободных профессий	41 »	0,41		
Рантье и пенсионеров	318 »	3,18	139 »	1,39
Без определен. Занятий	293 »	2,93	133 »	1,33
ВСЕГО	10.000 ч.	100	10.000 ч.	100

The largest military-industrial enterprise in Austria was the Skoda plant in Pilsen (in Moravia). Founded in 1869 as a steel mill, and remaining purely commercial until 1886, the Škoda plant began its military

production from armor plates for land fortifications, and then in 1888 he produced his first howitzer mount for 5.9 "mortars and took out a patent for a new machine gun. In 1889, Skoda began manufacturing field and other

artillery for the Austro-Hungarian army, and in 1896, having built new cannon workshops, began manufacturing naval artillery. In 1900, Škoda is transformed into a joint-stock company with the help of the Credit Institution and the Bohemian Accounting Bank. In 1903, the previously maintained connection with Krupn was consolidated by the exchange of patents, and Skoda actually turned into a branch of Krupn, supplying with it steel

for our Putilov plant. In 1908, Skoda already supplies guns for Spanish warships, and in 1912, together with the Hartenberg Cartridge Company and the Austrian Arms Factory, it receives an order from China for artillery and hand weapons, in return for a loan arranged for him by

Viennese bankers. Skoda is becoming as ubiquitous as Krupp himself. In 1909, after the Bosnian crisis, the plant in Pilsen was significantly expanded and received government orders in the amount of 7,000,000 kroons with a deadline for delivery by 1914. In 1912, the gun and machine workshops were again expanded, and the following year the company entered into an agreement with the Hungarian government to build a large

gun factory in Gyory, in which the Hungarian treasury was to invest 7 million. kroons, and the company - 6 mil. crowns

Closely associated with the "Austrian Society of Daimler Motors", in 1913, the Skoda company began to install its heavy howitzers (28 centimeter) on Daimler cars. Another major Austrian military-industrial enterprise

was the Vitkovica Coal and Iron Company in Moravia, which produced armor, gun barrels, shells, armor domes and gun mounts. This company was part of the Nickel Syndicate of Steelworkers, a joint stock company headquartered at Vickers House in Westminster.

The third major firm is the Austrian arms factory in Steyer, headed by Mannlicher. The factory supplied the Austro-Hungarian army with a rifle of this name. The plant was founded in 1830, and in 1867 his rifle was adopted. In 1869, a joint-stock company was formed, and in 1878 the productivity of the Steyer factory already reached 500,000 rifles per year, and over 3,000 people worked on it. The plant was also part of the association with the German Arms and Shell Factory and Br. Boller & Co."

In Prague there was a dynamite factory from the Nobel Association, which had widely spread its fetters in the countries of Europe. Finally, in Fiume, Armstrong and Vickers had a factory for making torpedoes.

There are no words that the industry of Austria-Hungary could not enter into any kind of competition with the world powers, but, in any case, its development moved rapidly forward. Using its own capital, syndicated with foreign capital, the heavy industry of the Habsburg monarchy got back on its feet every year, and, if only there were difficulties in domestic politics, the development of industry would be faster than it turned out to be.

deed.

From what has been said about the development of industry, it is clear that in Austria-Hungary, on the one hand, a class of large capitalists was formed, and on the other, the proletariat grew.

As for trade, Austria-Hungary, according to 1912 data, traded on a world scale for only 5.600 million. stamps, which accounted for 3.3% of all world trade. The greatest exchange of goods took place with Germany, England, Italy, the United States of America and then with the Balkan states (Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece). It should be noted that trade with the latter ran into resistance from the Hungarian agrarians, who saw the development of trade with foreign countries as undermining their own well-being. Special prohibitive and high duties were introduced, which, on the one hand, helped the development of Hungarian agriculture, but, on the other hand, increased the cost of products, often creating crises and making Austria dependent on Hungary, not to mention

bitterness against the Danubian monarchy, created in the neighboring Slavic countries. The budget of Austria-

Hungary was formed from four budgets: the general imperial, Austrian, Hungarian and Bosnian. The general imperial budget was intended mainly for the general imperial maintenance of government institutions and to cover the costs associated with the constitution, occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the Austria and Hungary paid certain debts to the general imperial budget, with the contribution of Austria to a large extent exceeding the Hungarian one. Compared to the other powers of Europe, the budget of Austria-Hungary in millions of francs, as shown in Table No. 3, was as follows:

Table No. 3

СТРАНЫ	1907 год	1913—14 г.
Австро-Венгрия	3.000	4.500
Германия	5.903	7.125
Франция	3.833	5.473
Англия	5.000	6.050
Италия	1.945	3.320
Россия	4.950	7.150

Thus, only Italy alone had a budget smaller than Austria-Hungary, while other powers overtook the former Habsburg empire. The growth of the budget did not correspond to

the development of the productive forces of Austria-Hungary, as a result of which the state debt increased every year and in 1911 was expressed in the amount of 18,485,000 crowns, which was 359 crowns per inhabitant. In terms of the severity of the state debt, however, Austria-Hungary was overtaken this year by France, Italy, Germany, and only in England and Russia was the population less burdened with debt. However, if we take into account that every Frenchman and German had a higher income than a subject of Austria-Hungary, it becomes clear that the Habsburg Empire forced the forces of its population. What were the reasons for this, we will not disclose yet, as we will return to this issue even further.

We have no right to make further searches in the field of economic statistics, as we would evade our task. The foregoing is necessary for us as a basis for further judgments about the Danubian Empire. The multi-tribal

composition of its population and the slow development of the productive forces indicate that this state was not up to the imperialism of its European neighbors. If one can speak of Austrian imperialism, then only as a system with too limited dreams and goals far from capturing those colonies that were fought for by other great European powers, and in particular by allies - Germany and even Italy.

Austrian imperialism, as such, scattered its nets only in the nearby Balkans, and its ultimate aspiration was access to the Aegean Sea, and then attempts to gain harbors in Asia Minor. The Austrian imperialists did not dream of more. Despite the fact that the Austrian industry was getting stronger and stronger every year, its representatives were not only interested in the wide expansion of their German allies, but also afraid of it, they were also satisfied with their local market. Thus, representatives of the Austrian iron industry turned out to be very interested in their home market, since the prices for iron and steel in Austria are 100 percent more expensive than in Germany. The Hungarian agrarians were not only afraid of German dominance, but also sought to limit the import of agricultural and livestock products from neighboring Romania and Serbia. that there is no other way out, that they get some profits from the policy of their expansive ally. Thus, if the internal market was still free, if there was still a lot of income at home for the capitalists of the Danubian Empire, i.e. in other words, if there were no incentives for an aggressive policy outside the country, then it would seem that the Habsburg Empire should be the "promised" country of the

world, and not the burning torch that ignited the world fire, as it turned out to be in reality.

The active policy of Austria-Hungary was based on something else: "a dynastically forced conglomerate of centrifugal national fragments" - Austria-Hungary was "the most reactionary formation in the center of Europe." Surrounded by nationalities related to the empire, Austria-Hungary, in order to save its unity, in its foreign policy preferred the path it had chosen to enslave the neighboring small states, but could not agree to its own disintegration. This is the expression of so-called Austrian imperialism. The Argonauts from the banks of the Danube did not go on military expeditions in search of the Golden Fleece in distant lands, but to round off their borders, to include in their composition those independent nationalities that, by their presence, embarrassed the loyal subjects of the Habsburgs, disturbing the peace of the latter. He was no longer at home - within the state, and thus, for Austria-Hungary, foreign policy turned out to be closely and directly connected with domestic.

In view of the foregoing, we consider ourselves obliged to cast a glance at the internal balance of forces in the Danubian Empire. The

once blissful and calm times for the Habsburg dynasty, which expanded its possessions along both banks of the Danube by marriage, passed by the middle of the 19th century, and "my peoples," as Franz Joseph called the conglomerate of his subjects, began to move. The bonds of marriage ceased to exert their magical effect, and in 1848 the Hungarian revolution broke out with the idea of national self-determination. Suppressed with the help of the Russians, Hungary did not calm down in its struggle, and by 1867 achieved

independence.

According to the constitution of this year, on the banks of the Danube, instead of the former Austria, there was a dualistic (dual) Austria-Hungary, with a special Hungarian parliament, and then an army. Having won, Hungary did not stop in its demands, and the subsequent years, up to the World War, were filled with internal parliamentary struggle. In other years, this struggle took on a fierce character on all fronts - political, domestic, economic, etc. In a word, the Hungarians did not stop their struggle for a single day.

for independence until 1918, when there was already an actual separation of Hungary as an independent state.

The defeated carriers of the Austrian idea - the Germans - saw their salvation only in reunification with a strong Germany. Once a strong stronghold for the Habsburg dynasty, the tribe that once dominated the state, its backbone, has now degenerated into [2] the Austrian irredenta. Instead of a binding force, the Germans were a centrifugal force, held only by Germany itself, which considered it more profitable to have the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as a whole than to include an extra 10,000,000 co-ethnic eaters. An increase in the clerical south of Germany by archclerical Austrian Germans would weaken the position of the Protestant north in the German alliance and, finally, it would be more economically advantageous for the Spree Germans to have a good customs union with the Danube Germans than to see them as competitors within Germany itself. In such a position were the two dominant nationalities in Austria-

Hungary. The rest of the peoples were divided among them. However, such a division was not very pleasant for those deprived of the right to national self-determination. The struggle for autonomy with the announcement of the constitution of 1867 began in both halves of the state. In Austria, the Czechs fought the Germans, the Poles fought the Rusyns, the Italians sought to join Italy. In Hungary, there was a long and stubborn struggle between the

Hungarians and the Croats,
Slovaks, Serbs, Romanians.

Finally, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, occupied in 1878, there was a clear dissatisfaction of the Serbs with the regime of the occupiers and an inclination towards an

independent Serbia. In a word, the centrifugal national tendencies every year, as the productive forces developed in the territory of the oppressed peoples, developed more and more strongly, creating difficulties in the state and threatening in one way or another to result in an armed clash with the dynasty. The

internal situation of Austria-Hungary was fraught with great dangers, which was no secret to any sane statesman of the Danubian Empire.

They only conceived ways to improve in different ways: some saw the need to transform the state through internal reforms, as was done in Germany, while others, relying on the experience of the same Germany, sought to create a state with such borders that would include all independent one-tribe states into a single connection - the Danube Empire of the Habsburgs. The representatives of the second current were those Austrian imperialists mentioned above. The "calming" of the monarchy through internal reforms was understood in the sense of declaring autonomy for individual nationalities with the simultaneous grouping of those into large related

associations. Thus, dualism was replaced by trialism, i.e. unification of Austria, Hungary and Slovakia from the Slavic tribes. However, such a division met with resistance among the Germans and Hungarians, who were afraid to let the wards of the Slavs out of their hands. Thus, Hungarian Prime Minister Tissa did not allow anyone to touch "my Serbs," as he put it, emphasizing the rights of the Hungarian crown to the Slavic peoples that were part of its lands. Finally, it was difficult in general to reconcile the Slavs themselves among themselves, not to mention the Romanians and Italians, whose fate, even with the new division of the state, promised their former dependence on one or another foreign rulers.

The paths of statesmen from the banks of the Danube of the second group went on the outer lines, and so we will leave them for now.

Approaching the history of Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, we are obliged to shed light on the position of that driving force that in all states at the beginning of the 20th century came to the fore - this is the labor movement. With the development of industry in Austria-Hungary, the working class grew, the Social Democracy grew, more and more drawn into the internal struggle that was seething in the state. However, instead of leading the working class along the path of revolutionary internationalism, the Austro-Hungarian Social Democracy threw it into the arms of bourgeois nationalism, burning with struggle, and itself entered into this struggle for the interests of the nationalities. However, despite all the struggle waged by individual nationalities in Austria-Hungary, the latter, as a state association, still continued to exist.

It was clear that

its life path is shortened every day, but for this it was necessary to strike from the outside on the flabby body of the Danubian Empire, but inside everything so far resulted in a fierce parliamentary struggle, sometimes accompanied by barricades and gunfire in large settlements of the state. According to the constitution of 1867, both halves of the state (Austria and Hungary) had

their own independent representative institutions, their own independent ministries and their own armies. Bosnia and Herzegovina also had its own independent Sejm. Each of the "halves" allocated delegations, which alternately had meetings in Vienna or Budapest, solving all-imperial issues. The army and the ministries of foreign affairs and finance, supported by the general imperial budget, were recognized as all-imperial institutions. At the head of the entire state machine was Franz

Joseph, who was to some extent the binding force that for the time being did not allow the mechanism of the empire to go to eternal rest. As it should be for any bourgeois constitution, the

Austrian constitution also had a "paragraph 14", which gave the right to the supreme power to carry out certain measures in the direction it desired. National separatism kindled hatred not only among the masses, but also penetrated into the upper

classes of the bourgeois classes of the monarchy. True, a kind of international circle of the ruling court clique was formed around the court, so to speak, but even it was dominated by

those same centrifugal national federalist aspirations. No matter how bourgeois and high in his nobility and origin, the Hungarian dignitary of the Danubian Empire, but he, above all, remained a Hungarian. In the same way, other nationalities were suspicious of this or that general imperial minister of a certain nationality, often seeing in the minister's projects a belittling of the rights and interests of their nation.

But no matter how the disagreements among the upper classes of the bourgeoisie increased, they nevertheless stood firmly on their feet. The presence of a large number of large landowners in Hungary, Galicia, the formation of a circle of large

industrialists, the development of banks, etc., filled the ranks of the big bourgeoisie, which saw the preservation of the monarchy as the only way for its development. This big bourgeoisie was

followed by that huge army of officials, which was a characteristic feature of the former Habsburg monarchy. This army of bureaucrats, who lived at the expense of the state, was three times the size of the entire military force of Austria-Hungary, and according to Krauss' calculation in his book "The Reasons for Our Defeats": "every fifth or sixth person was an official. Half of Austria's income went to the maintenance of officials who saw the army as the most dangerous enemy for their existence.

Wherever possible, this bureaucratic army went against the armed forces of the empire, proving the heaviness of the costs associated with the maintenance of the army. The army of parasites waged a stubborn battle for its existence, and in its smaller layers it became infected with the same national separatism inherent in the entire population. On

the part of responsible statesmen of the former monarchy, one could more than once hear complaints about the national federalism that was carried out by the petty intelligentsia, teachers, and other representatives of the petty bourgeoisie. There is not much to say about the total mass of the population. Her material well-being was far from satisfactory. It is true that in areas in which industry developed, as, for example, in Bohemia and Moravia, the situation of the population improved, P. but still not enough. The reasons for the

unsatisfactory material situation of the masses were considered to be the bonds that the 1867 constitution imposed on self-determination, those restrictions within which it was impossible to speak of any rapid development of the country's productive forces. As always happens in such cases, looking for a way out of the emerging situation within the state, the eyes of many, and above all of Franz Joseph himself, were looking for a supernatural person, a statesman who would save the crumbling empire. "My misfortune is that I year for the national cannot find a statesman",

Franz Joseph said.

But the misfortune, according to Krauss, did not lie in the lack of such statesmen, but above all in the nature of Franz Joseph himself, who did not tolerate independent persons, people with an open look and their own opinion, people who knew their own worth and behaved with dignity. Such personalities were not suitable for the Austrian court. Only "lackey natures" enjoyed love in him, as Krauss testifies. Speaking of Austria-Hungary, one cannot ignore the

personality of Franz Joseph, who to some extent served as the cement for this state unification. Despite the national struggle that was going on in the country, the personality of this elderly representative of the Habsburg dynasty enjoyed a certain popularity among the population. The latter was not in the merits of Franz Joseph, but rather in the habit of him, in the assessment of him as an existing factor of historical necessity. The foregoing may lead to the conclusion that Franz Joseph had little influence on the course of

affairs in the Danubian Empire. However, it is not. Throughout his long tenure as head of state, Franz Joseph did not let go of the steering wheel of the state machine. True, external and internal storms more than once threatened to snatch this instrument of control from his hands, but he stubbornly held on to it, swimming either against or with the current.

In a severe internal crisis after the just ended Hungarian revolution of 1848, having ascended the throne of the Habsburgs as a young man, Franz Joseph immediately plunged into a life full of anxieties and dangers. Having

found the period of absolutism in the state, Franz Joseph from the very first steps had to experience the collapse of it (absolutism) and the transformation of the country into a constitutional state. Life forced to adapt to new forms; Franz Joseph did not recoil from them and went along the new path as much as the inexorable circumstances required. By recognizing the victory of the Hungarians and becoming a dualistic monarch in 1867, Franz Joseph was far from any transition to other forms of government. The 1867 constitution was his last concession. Faithful to her, the penultimate Habsburg could not come to terms with any

further autonomy of other nationalities, except for the Hungarians: the idea of trialism was alien to Franz Joseph.

Remaining faithful to the monarchical precepts of his ancestors, Franz Joseph, with each year of his reign, moved further and further away from the life developing in Europe. The great steps of imperialism, the social movement - all this was not for the high-power monarch on the Danube. "His peoples" were to think of their true master with a sense of respect and devotion; which, in turn, should not violate monarchical etiquette and go "to the people", as his ally Wilhelm tried to do. Conservative etiquette from everyday life was transferred to the management of public affairs. Here, too, etiquette had to be observed: everyone could speak only in the circle of their activity, but no more. As a man with a far from strong nature, with a conservative way of thinking, Franz Joseph, however, did not overestimate his strength and did not shy away from energetic people who fought for him in the internal

affairs of the state. One thing he could not forgive such people - these are violations of court etiquette and loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty. By fulfilling these demands of the monarch, independent and strong-willed statesmen could carry out their policies without fear of losing the trust of the aged Habsburg. Conservative by conviction, Franz Joseph remained so in his relations with people. The person who received his trust did not soon leave his high state post, even though he corresponded to his appointment. On the contrary, people who were somehow antipathetic to the emperor, despite

all their virtues and qualities, could not count on their successful state activities. Thus, in the testimony of Krauss, we must make some correction in the sense that if "servantry" was Franz Joseph, the form is recognized as an expression of loyalty, then only as a form, but in essence, within the limits defined for each official, they were also allowed to freely express their thoughts and defend the propositions put forward.

A German by birth, Franz Joseph remained in the foreign policy of the state, despite a series of defeats in the war with Prussia and other German states. Those external blows that fell to the lot of Austria in the first period of Franz Joseph's life made him to some extent lose faith in the military power of the Danubian Empire. The impending world slaughter seemed to suppress him: monarchies were supposed to disappear in this war, and Franz Joseph stubbornly rejected any actions that could lead to disaster. A stake on "peace" was more desirable for the modern Abdul-Hamid than saber-rattling; skillful diplomatic victories were more seductive in their bloodlessness than the deceptive and risky course of military happiness. And if Austria was the instigator of the world war, then we must not forget that the Sarajevo action was directed against the Habsburgs, in whose defense Franz Joseph was even ready to draw his sword, although he did not have particularly vague feelings for his future successor. The latter, in the person of Franz Ferdinand, had already been in government for several years, promising in the future to

make a breakthrough in the internal life of Austria and its external situation. Distinguished by a nervous nature, embittered from childhood at the court and at the head of the administration of

statesmen, especially the Hungarians, who often bullied the future ruler of the state, Franz Ferdinand had an unbalanced temperament. Sometimes cheerful and lively, and often harsh in dealing with others, the heir to the throne from childhood closed first in himself, and then in his family circle.

Alien to any attempt to seek popularity, too contemptuous of humanity to value or reckon with its opinion, Franz Ferdinand terrified and feared the ministers and other persons involved in the government who came to him with reports. An irritable, intemperate cleric, Franz Ferdinand especially despised all the servility that was characteristic of the Austro-Hungarian state machine. However, with people who did not get lost and firmly defended their opinions, Franz Ferdinand became different and willingly listened to them.

The future promised a stern ruler to Austria, if history itself had not turned the wheel in the other direction and the "greatest convulsion" had not swept away not only Franz Ferdinand, but also Austria-Hungary as a state association.

Having experienced the burden of Hungarian harassment, not seeing the dualism of salvation for the Danubian monarchy in the system, Franz Ferdinand sought such a radical transformation of the state on the principles of federalism.

His attitude towards the Hungarian half resulted in one phrase: "They (Hungarians) are antipathetic to me, even if just because of the language," Franz Ferdinand said, despairing of trying to learn the Hungarian language. The personal antipathy towards the Hungarian magnates learned from childhood was transferred by Franz Ferdinand to the entire Hungarian people. Possessing political intuition, he understood all the harm that brought with it not only Hungarian separatism, but, mainly, the policy of Slavic oppression, stubbornly pursued by the M

From this, naturally, flowed the constant desire of the Archduke to help the Romanians, Croats, Slovaks and other nationalities free themselves from Hungarian

dominance. Such a policy of Franz Ferdinand in the Hungarian issue did not remain a secret for Hungary, which paid the same coin of malice and hatred to the descendant of the Habsburgs.

The policy of federalism of Franz Ferdinand did not meet with sympathy, first of all, in Franz Joseph himself, as already mentioned above, frozen within the framework of the constitution of 1867. Differences in views on domestic politics as well as personal relations separated these two representatives of the House of Habsburg from each other. If, in the opinion of the heir, he meant for the emperor "no more than the last lackey in Schönbrunn", then on the other hand, Franz Joseph also definitely revealed his point of view on all the innovations of his nephew. "As long as I rule, I will not allow anyone to interfere," the old emperor summed up all sorts of arguments about any kind of reorganization of the state. The created estrangement between relatives was further deepened by obliging people, who, of course, were not lacking in the bureaucratic machine of Austria.

Despite the sharp rebuff of his uncle, the nephew did not think to give up his positions and move away from governing the country. "Someday I will have to answer for the mistakes made now," said Franz Ferdinand, considering it his duty to delve into public life everywhere and everywhere. Thus, two control centers were created, two supreme authorities - the present and the future, often found themselves at opposite poles, between which the subtle bureaucrats of the country's state machine had to maneuver. The latter, which already required major repairs, creaked even more from all these frictions, slowed down its course even more, threatening with a final breakdown. The foreign policy of Franz Ferdinand, both at home and abroad, was associated with the idea of militarism of the Danubian monarchy. The heir to the throne was considered the leader of the military party of Austria. There are no words that the so-called Austrian imperialism was not alien to him; in his dreams, the archduke was again the owner of Venice and other areas of former Austrian Italy. Perhaps his dreams would have taken him even further if it were not for the consciousness that without the improvement of the internal life of Austria-Hungary itself, without the creation of a strong army, it is still too early to think about an active foreign policy. Behind him, hiding behind his name, a military party really worked, every year fanning the torch of war more and more, but Franz Ferdinand himself. If he was not alien to aggressiveness, then for the time being he considered it necessary to limit it.

Recognizing in foreign policy a necessary condition for the preservation of the independence of the two-pronged empire, Franz Ferdinand sought to limit its alliances only to those that led to the specified goal. Alien both within the state and in the foreign policy of the pan-German idea, he sought to peacefully eliminate the clashes between Austria and Russia in the Balkans, considering the ideal union of Germany, Austria and Russia. It should be noted that often personal antipathies, often based on family relations to one or another court of a foreign state, invaded foreign policy in the view of Franz Ferdinand. Wilhelm II turned out to be in the closest relationship with the Archduke, apparently hoping to subsequently find an obedient vassal in Franz Ferdinand. It's hard to predict the future, but hardly an heir

the Austrian throne, being on the latter, would blindly follow the ruler from the banks of the Spree.

It has already been said above that for Austria-Hungary, foreign policy turned out to be closely and directly connected with domestic policy. Indeed, the latter contained all the guiding lines for foreign policy. In the middle of the 19th century, in the west and in the center

of Europe, Austrian foreign policy received blow after blow, the consequences of which were the loss of Italy and the transfer of hegemony in the alliance of German states to Prussia. Austria was now face to face with two new states:

a united Italy and North German

union.

Most of the possessions of Austria and northern Italy became part of the new Italian kingdom, and only minor areas inhabited by Italians remained within Austria. The hope of regaining what was lost did not leave the politicians of Franz Josef, and 1866 seemed to favor this, if not for the decisive defeat on the fields of Koeniggratz. Italy was saved by the power of Prussian arms and kept her 1859 conquests.

Not daring to enter the war of 1870 on the side of France, held back by the hostile position of Russia, Austria missed the opportunity to settle accounts with its two former enemies - Italy and Prussia. From now on, her policy took a new path of rapprochement with these two states. Having entered into an alliance with Germany in

1879, Austria in 1882 with Italy joined the Triple Alliance.

Thinking "by blood and iron" to achieve the unification of Germany under the hegemony of Prussia, her future Chancellor Bismarck saw in Austria a dangerous enemy in the south. Having brought the matter to a resolution with an armed hand in 1866, Bismarck won, but ... did not want to completely finish off the Danubian Empire. He needed her for the future. Having eliminated the immediate danger in the person of Austria, Bismarck nevertheless considered her as an enemy capable of seeking revenge. It was necessary to give new guidelines for the policy of Austria, which would distract her from the West, and, by the way, would help the same in relation to Russia.

Shortly after the conclusion of peace, the victor at Königrätz hinted rather transparently to Austrian diplomacy about the possibility of finding solace for the lost Italian regions and for the defeat at Königrätz on the Balkan Peninsula. This is where the future of Austria was, according to Bismarck, and what was to the taste and diplomacy of Franz Joseph. Needless to say, Bismarck achieved another benefit with this move, namely: by turning Austria to face Constantinople, he turned Russia there too, diverting her from Western affairs in the same way. From now on, Austria, a strong Austria, was to render serious services to German diplomacy.

In 1872, during a meeting between the Austrian and German emperors, the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was already decided, and in 1879, after the Berlin Congress, when Russia had significantly cooled in its sympathies for Germany, a treaty was signed between the two German states linking these

states. On the basis of this treaty, relations between Germany and Austria developed until the last days. True, in his policy of national unification, Bismarck for a long time did not dare to break with Russia, playing a double game between Vienna and St. Petersburg. However, Bismarck did not want to sacrifice Austria because of the beautiful eyes of Russia, and the alliance concluded in 1879, which soon turned into a tripartite one, retained its strength and vitality. Drawn into Balkan politics, Austria now also needed the assistance of a strong Germany, and no matter how false the alliance with her was at times, no matter how vivid the memories of the wounds of 1866 were, no matter how clear the role of an assistant in this alliance was for Austria, she but she considered it essential for herself now. With Germany's

transition to an imperialist policy, in which Austria had relatively little interest, the Allies became disillusioned with each other. For Germany, Austria was needed as a vanguard for its penetration to the east - into Asia Minor, as a counterbalance to Russian policy in the Balkans, and for Austria, an alliance with Germany gave support, which was needed in the same Balkan policy, on the path of which Austria had already entered for a long time. Despite the fact that sometimes, with the development of Germany's trade relations with the Balkan states, its interests significantly collided with the commercial interests of Austria, the union continued to exist for

still. If any side doubted its strength, it was Austria, while the other side, under the existing political situation, was confident in its Danube ally. Indeed, despite the attempts of the English King Edward VII to breach the alliance and wrest Austria from the embrace of Germany, Franz Joseph remained true to the treaty of 1879 and rejected the proposals of diplomacy.

Linking its fate with Germany, Austria-Hungary also entered the imperialist policy of the Western states of Europe with her, if not taking an active part in it, then as an ally of Germany, ready to support her on the path of a future armed conflict. Austria's relations with France and England were built, on the one hand, on the settlement of the Balkan question, and on the other, on the support of Germany in its world politics.

Since 1882, being in alliance with Italy, its former enemy, Austria-Hungary had more points of contact with it than with the rest of the Western European states. The wars of 1859 and

1866, as already noted above, did not allow the national unification of Italians, and a significant number of Italian speakers remained in Austria with a passionate desire to be with their fellow tribesmen. This is how the Italian irredenta was born. Already at the Berlin Congress in 1878, Italy sought to get Trient for the

cession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria, but Italian diplomacy had to put off the dream of this for many years, limiting itself to the hopes of acquiring Tunisia, supported by favorable assurances from England. However, Tunisia was already attracting a stronger France, which, moreover, secured the consent of the same England and Germany in this. The possessions of the "sick man", which has long been recognized by Türkiye; after the Berlin Congress were subject to further division and capture by the main states of Europe. In 1881, Tunisia was ceded to France, and "offended Italy found it necessary in its policy to rely on the Central European

states, joining the Triple Alliance in 1882, which at that time seemed to have no special claims, except for the Balkans, to African dominions of the sultan and thus no herds

to create special obstacles to the Roman government in its African adventures.

The aggravated relations between Italy and France fully corresponded to both the views of Bismarck and England, which saw in the resurgent Italy a good companion against the same France. The Italian irredenta, despite Italy's entry into the Tripartite Alliance in 1882, served as a great hindrance in the relations of the new allies - Austria and Italy. True, at that time the attention of Italian diplomacy was diverted by other goals - the policy of national unification was replaced by an imperialist policy - and the Italians had to not miss the division of Turkey's African possessions. In 1877, the Austrian Prime Minister Andrassy, while discussing with the Italian Prime

Minister Christie the causes of conflicts arising between these states, presented as one of them the aspirations of the Italian irredentists and remarked: "It is amazing how these people do not understand that they do not do it with the help of grammar. politics", i.e. that modern politics is in fact not at all determined by the desire for national unification, in other words, the point is not to use one grammar. Agreeing with this view, Christie, for his part, pointed out: "we were revolutionaries to create Italy, we became conservatives to preserve it." By the word "conservative" Christie meant a supporter of the imperialist policy, on the path of which Italy had already embarked, dreaming of conquering Tunisia.

Thus, for the time being, Italian irredentism lost its edge, the Italian government wanted to use Austria as its ally.

Until the end of the 1990s, Italy turned its front to France, and diplomatic conflicts constantly occurred in the relations of these states, even entailing a customs war. Since the beginning of the rapprochement between England and France, Italian policy also changed its course: relations between Italy and France began to improve again, ending with the Italo-French treaty secretly concluded in 1901, according to which France was given freedom of action in Morocco, and Italy in Tripoli.

Since that year, Italian policy has assumed an active character against Turkey, and after it against Austria, as interested in affairs in the Balkan Peninsula. The inevitable consequence of Italy's falling out of the Triple Alliance was the development of Italian irredentism and the western regions of Austria and the preparation of Italy for a possible armed clash with the Habsburg monarchy. Another focus of Italy's struggle with Austria-Hungary was the Balkans, and with them the

Adriatic Sea, the predominance of which was one of the important goals of Italian policy.

In the Balkans, the interests of Austria, Russia and Italy intersected, and as well as other European countries.

As you know, Austria and Russia have guarded each other in Balkan politics since the 18th century: each step forward of one caused a response movement of the other.

Under Nicholas I, the idea of dividing the inheritance of a "sick person," which Turkey then recognized, was more and more sharply honed, ending with the Crimean War.

By 1876, the Balkan issue had escalated again. It was noted above that since 1866, with its front turned to the Balkans, Austria henceforth considered its Balkan policy the most important in its external relations with neighboring states. From now on, the Austrian diplomats watched with jealous eyes every step of Russia on this peninsula. In 1875, the Slavic movement in the

Balkans broke out again, resulting in a series of uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Mohammedan landowners, led by Catholic priests, not without the support, of course, from Austria and even Germany. The Austrian government came before the "concert" of European states with a reform project. But the "concert" itself failed, and meanwhile the idea of dividing Turkey was sharpened again. In the summer of 1876, Alexander II went to Vienna for personal negotiations, which resulted in a written agreement on the formation of independent Slavic states in the Balkans; about compensation for Russia by Bessarabia and in M. Asia, and Austria was granted the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78 broke out, ending under the walls of Constantinople; Austria occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia went to Canossa - to Berlin for a congress led by the "honest broker" Bismarck.

Russia's military successes were downgraded in value, the Balkans were redrawn, and since 1879 Russian diplomacy, apart from England, has included Austria first of all in the list of enemies, and after it the "honest broker" with its state. But it was

not in the "offense" of the Russian Slavophiles and Russian tsarism that all the "evil" of the Berlin Congress of 1879 was

hidden. Created at the Berlin Congress in 1879, the Balkan balance was full of contradictions, like the modern Treaty of Versailles.

Divided into parts by artificial ethnographic borders), the Balkan peoples continued to strive for further national liberation and unification. The line of the national policy of an independent Bulgaria was naturally directed to Macedonia populated by Bulgarians, left by the Berlin Congress under the rule of Turkey. Serbia, with the exception of the Novobazar Sanjak, was not interested in Turkey; its natural and national interests lay entirely on the other side of the Austro-Hungarian border: in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Croatia, in Slovenia, in Dalmatia. The national aspirations of Romania were directed to the northwest and east: to Hungarian Transylvania and Russian Bessarabia. These aspirations, of course, pushed Greece, like Bulgaria, against Turkey. Such were the results of Bismarck's "honest brokerage", who had no intention of bringing calm to the Balkans. For him, on the contrary, an

unquenchable Balkan bonfire was needed, which, attracting both Russia and Austria to itself, would leave them a minimum of opportunities to interfere in Western European affairs. For Austria-Hungary itself, the formation of a strong Slavic state in the Balkans was undesirable, and if Viennese diplomacy agreed to the division

of Turkey, then only on the condition that small Slavic states were formed that could not disturb the peace on the banks of the Danube. The small states of the Slavs in the Balkans formed by the congress in Berlin were not terrible

strong Austria, and all the art of her policy was to: 1) not allow them to grow stronger, and 2) to include the closest of them into the Danubian Empire, using the old, tried by diplomatic intrigues, preaching among them the same idea of national unification, but only in reverse order.

This new program for Austrian diplomacy is inscribed in the hand of the same "wise" Bismarck. The example of "great" Germany should be taken up by Austria as well. The latter could leave the Serbian dynasty alone, not encroach on the formal state integrity of Serbia, but still include it in Austria-Hungary, as Prussia did with small states.

This path was so well mastered by Austrian diplomacy that, having embarked on it, it did not leave it until the World War, with the difference that its size expanded, and independent Romania and the same independent Poland were to become part of the future Danubian Empire.

So far, first of all, it was necessary to prevent Serbia from strengthening territorially, not to allow it to develop economically - by obtaining a harbor on the Adriatic coast. In a word, but it was necessary to create a Slavic "Piedmont" from Serbia, which would attract the Austrian Slavs. Internal policy dictated and indicated goals for external. In addition, the "golden dream" of the

Austrian imperialists was the plan to expand the Austrian territory to the Aegean Sea, turn Thessaloniki into an Austrian port and achieve complete dominance over the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. The danger of such expansion was great: it ran into resistance from Russia, Italy and the Balkan states. We had to wait, but for the time being Serbia should not have been allowed to take possession of the Novobazar Sanjak and the old Serbian lands in the Vardar valley.

Trying to swallow occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina through a military regime, stewing in the cauldron of its own internal battles of individual nationalities, Austria-Hungary in its Balkan policy sought to: 1) maintain the situation in the Balkans established in Berlin in 1879 and 2) win the sympathy of the newly formed Slavic states.

In these aspirations, the monarchy of Franz Josef first of all met with resistance from the Russian tsarism, which was defeated in 1879, but did not lose hope of again diplomatically seizing the Balkan states. The struggle for influence in these states by Russian and Austrian politics was carried out stubbornly until the beginning of the 20th century, and Russian diplomacy was defeated more than once. Caring Viennese diplomats in 1885, stopping the advances of the Bulgarians against the Serbs. expanded more and more influence in Serbia and Bulgaria, planting their "high-power" creatures. But at the same time, the

destruction of European Turkey was not in the nature of Austrian diplomacy, and the Danubian Empire assumed the role of the defender of the "sick man" from the blows that could follow from the nationally resurgent Balkan Slavic states. According to the Austrian Social-Democrat. Bauer, Austria became "the enemy of their freedom and their national unification, she acted as a counter-revolutionary force, as a patron of social and political reaction." In 1853, Marx wrote in an article on the Eastern question: "We have

seen how European politicians, in their deep-rooted stupidity, ossified routine and hereditary inertia, turn away with fright from any attempt to answer the question of what to do with European Turkey, a powerful impulse for Russia's striving for Constantinople is served precisely by what they want to keep it from it: an empty and completely impracticable theory of maintaining the status quo (old position). After the Berlin Congress, to keep the newly formed Slavic states by maintaining the status quo in the Balkans was the "hardened stupidity" of Austrian diplomacy, which was used by the diplomacy of Russian tsarism, which, by the way, did not leave dreams of Constantinople.

Acting "in the role of the strangler of the national revolution of the southern Slavs," Austria sowed wind and storm in the Balkans. The uprising that soon broke out in Macedonia in 1903 gave rise to the usual "drafts" of reforms put forward by the European states. Whether these "projects" would have ended in a world dump at the same time is hard to say now, because history has postponed its decision, throwing Russia into a Far Eastern adventure and opening up a wide field

activities in the Balkans for Austro-German diplomacy. Not infrequently, the Austrian imperialists, with sadness on their faces, say that with the resignation of Andrassy (1879), Austria actually did not pursue at all that independent foreign policy, befitting a "great" power. By the beginning of the 20th century, Austrian diplomacy returned to the path of an active foreign policy, not suspecting that this was the beginning of its end - the death of the entire Habsburg empire. It

was noted above that in its Balkan policy, Austria met with resistance from Italy, which also laid claim to the Turkish inheritance not only in Africa, but also in the Balkans.

Only a narrow strip of the Adriatic Sea separates the commercial ports of Italy from the western coast of the Balkans, representing a good route for the penetration of Italian goods into the Balkans through Durazzo and Valona. Having mastered the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea, Italy would turn it into an Italian "lake", blocking the road between Otranto and Valona for Austrian merchant ships, creating not only commercial, but also political competition in the Balkans. Thus, the objectives of

Austrian policy were the natural desire to prevent Italian expansion in the Balkans and above all in Albania. A fierce struggle between the two allies begins for this territory, but not with sword and fire, but with "peaceful" means. The Danubian monarchy releases a powerful tool into Albania - the Catholic Church, which seeks to seize not only the religious worldview of the newly converted Albanians to Catholicism, but the school and hospital business. Italy, in turn, opens schools for Mohammedan Albanians, large trading companies acquire land in harbors, build railways, organize navigation on Lake Scutaria, and open banks. The extent to which the Italians ousted the Austrians from Albania is shown by the percentage of participation in the Scutari trade of two Austrian shipping companies - "Austrian Lloyd" and "Ragusa" and one Italian "Apulia" (table No. 4).

Table No. 4

Года	«Австрийский Ллойд»	«Рагузское»	«Апулия»
1901	46	40	14
1903	45,8	27,7	26,5
1905	8,9	14,9	56,7

As you can see, the struggle in Albania was difficult for Austria and, apparently, the cross and prayer of the Austrian fathers had difficulty fighting the merchants of the Apennine Peninsula, and the Albanians turned out to be more "real" politicians than they thought in Vienna. We will not

object to the fact that our sketch of the state of Austria-Hungary at the beginning of the 20th century is pale and does not give a clear picture of the state of this state. Several volumes could be written about this, but this is not within the scope of our book, which pursues a different goal. We tried to succinctly outline the starting data on the Habsburg monarchy, which could serve to judge the subject we are touching on - we managed to do this, go no,

we can't say.

It was noted above that some Austrian diplomats sadly stated the fact that since the Berlin Congress the Danube Monarchy no longer pursued an active policy befitting a "great" power. We have to agree not with the sadness of these "old-fashioned"

diplomats, but with the fact that Austria could not pursue a new "imperialist" policy.

The main reason for this, first of all, was its internal state and the policy with which Austria tried to regulate life within the state. The centrifugal aspirations of individual nationalities, which over the years turned into a pronounced enmity between them, could not, of course, contribute to the prosperity of the Habsburg empire. With the growth of productive forces in the territories of individual nationalities, the enmity between them only grew stronger, and the example of their neighboring tribesmen, free from the oppression of the Habsburgs, who quickly walked along the path of economic development, directed their thoughts and thoughts even more abroad. There were few statesmen in Austria who, in a fit of seething national enmity, would admit that

the only way out for the temporary salvation of the state is broad autonomy for individual nationalities, the restructuring of the country on a federal basis. Of course, this was not a solution, but only a delay, a last resort from an imminent defeat.

If the ideas of trialism fit in the head of the heir of Franz Ferdinand, then they were alien to the representative of the supreme power - Franz Joseph, who stubbornly stood on the constitution of 1867, instead of broad reforms and recognition of national autonomy within the state as a historical fact, the Habsburg government chose to follow the path of counter-revolutionary, the old favorite way of absolutism disguised in constitutional forms. After the political death of the Empire, some of the survivors in Austria, such as Krauss, in his book "The Causes of Our Defeats", agree to the truth that "a strong and active policy (foreign; B.Sh.) can be carried out by the state, healthy inside. The strength and health of the state rest on its internal relationships. Only a state in which there is an internal order can pursue active political goals outside its borders. Words of wisdom... but after time!!

Austria was sick inside, economically lagging behind her allies - Italy and Germany, and future enemies - France and England, and the active policy of imperialism, furiously developed by these states, was beyond her capacity, no matter how much she dreamed about it Viennese diplomats.

By the force of things, the entire foreign policy of Austria, on the other hand, was concentrated in the place from which it was threatened with a mortal blow, this is in the Balkans. The bitter nature of the struggle against national autonomy within the country was transferred by the Austro-Hungarian diplomats and other people in power into politics in the Balkans. Here, in their view, Austria had to win or collapse into oblivion. These restless fields of the European peninsula concentrated all the efforts of Austria-Hungary. Thrown at them by the intrigues of Bismarck, the Danube Empire, headlong, with a fervent desire to be at least here a "great" power, was going to certain death. Dark and gloomy was her path.

"Where are you going, Austria?!" - so asked the warning voice even of some of her sons, like the Austrian ambassador in Constantinople, Pallavicini. But... no one listened to him anymore... The "Austrian imperialists", if you can call the second-rate imperialists of Europe that way, saw their active policy in the Balkans as a way of salvation. There was no other choice!

"The building of the monarchy, which he (Franz Ferdinand) wanted to support and strengthen, was so putrid," writes Chernin, "that it could not bear a solid restructuring, and if the war had not destroyed it from the outside, the revolution would probably have shaken from the inside - the patient was hardly able to endure the operation.

Once dividing in Berlin in 1879 the inheritance of the "sick man" - Turkey, Austria now itself turned out to be a "sick man" and, moreover, so hopeless that an operation within the state could not save it, and even more so such a serious operation as a war on outer front. The path of Austria-Hungary was destined. He led ... to nirvana!

Chapter II

Austro-Hungarian army and navy at the beginning of the 20th century

The Wallenstein camp is the basis of the Habsburg army. - Commander's fear of the Habsburgs. - Fundamentals of soldering of the Austro-Hungarian army. - Revolution of 1848 and the army. - The Constitution of 1867 and the division of the army. - Fundamentals of the organization of the army and its recruitment. - A question of language. - The appearance of the commanding staff. - Corps of reserve officers. - Management of the army. - Brief information about the organization of the army. - The total strength of the army. - Higher formations of the army. - Deployment of the army. - Increased army contingent. - Budget size of the army in 1905 - Wartime army in 1903 - States and combat training. – Armament and technical supply of the army. - Military budget. -

Austrian historians attribute the birth of the Austro-Hungarian army to the end of the 15th century, according to the main two features that survived until the time of its disappearance from the world scene, this army acquired in the Wallenstein camp.

Here, the military genius of Wallenstein created a type of "Caesar" army, which called itself that until its last days. In the dark days of the Thirty Years' War, in the camp of this commander, "his" army was formed and tempered in continuous battles, an army of professional soldiers, assembled from the "freemen" that flocked from different parts of Europe. On the basis of religious and political tolerance, but with the recognition of strong military discipline and complete submission to the will of their brilliant commander, the military system of Austria was created.

“Speech is free, obedience is blind” - this is the main slogan for Wallenstein’s army, which really “blindly” believed in its leader and was ready, on his orders, to go even against his “Caesar” from the House of Habsburg. Despite all his genius, Wallenstein turned out to be politically dangerous for the Habsburgs, and the hired dagger soon deprived the army of its inspiration.

The example of Wallenstein remained in the memory of the Habsburgs, who later, without taking command of the army, did not entrust it to outstanding military figures, without known restrictions on their rights. The famous *Gefährliche Rat* appeared on the scene, about whose gloomy activities and harm to the army one does not have to spread much, as about a military phenomenon known to everyone. Even commanders connected by blood with the Habsburgs, such as, for example, Archduke Karl, could not earn their trust and ended up failing their lives.

in honorable exile on their estates.

Some of our contemporaries, such as, for example, the former Minister of War and commander of the 4th Army, Auffenberg, see the reasons for the decline of the army itself in the absence of leadership qualities among the representatives of the House of Habsburg. Meanwhile, the supreme power did not pay due attention to the army, and all proposals for reforms put forward by the generals of this army) did not find a proper response in the state.

One can agree with this only to a certain extent, because the main reason was not the lack of military prowess among the representatives of the House of Habsburg, it was rooted in the very way of life of this professional army. The political and

religious tolerance that came out of the Wallenstein camp and the absence of any cohesive national force persisted for a long time in the “Caesar” army, creating its peculiar corporate way of life, which was remarkable for its amazing stability. The most diverse elements gathered under the banner of this army, and the only force that united them was the military life that existed in the army. Everything was mixed here: the language, and political beliefs (the monarchist got along next to the Republican), and religion, but one thing was common - it was a military career, professional work, barracks life. Here is the circle

which did not go out the aspirations of members of all ranks and levels of the "Caesar"

army. When Archduke Karl, being the sovereign arbiter of the fate of the Austrian army in the period 1806-1809, prevented Scharnhorst's reforms by trying to introduce the concept of the fatherland into his army and rely on the militia, the army surrendered and began to suffer one defeat after another. The return to the old way of life, which the smart commander quickly carried out, caused rejoicing in the army, gave it stability and even hints of victory over the army of Napoleon himself.

The revolution of 1848 dealt a heavy blow to the army, arousing in the peoples of the empire a desire for national unification. 21 battalions and 10 hussar regiments, manned by Hungarians, went over to the side of the revolutionaries. With the

assistance of Russian troops, the national Hungarian revolution was defeated, the revolutionaries were subjected to cruel reprisals by the Austrian reaction: in the city of Arad, 100 death sentences were passed on Hungarian officers, the rest were demoted, 1,750 people were sent to hard labor and 50,000 Hungarian Honvéds were poured into the Austrian regiments.

However, a gloomy reaction was preparing future defeats for itself, and in 1859 II 1866 the "Caesar" army again suffers military setbacks from armies fighting for those principles of nationality that were so cruelly persecuted in Austria, but which could no longer disappear from the life of the peoples of the country and even the army itself.

The revolution of 1848 brought something new to Wallenstein's army. The constitution of 1867 fixed the existence of a special Hungarian army - the Honved, the national army, although it was an integral part of the general system of the armed forces of the Habsburg Empire. The breach has been pierced. Along with the "Caesar" army, two quantities appear - the Austrian and Hungarian landwehrs. However strong were the principles of military unity taken from the Wallenstein camp, however, national unification, which had become a general question for Austria-Hungary, also entered the army. Slowly but surely, national autonomy seeped into the ranks of the armed forces of the Habsburg monarchy and did not meet with such persistence in the army itself as during the reforms of Archduke Karl.

We allowed a small excursion into the area of the history of the Austro-Hungarian army in order to better understand its appearance, with which it entered the 20th century. Below we will not, for obvious reasons, give an exhaustive "description of the armed forces" of Austria-Hungary, since this is not part of our tasks. Our presentation of the military system of the Austro-Hungarian Empire pursues only the aim of a general acquaintance with the army and its features. The military ground

forces of Austria-Hungary consisted of: 1) the general imperial army; 2) Austrian Landwehr; 3) Hungarian Landwehr or Honved; 4) Bosno-Herzegovina troops. These forces formed the first line, there was no second line, and, finally, the third line was formed by: 1) the Austrian Landsturm and 2) the Hungarian Landsturm. The army was recruited on the basis of

universal conscription
and the territorial system.

The total service life is 12 years, of which: under the banners 3 years, in the reserve 7 years, in the Landwehr under the banners 2 years and 10 years in the Landwehr reserve.

In addition, there was a special reserve for the general imperial army and landwehr: the duration of stay was 10 years for the active army and 2 years for the landwehr, the duration of stay in the reserve of the landwehr was 12 years for those directly credited to it.

All other citizens of military age who did not fall into the general imperial army or landwehr, as well as served time in these troops, aged 19 to 42, were required to be on the lists of the landshturm.

In the Bosno-Herzegovina troops, the service lasted only 12 years: 3 years under the banners and 9 years in the reserve, there was no special reserve and Landsturm.

The general imperial army was replenished from all districts of the state, and the landwehr (Austrian and Hungarian) and Bosno-Herzegovina troops from the recruiting districts of the corresponding half of the empire and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

To replenish the army, as indicated above, a territorial system was adopted, in which each part of the troops was recruited from the same area. Thanks to the adoption of this picking system, it was possible to achieve that many

individual parts of the army had their own specific national identity. So, out of a total of 102 infantry regiments, 35 were Slavic, 12 German, 12 Hungarian and 3 Romanian, the rest of the regiments were of mixed composition.

In such an army, of course, the question of language was acute. For the general imperial army and the Austrian Landwehr and Landsturm, the service and command language was German, in the Hungarian Landwehr (Honved) - Magyar, and finally, in the Croatian Landwehr, which was part of the Honved, the service and command language was Croat. With the intensified national struggle, the question of language was one of the points of contention. Dissatisfaction on the part of the nationalities, whose language was not recognized as official and command, grew every year; serving as a pretext for deepening the burning national enmity. With the recognized three privileged languages, of course, the statutory legislation also had to apply to them: the statutes and instructions were issued in these three languages. If tolerance was allowed in the Wallenstein camp in this regard, then the policy of the last Habsburgs turned out to be in sharp contradiction, based on the rights of the constitution of 1867, which established this trilingualism in the army. The supreme power and the majority of statesmen, both civilian and military, did not think of further evolution, lagging behind the progress of life.

The connecting link of this "patchwork" army was the command staff. In the all-imperial army and the Austrian landwehr, the non-commissioned officers were recruited mainly from Germans, which gave a certain adhesion to the army, 110, on the other hand, caused displeasure of other nationalities. In the Hungarian and Croatian Landwehr, non-commissioned officers were selected from the respective nationalities. The bearer of the

idea of the "Caesar" army was its regular officers, who preserved the traditions of Wallenstein's army at the turn of the 20th century. Collected in its overwhelming mass from different ends, nationalities and classes of the population, the cadre officers were the binding cement on which this entire military system, creaking at all seams, rested. The bearer of the idea of the Habsburg Monarchy, a regular officer of the army, in general, still remained closed in the circle of his purely military life, seeing all

purpose of his existence in a military career. As a traditional commissure of officers, the appeal to "you" was preserved, although often personal sympathies were far from this comradely and friendly colloquial custom. A closed careerist, the Austro-Hungarian officer was quite well trained in military affairs, was fond of it, but, by the evil fate of fate, he also carried the sins of his fathers, who had seen more defeats of the army than its victories. Tradition was a strong and at the same time a weak point of this corps of command personnel. On the one hand, it gave him a military spine, and on the other hand, it hindered his intellectual development. Today, Austrian historians compose

hymns of praise to the career officer of the "Caesar" army, seeing in him the source of all those victories that in the last world war ever overshadowed the banners of the Habsburg army. To some extent this is true, but ... this is an unfortunate "but", at the beginning of the 20th century in the corps of regular officers of the Austro-Hungarian army, however, there was no former adhesion of Wallenstein's army: national enmity penetrated into it, albeit slowly, and it was mainly careerism that seized him. For the army of such a state, in which the bureaucratic machine dominated the life of the country and in which envy, patronage and other attributes of the true bureaucracy of the old time, inherent in it, flourished, this bureaucratic situation could not pass without a trace. The "bearer of the idea of the Habsburg monarchy" in the army, its career officer, absorbed the same qualities that any civil servant had. A wide field for patronage, intrigue, "strife" was opened in the command staff of the Wallenstein army of the 20th century. All kinds of "swagger" found fertile ground in the officer corps of the Habsburg army. There was no need to talk about the advancement of capable people, Wallenstein's religious tolerance was forgotten, and often the appointment to the highest post depended on the religious beliefs of the candidate: with the dominance of clerics, the Protestant could not hope to achieve high places. The building was crumbling from the inside. As for its façade, the bearer of the idea of the Habsburg monarchy, its cadre command staff, experienced hatred not only from

the side of individual nationalities seeking to get rid of the oppression of the empire, but also from the army of officials and even the highest

the authorities of the country. Krauss, mentioned by us more than once, tells us that the officer corps, even the highest, did not enjoy attention and respect in the bureaucratic machine of the country. Young civilian officials, who were quickly promoted to high positions due to all sorts of tricks, often treated such persons as corps commanders. In a word, cut off from the masses of the population,

alien to the mass of soldiers, suffering from internal turmoil, the cement of the "Caesar" army - its regular officer corps, at the turn of the 20th century was not as strong as it was in bygone times and how they wanted to see it living out its the last days of the Habsburg monarchy.

Along with regular officers, another command staff grew every year - the corps of reserve officers, which the Wallenstein army did not know before, which contradicted its structure and which was a necessity for the army of our days. This commanding staff, emerging from the

bowels of the population and living in the interests of the masses, brought with it the national strife that was evident in various parts of the Habsburg monarchy. The reserve officers not only were not "bearers of the idea of the Habsburg monarchy", but turned out to be faithful guides to the army of the idea of national autonomy, an idea that grew deeper every year. Therefore, we are not surprised by the complaints that "old-fashioned" Austrian historians, which we hear from their lips, about the reserve officer corps. In Wallenstein's camp, this was too unusual a phenomenon, and the old tradition could not reconcile with it.

In fairness, it should be noted that the complaints of these historians are far from groundless - the reserve officer was far from an open battle with the Habsburg dynasty and, on the contrary, also dutifully laid down his life for interests that were not only alien, but even hostile to him. In the name of protecting bourgeois interests, the bourgeois sons, who made up the corps of reserve officers, meekly prepared for a world slaughter, and only in the process of it sided with the revolution.

The constitution of 1867, which created dualism in the Habsburg empire and dividing the army, decentralized also the administration in it.

The highest military power was in the hands of the emperor and the king of Austria-Hungary, but the executive was divided, in accordance with

by dividing the army into three parts and, in addition, as the body in charge of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the all-imperial minister of finance took part in the appointment of the contingent and the approval of the budget for the troops of these regions.

The All-Imperial Army with its reserve was directed by the All-Imperial Minister of War, the Austrian Landwehr by the Minister of National Defense of Austria, and the Hungarian Honvéd by the Minister of National Defense of Hungary.

Under the emperor, there was a military office, and then the same was formed under the heir, Franz Ferdinand. These military offices, not being independent institutions, prepared cases submitted for consideration by the highest military authority for the report. Below we will see what role the military offices played, but here we only note that these growths in an already complex system of government, in the unhealthy bureaucratic atmosphere that enveloped not only the army, but the entire building of the monarchy, were a painful phenomenon, even more so. complicating things. Finally, there was the highest inspection of the army with the functions of inspecting the

preparation of the army, carried out through three inspector generals, responsible only to the highest military

power.

The all-imperial minister of war, being a person responsible to the highest military authority and delegations, headed the military ministry, in which all control of the all-imperial army and navy was concentrated. The Ministry of War was divided into five departments, of

which four were in charge of the land army, and the fifth was in charge of the navy. Covering the management of the entire life of the army and navy, the War Ministry also had auxiliary bodies. These should include: 1) chief of the general staff; 2) inspectors for the types of troops, for the convoy, for repairs, for military educational institutions; 3) the head of the sanitary troops; 4) chief of the corps of military doctors; 5) field vicariate and chief military court.

The chief of the general staff of "all the armed forces", although he was directly subordinate to the supreme supreme authority, was at the same time an auxiliary body of the military

ministries in matters of defense, falling within the terms of reference of the General Staff. Here

we will not go into consideration of the position of the General Staff in the country and in the army - this will be done in its place. It can only be noted that the duality in the position of the General Staff could serve as a fertile ground for conflicts. Local military administration was carried out through a

system of 15 corps districts and the Zara military department (Dalmatia), into which the territory of the Habsburg monarchy was divided. Landwehr (Austrian Hungarian) was controlled through

special ministries of national defense, commanders-in-chief of these landwehrs, corps commanders of the all-imperial army and military headquarters of landwehr troops.

The dualistic system of the state, transferred to the management of the army, created a number of frictions in the military machine. The representatives of the interests of the army and navy were: the all-imperial army and navy - the minister of war and the commander of the naval forces, who spoke to the delegations; the ministers of the landwehr carried out their needs through the respective parliaments, and, finally, the budget for the Bosno-Herzegovina troops was with the general imperial finance minister.

If we take into account the national separatism of the two halves of the monarchy, each of which primarily took care of its landwehr, then the difficult situation in which the purely "Caesar" army found itself becomes understandable. Often the landwehr was better supplied than the general imperial army, for which both increase in numbers and appropriations were tight.

Bureaucracy, characteristic of the whole country and also infiltrating the army, flourished in it with decentralized military administration and contributed to an increase in paper spending, marking time, written and verbal tournaments of representatives of one or another institution as part of one military department.

We have no right to go into details of the organization of the armed forces of the Austro-Hungarian army, but we consider it necessary to recall the starting data for 1906. By this time:

The infantry numbered 102 infantry in the all-imperial army. regiment, 4 Tyrolean infantry. a regiment of 4 battalions and 26 jaeger battalions; 4

Bosno-Herzegovina regiments, 4 battalions each. 1 Bosno-Herzegovina Jaeger 6-p; 35 aust. landvern. regiments, of which 1 to 4, 34 to 3 battalions; 26 Hungarian. landvern. regiments, of which 10 to 4, 18 to 3 battalions; 1 self. landvern. company (Fiume).

Cavalry - in the general imperial army - 42 regiments of 6 squadrons; Austrian Landwehr - 6 regiments of 6 Esq. and a separate division of 3 squadrons; Hungarian landwehr - 10 regiments - 6 esq. and in wartime 30 esq.

Landsturm. Field artillery - 14 corps. art. regiments of 4 batr. from 8 or., 42 division, art. regiment of 4 batr. from 8 op., 8 con. divisions of 2 batr. of 6 weapons, 1 mountain division of 3 batr.

4 guns. Fortress artillery - 6 regiments of 3 battalions each, 3 det. battalion and 5 personnel for siege howitzer divisions.

Technical troops - 15 pioneer battalions of 5 companies in peacetime and 7 in wartime; 4 pontoon battalions (each has a bridge of 53 meters); 1 telegraph and railway regiment in 3 battalions in wartime forms 12 railway. mouth, branch of field zhel. roads and telephone department. Convoy troops - 15 convoy divisions. Sanitary troops - 27 sanitary departments in peacetime. Total strength: a) in peacetime -

382,000 people, 62,226

horses, 1,144 harnessed guns, 676 battalions, 352 squadrons, 224 riders, 16 cavalry, 14 mountain batteries, 72 fortresses, art. companies, 18 technical companies; b) in wartime - 676 battalions, 352 squadrons, 224

riders, 16 horse batteries, 30 mountain batteries, 18 fortress battalions, 5 sieges. howitzer divisions and 18 battalions of technical troops. In addition, 106 marching battalions for infantry and page regiments, 26 marching companies for chasseur battalions, 10 reserve batteries and 42 reserve squadrons.

Austrian and Hungarian Landsturm.

Рота	По мирному времени		По военному времени	
	Офицер.	Солдат.	Офицер.	Солдат.
Общеимперская армия:				
Нормальная	4	93	4	239
Усиленная	4	129	4	259
Австрийский Ландвер	3	54	4	259
Гонведы	4	51	4	259

staffing

Эскадрон	Мирного времени			Военного времени		
	Офиц.	Солд.	Лошад.	Офиц.	Солд.	Лошад.
Общеимперская армия	5	166	140	5	172	173
Австрийский Ландвер	5	73	67	5	172	173
Гонведы	4	65	33	5	172	173

Higher formations existed: 15 corps from 2 all-

imperial and 1 landwehr infantry divisions, 1 artillery support corps, 1 pioneer battalion, 1 artillery park, 1 telegraph department, 1 telephone. departments, 1 engineering park, 1 field hospital, 1 food column, 1 field bakery, 1 convoy park and 1 convoy squadron.

46 technical divisions in 2 brigades, from 12 to 15 battalions, 3 squadrons, 1 division. art. regiment, 1 art. park, 1 bathroom detachment, 1 telephone, patrol, 1 food column, 1 field bakery, 1 convoy squadron. Combat strength from 12 to 15,000 people, 450 horsemen, 32 guns. A mountain

division of 3-4 mountain brigades, 1-2 squadrons, 1-3 mountain batteries, a pioneer company and other auxiliary units. Combat strength 9,000–15,000 people, 150–300 horsemen, 20–28 guns.

5 cav. divisions of 2 brigades each, 1 cavalry artillery battalion, 1 sanitary detachment, 1 art park, 1 telegraph office, 1 food column, 1 convoy squadron - a total of 24 squadrons, 4 cavalry pioneer platoons and 2 cavalry batteries. Combat

composition 3.600 sabers, 12 guns. Each of the 88 infantry brigades consisted of 3-6 battalions. Each of the 12 horns. brigades was composed of 3-5 battalions of 1 horn. batteries. Each of the 18 cav. brigades of the all-imperial army was part of the 2 cavalry. regiment 12 esq., 2 con. pioneer platoon. 4 Honved kav. brigades 2 to 3 regiments and 2 to 2 regiments. 4 Landwehr Austrian Cavalry. brigades 1 in 2 regiments and 3 in 1 regiment and division. The deployment of the army (table No. 5).

Table No. 5

Армейский корпус	Пехотные дивизии				Кавалерия		
	Общеперские	Австрийский ландвер	Гонимые	Всего	Дивизий	Отдельных бригад	Всего
I корпус Краков	5 Ольмюц 12 Краков	46 Краков	-	3	Кав. див.	-	1 к. д.
II корпус Вена	4 Брюн 25 Вена 47 Вена	13 Вена	-	4	Кав. див.	-	1 к. д.
III корпус Грац	6 Грац 28 Лейбах	22 Грац	-	3	-	-	-
IV корпус Будапешт	31 Б. Пешт 32 Б. Пешт	-	40 Б. Пешт 41 Печ.	4	-	4 кав.бр. 2 ланд. к. бр. Б. Пешт 3 ланд. Печ.	3 кав. бриг.
V корпус Пресбург...	14 Пресбург 33 Коморн	-	37 Пресбург Нитра	3	-	16 кав.бр.	1 кав. бриг.
VI корпус Кашау	15 Мишкольц 27 Кашау	-	39 Кашау-Сатмар Немети	3	-	6 кав. бр.	1 кав. бриг.
VII корпус Темешвар	17 Гроссардейн 34 Темешвар	-	23 Сегедин	3	-	7 кав. бр. 1 ланд. бр. Сегедин 4 ланд. Дебречин	3 кав. бриг.
VIII корпус Прага	9 Прага 19 Пильзен	21 Прага	-	3	-	-	-
IX корпус Йозефштадт	10 Йозефштадт 29 Терезиенштадт	26 Лейтмериц	-	3	-	9 кав. бр.	1 кав. бриг.
X корпус Перемышль	2 Ярослав 24 Перемышль	46 Перемышль	-	3	Кав. див. Ярослав	-	1 див.
XI корпус Львов (Лемберг)	11 Львов 30 Львов	43 Львов	-	3	Кав. див. Львов Кав. див. Станиславов	-	2 див.
XII корпус Германштадт	16 Германштадт 36 Клаузенбург	-	38 Клаузенбург	3	-	12 кав. бриг.	1 кав. бриг.
XIII корпус Аграм	7 Эоер 36 Аграм	-	42 Аграм	3	-	8 кав. бриг. 13 кав. бриг.	2 кав. бриг.
XIV корпус Инсбрук	3 Линц 8 Боцен	44 Инсбрук	-	3	-	-	-
XV корпус Сараево	1 Сараево 18 Мостар	-	-	2	-	-	-
Округ Зара	4 и 5 горн. бр.	-	-	2 горн. бр.	-	-	-
Всего	31 и 2 горн. бр.	8	7	46 и 2 горн. бр.	5 кав. див.	12 кав. бриг.	5 кав. див. 12 отд. Кав. бр.

The modern development of million-strong armies required an increase in the annual peacetime contingent. However, such in Austria-Hungary went a slow way. The contingent was established for 10 years, and for its increase there was a stubborn parliamentary struggle, in which

all the distrust that had accumulated among the masses against the "Caesar" army had

an effect. For 1905, the contingent included: for the general imperial army 103,000 people (of which 2,800 people for the fleet), for the Austrian Landwehr

15,050 and for the Hungarian Landwehr 12,500 people. - Total 130.650 people or 0.28% of the population.

How was the strengthening of the annual contingent in Austria-Hungary shows table number 6.

Table No. 6

Года	Государства			
	Австро-Венгрия	Германия	Франция	Россия
1894	126.000	257.000	271.000	285.700
1904	130.000	259.000	257.000	336.000
1905	130.000	261.000	253.000	475.346

Thus, against its main adversary, Russia, Austria was certainly lagging behind in increasing its annual contingent.

To what extent the population was burdened with peacetime service, shows table number 7, taken for 1905.

Table number 7

Государства	Население	Ежегодный контингент	% от населения
Австро-Венгрия	47.000.000	130.650	0,28
Германия	60.000.000	261.000	0,40
Франция	39.000.000	253.000	0,64
Россия	145.000.000	475.000	0,32

Even Russia, with its rich population growth, Austria-Hungary was inferior in the severity of military service for the population, not to mention the rest of the central countries of Europe.

The budgetary strength of the peacetime army of the Danube Empire for 1905 is shown in Table No. 8.

Table No. 8

Части армии	Офицеров	Солдат	Лошадей
Общеимперских армий	21.900	300.000	62.000
Австрийский ландвер	3.400	33.000	3.200
Венгерский ландвер	2.800	28.000	3.600
Босно-герцеговинский	400	6.800	40
Всего	28.500	367.800	68.840
	Около 400.000 чел.		

In relation to the population and in comparison with other states for 1905, the budgetary size of the armies is shown in Table No. 9.

Table number 9

Государства	Население	Бюджетная числ. армии	%
Австро-Венгрия	47.000.000	400000	0,84
Германия	60.000.000	609.000	1,00
Франция	39.000.000	607.000	1,60
Россия	145.000.000	1.200.000	0,80
Италия	33.000.000	278.000	0,81

Lagging behind France and Germany in the development of the peacetime army, Austria-Hungary went toe-to-toe with Russia and Italy, but, given the absolute numerical superiority of the Russian army, it must be admitted that Austria's military tension was far from corresponding to its future role in an alliance with Germany. The wartime army for 1905 consisted of those liable for military service:

Части армии	Численность (тыс. человек)
Общеимперской армии	900.000
Австрийского ландвера	160.000
Венгерского ландвера	160.000
Резерва	500.000
Ландштурма	2.000.000
Всего	3.700.000

Of this number, only 1,200,000 people could be considered trained, while others had little or no training at all. The total stock of conscripts in the

Habsburg army was 8% of the total population, equal in this with Germany, but the latter actually had about 4 and 1/3 million trained against the 1,220,000 of the Austrian army.

That 10% tension of the population in wartime, which military theory established even before the World War, was not achieved by the Danube Monarchy, while its closest neighbors and probable opponents, like Italy, Serbia and Montenegro, exceeded the indicated figure. The foregoing about the size and

organization of the army speaks for the fact that, not using its entire conscript contingent, due to the small budget size in peacetime, the Danube Empire did not fully pay insurance for the future, leaving a large percentage of untrained military-billed citizens in the country, who in difficult days tests would have to be used as fighters, but fighters not prepared in advance. They could serve more as cannon fodder or a trophy for the enemy.

The horizon of the future monarchy was covered with military clouds, which grew thicker and thicker. It was no secret to anyone. To protect the existence of the country, a large army was required, and in peacetime, appropriate personnel were required for its deployment. Rejecting the system of "hidden personnel" and assuming that all wartime units were already available in peacetime, the country's top military administration, keeping within the budget, went to reduce the staffing of the units. For illustration, we have given the states of

the company and squadron, which clearly show that it was very difficult to conduct training in such states, taking into account the ordinary daily consumption of people, and parts of the main branches of the military lagged far behind the requirements of modern combat training.

But even these small states were under the threat of further cutbacks. With the beginning of the 20th century, military equipment began to develop rapidly, which, of course, could not be ignored by any European army. It was not necessary to lag behind in the technical improvement of the army, but

this required the formation of a cadre of military specialists, not to mention the replacement of the material part itself with a more advanced one. The accumulation of this personnel could go either by increasing the annual contingent, or by internal reorganization, i.e. at the expense of the existing states of the troops. The first path was resolutely rejected by the governments on the banks of the Danube, and the second, of course, fell upon the infantry and cavalry first of all. However, as has just been said, the latter were themselves reduced to the extreme, and further reorganization within them threatened to make them even worse trained and

prepared for battle. It must be remembered that each organization has its own specific framework for the expedient existence, and excessive reductions can lead to the destruction

of the organization itself. The adopted military system in Austria was not sufficiently provided for wartime by the presence of higher command staffs, which were to be called to life only during mobilization.

We have indicated only the main shortcomings of the organization and the small budgetary size of the Austro-Hungarian army in peacetime, but even from them it is clear that the body of the army required a reorganization in order to withstand the future shake-

up that awaited it. Not everything turned out to be successful in the armament and technical supply of the army. The next step was the question of re-equipping the infantry with the best model of the gun, which began to be introduced into the army, but, oddly enough at first glance, first in both landwehrs. If we remember that the latter were considered the armies of the "people", that they were the "property" of each of the halves of the country, then we will immediately find the answer to this fact. The all-imperial, "Caesar" army had to get crumbs, because it was "Caesar", and not "Austrian" and not "Hungarian".

The steel-bronze guns of the field and mountain artillery were also subject to replacement in order to keep up with the European armies, which were already far ahead in terms of introducing field rapid-fire and heavy field artillery. In this matter, one had to reckon only with the limitedness of cash holidays, since the heavy industry of the country could fulfill the orders of the army, if only there were funds for this and the government did not interfere in

the development of the military industry, as was the case with the Skoda plant in Hungary.

The heavy military industry in Austria-Hungary, as we noted already in the previous chapter, was in such a state that it could boldly satisfy not only the needs of its own army, but also sought to sell its products to foreign armies. However, the Ministry of War so far, instead of a mass order of a certain type, has limited itself to small orders, without embarking on the path of a broad rearmament of the army. The reason for this is clear - the lack of military budget funds, because they were also required to provide the army with equipment: telegraph, telephone, field railways, cars, aeronautics, bridge equipment, field kitchens, etc. All this was far from being in abundance in the army Danubian monarchy. Meanwhile, feverish armaments were going on all around Europe, new weapons systems were introduced

everywhere, new technical means appeared, but in Austria all this went on at a slow pace, with a delay - always characteristic of this country. In accordance with the distribution of the state budget into four independent budgets, the military budget was calculated in the same way (Table No. 10).

Table No. 10

Бюджет	1904 г.	1905 г.	В 1905 г. больше
	<i>В кронах. (Рубль = 2,5 кроны)</i>		
Военного министерства (общеевропейской армии и флота)	352.000.000	353.000.000	1.000.000
Босно-герцеговинских войск	7.500.000	7.500.000	—
Австрийского ландвера	63.600.000	64.700.000	1.000.000
Венгерского ландвера	41.800.000	42.600.000	800.000
Всего	464.900.000	467.800.000	2.900.000

From the state budget, the military budget for 1905, as can be seen from table No. 11, was:

Table No. 11

Разделение бюджетов	Общий бюджет	Военный бюджет	% военного бюджета от общего
	В кронах		
Общеимперский бюджет (сюда входит и бюджет босно-герцеговинских войск)	384.000.000	360.500.000	93
Бюджет Австрии	1.777.000.000	64.700.000	4
Бюджет Венгрии	1.259.000.000	42.600.000	3,4
Всего	3.420.000.000	467.800.000	13

Thus, Austria-Hungary spent 13% of its entire budget on military spending in 1905, while its ally Germany paid a military insurance premium of 18% of its entire budget.

Table No. 11 above shows the tension of both halves of Austria-Hungary in the development of their own Landwehr. Despite all the separatism of the Hungarians, it should be noted that they were far from willing to make military sacrifices to strengthen and improve their Honvéd, which in the future was to form the core of their independent army of the free Hungarian state.

Meanwhile, every year the cost of the armed forces grew in all states of Europe and, of course, Austria-Hungary could not be an exception in this. Without looking far back, we will trace the growth of these expenditures and the burden on the population over only a five-year period at the beginning of the 20th century. Table No. 12 (taken by us from the Military Encyclopedia, ed. Sytin, vol. VI, pp. 576-577) shows military spending in millions of German marks and population in millions of souls.

Table No. 12

Государства	1903 г.			1904 г.			1905 г.			1906 г.		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Австро-Венгрия	46,6	410	8,81	47	421	8,95	47,4	516	10,88	47,8	431	9,23
Германия	58,8	872	14,84	59,7	854	14,30	60,6	929	15,32	61,5	998	16,23
Италия	32,9	327	9,95	33,1	344	10,40	33,3	343	10,30	33,6	371	11,03
Россия	139,7	1004	7,19	141,5	1044	7,41	143,0	1069	7,47	144,5	1034	7,16
Франция	39,10	811	20,68	39,15	797	19,68	39,20	853	21,87	39,30	940	23,93

Thus, for the indicated five-year period, military spending, as shows table. No. 13, increased.

Table No. 13

Государства	Рост военных расходов в %	В среднем на 1 душу насел. в год марок.
Австро-Венгрия	9	9,31
Германии	3,5	15,13
Италия	18	10,06
Россия	6,7	7,33
Франция	2	21,45

Following Italy, Austria-Hungary, more than all the major states of Europe at the beginning of our century, increased its military spending, despite the fact that such a state as Russia was at that time leading a war. The increase

in the colossal military budgets of Germany and France proceeded at a slow pace, but the tension was already such that they placed a heavy burden on the population. In terms of the severity of the war tax, Italy followed these states, which, in turn, was overtaken by Austria-Hungary. Thus, in terms of the severity of military spending, the latter was in fourth place; however, if we take into account the ability to pay of the population of citizens of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and other Western European countries mentioned, then it must be admitted that the military tax of 9.31 marks per person was difficult for the Danubian Empire. Those 13% of the total budget that Austria-Hungary spent on military needs were not inferior to the 18% spent by Germany on the same needs. Therefore, any increase in military spending, and such, as we saw above, in Austria at the beginning of the 20th century proceeded at an accelerated pace, must have had a painful effect on the general economic condition of the country. Austria was approaching the limit of its solvency, the transition beyond which was possible only if there were external loans, or it promised complete bankruptcy. "Strength at the present time is the army and the navy," wrote Engels, and both cost "a hell of a lot of money," which Austria-Hungary did not have in excess, and therefore its "strength" turned out to be limited in its development. Above, a description of the commanding

staff of the army has already been given, which we will supplement here only in a few words with an outline of the appearance of the soldier mass.

The internal struggle that went on in the country between the individual nationalities, of course, found an echo in the broad sections of the army - in its soldier mass. With the formation of national schools, the contradictions in the population deepened even more, and, consequently, in that part of it that went to the army. The monarchy, as a state association, was still recognized by the masses, but before the first blows that were supposed to shake this shattered and rotten building. The consciousness of belonging to a single "Caesar" army was not so strong in all the soldiers as in the old days, and in its individual parts, centrifugal national forces developed more and more. Since 1867, the Hungarians, having won the right to their landwehr, have steadily gone along the path of deepening this idea. The Hungarian soldier fought primarily for the interests of Hungary, and then the Habsburg monarchy as such. By the beginning of the 20th century, the other nationalities of the country were imbued with the same aspirations. As combat material, the soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian army were as

colorful as its general composition. In general, the army had a well-trained command staff, however, with a bias

towards theoretical training than to the development of determination and will. The training of the rank and file suffered, owing to the weakness of peacetime cadres, as noted above. Many conscripts received very little or no military training.

Such a phenomenon was fraught with consequences in wartime, when a large stream of poorly trained reservists and landsturmists had to join the weak peacetime cadres. Not to mention the political mood of the army, all fighting qualities should have been at an insufficiently high level of their development. The former army of the Wallenstein camp faced severe trials.

So far, we have mentioned in passing the navy of the former the Habsburg monarchy.

Despite the fact that colonial maritime policy seemed to be alien to Austria-Hungary, however, the wave of Marinism that swept Europe at the turn of the 19th and early 20th centuries swept the Danubian Empire as well. Being a coastal state and facing rivalry in the Adriatic Sea in the face of the developing Italian fleet, which threatened not only maritime trade

Austria, but created a military danger to its shores, the monarchy considered itself compelled to develop naval military forces in order to keep up with Italy in this respect. Military happiness did not leave the Austrian fleet in its struggle with the Italian in 1859, and the government of the Danube Empire did not allow the thought of the impossibility of fighting its "blood" enemy in the future. It cannot be

overlooked that the imperialist tendencies of some of the statesmen of Austria-Hungary were pushing towards the path of maritime policy beyond the borders of the Adriatic Sea. In the first chapter it was already noted that the foreign policy of the government of Franz Joseph was by no means alien to the idea of mastering the harbors in the Aegean Sea and on the shores of Asia Minor. To implement these projects, a strong navy was needed.

Its development was also in the hands of the heavy industry of Austria-Hungary, which could receive large orders and profits from such a policy. Therefore, the maritime program for the development of the fleet was not only welcomed by the country's big bourgeoisie, but the latter even encouraged the government to do so, finding among it excellent support in the person of the heir of Franz Ferdinand, whose cherished dream was to have a strong navy.

The laurels of the German Wilhelm in naval construction obviously kept the penultimate Habsburg awake. By the way, such maritime desires of Austria-Hungary were in the interests of its ally - Germany. The rivalry at sea with England, intensified by the French, and perhaps the Italian fleet, which would allow the British to limit themselves to leaving small forces in the Mediterranean and concentrating the main forces against the German fleet, directed the thoughts of the German command to the need to develop the Austrian fleet. The strong fleet of Austria-Hungary, especially in conjunction with the Italian one, which was not excluded, could: 1) prevent the transportation of French troops from Africa; 2) to threaten the English colonies and the coast of France; 3) in the event of a war with Russia, with participation in the war and Turkey on the side of the Central Powers, appear in the Black Sea and threaten the Russian shores. All this would force the future Entente to divert both ground forces to protect its shores, and a large number

ships of the English fleet in the Mediterranean, promising victory for the German fleet in the North Sea. Here

is a brief summary of the military naval policy that was to be carried out by Austria-Hungary, as an ally of Germany, which also came into the hands of the heavy industry of the country.

But, as you know, the development of the navy requires, first of all, money, and there were just not very many of them in the Habsburgs' wallet: there was not enough to improve the land army, and not just to create sea giants, which was required by modern naval warfare. Finding funds for naval armaments, it was necessary: 1) either to increase the burden of the military tax on the population, 2) or to cut loans for the ground military forces. Below we will see which path was chosen, and now we will take a quick look at the navy of Austria-Hungary. Without going

into the historical development of the fleet, we bring its state to 1907 (Table No. 14).

Table No. 14

Наименование судов	Год постройки	Водо-измещение в тоннах	Скорость хода в мор. мил.	Вооружение.
Линейные корабли				
Эрцгерцог Фердинанд	1905	10,600	20,8	IV-24 см., XII-19 см., XII-7 см., VI-4,7 см.
Эрцгерцог Фридрих	1904		20,5	
Эрцгерцог Карл	1903		20,3	
Бабенберг	1902	8,300	20	III-24 см., XII-15 см., X-7 см., VIII-4,7 см.
Арпау	1901			
Габсбург	1900			
Вена	1895	5,600	17	IV-24 см., VI-15 см., XII-4,7 см., II-3,7 см.
Будапешт	1896			
Монарх	1895			
Всего 9 судов				
Броненосные крейсера.				
Св.Георг	1903	7,400	22	II-24 см., V-19 см., IX-7 см., VIII-4,7 см.
Имп. Карл VI	1898	6,300	20,8	V-24 см., VIII-15 см., XVI-4,7 см.
Имп.Мария-Терезия	1992	5,270	19,4	II-19 см., VIII-15 см., II-7 см., XIV-4,7см.
Всего 3 корабля				
Бронированные крейсера.				
Асперн	1899	2,350	20	VIII-12 см., VIII-4,7 см.
Чигетвар	1899			
Цента	1897			
Имп. Елизавета	1890	4,000	19	VIII-15 см., XVI-4,7 см.
Имп. Франц-Иосиф I	1889			
Всего 5 кораблей				

In addition, the fleet included 32 destroyers and other small warships. On the Danube there was a

special flotilla consisting of 6 monitors and 6 destroyer.

Compared with the ships of other powers, the navy of Austria-Hungary was distinguished by its low displacement, but exemplary construction, which was carried out in Trieste at a private shipyard.

The personnel of the fleet was very good, manned mainly by Dalmatians, natural sailors, healthy, strong and unpretentious people.

The command staff is well trained, but at their higher positions was quite advanced in age.

The main base of the navy was the harbor of Pola, on the southern tip of the Istrian peninsula. Strongholds for the fleet

were, in addition, Cattaro, Lissa, Zara, Spalato and others. The main commercial ports were Trieste and Fiume.

The Austro-Hungarian navy did not have its own naval minister and the head of the naval department was the head of the naval department of the military ministry. However, although the department was part of the War Ministry, the head of the naval department was in fact completely independent, having a direct report to Franz Joseph and being a speaker and respondent to the representative institutions of the state on budgetary issues. The relationship between the chief of the naval department and the chief of the general staff will be discussed below. This concludes our acquaintance with Wallenstein's army in the form in which it appeared at the beginning of the 20th century. We have sketched only all the general forms, which by no means claim to be complete, which is not our task. We believe that from what has been said, one can conclude that the instrument of war, which was in the hands of the government and diplomacy from

the banks of the Danube, to a large extent needed to be improved. to serve, in the figurative expression of Clausewitz, as a genuine "battle sword", and not as a "front skewer", with which it would be enough to go into a duel

dangerous.

Did the Austrian government and diplomacy realize that in their hands was precisely the "front skewer", which more than once in the 19th century surrendered in a bloody battle, forcing the Habsburg monarchy to endure both physical wounds and all other consequences of defeat?! We will see this in the next presentation. The formidable specter of a

global battle was already roaming the fields of Europe, military clouds were gathering more and more on the horizon, and the barometer was stubbornly moving towards a storm ... It was stuffy in Europe and it smelled of blood ...

Chapter III

General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army

***Founding of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. -
The defeat of 1866 and its consequences for the
General Staff. - Isolation of the General Staff since 1875
- "Organizational Resolutions of 1900" and the general
functions of the General Staff. - Bureaucratic relations
of the chief of the general staff. - Dual
subordination of the chief of the general staff. — Konrad
on the scope of his work. - Konrad on the close
relationship in the work of the chief of the
general staff with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. -
The essence of the work of the chief of
the general staff in strategic deployment. - The
structure of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff and
the functions of its units. - Staff strength of the Austro-
Hungarian General Staff. - The relationship of the
General Staff with army inspectors, military ministries and
the navy. - Army General Staff. - The total number
of the General Staff in 1905 and 1911. - Replenishment
of the General Staff. - "Stability" as Chief of the
General Staff. - A "normal" day for the chief of
the general staff. - The "gravity" of the work of the
chief of the general staff. — Type of Austrian General Staff
Officer. - "Close circle" around the chief of the general
staff. - Engels on the selection of the staff. - The nature
of the work of the German General Staff. - The
talkativeness of the Austrian officers of the
General Staff. - The prevailing role of the General Staff in
the preparation for war. - "Strategy of the state" and
"supergeneral headquarters". - Pros and cons in the
work of the Austrian General Staff. - Responsibility
and severity of the service of the General Staff.***

In the first two chapters, the appearances of both the state itself and its drinking system were outlined. From them it is clear with what friction the state machine of the dualistic Austria-Hungary had to work. With no less creak they revolved

wheels and military vehicles. The same dualism, equipped with bureaucracy, complicated the military command and control of the army and navy, putting obstacles in their development and improvement in military affairs.

Outlining the essence of the structure of the Austro-Hungarian army, we briefly touched on its "brain" - the General Staff, but now we set ourselves the task of delving into its study, since this is the main goal of our work.

Austrian historians attribute the emergence of the General Staff to the beginning of the 18th century, when the "Quartermaster General Staff" was established by a major military commander, Eugene of Savoy, as the body that directed military operations.

Actually the general staff consisted of: generals, retinue emperor and quartermaster general staff combined.

Further development of the quartermaster general staff led to the introduction of staff positions in the troops, to the formation of a cadet corps in Wiener Neustadt (1869), later renamed the Military Academy. Until the 70s of the 19th century, the general staff was small in composition, forming the 5th branch of the military ministry.

The defeats of 1866 provoked criticism of the structure and activities of the General Staff, which was recognized as one of the culprits of the military failures experienced by the state. Criticism was directed mainly not against the existence of the General Staff as a necessary body of command and control of the army, but only against its replenishment on special grounds and rapid promotion. As a counterbalance to the caste composition of the General Staff, a proposal was put forward to recruit it from the composition of combat officers, and then promote those in the General Staff in the service along with their combat peers. By the "Basic Decrees" of 1871, these questions were resolved in favor of the system. However, in 1875 the General Staff was again separated as a separate body, and to some extent it was given independence from the War Department. Further legislative provisions strengthened the isolation of the General Staff more and more. Since 1900, the General

Staff has extended its influence not only to the general imperial army and navy, as it has been until now, but also to both landwehrs.

In general, by the beginning of the 20th century, the Austro-Hungarian general staff received a definite and stable appearance, approaching closely to the German general staff, but having its own special features.

The general functions of the General Staff, as the brain of the army, are outlined in the "Organizational Resolutions" of 1900, which in this part read as follows:

"At the head of the general staff is a general who is given the title of chief of the general staff of all armed forces" and who is directly subordinate to the emperor. "The chief of the general staff is at the same time

an auxiliary body of the general imperial minister of war; as such sends his proposals to him; however, it has the right, on issues within the terms of reference of the General Staff, through the ministers of war to enter with a report to the emperor and make his proposals. "All operational work and preparatory work in case of war lie on it; he is obliged, in view of

this, to take part in all military-political questions, in drawing up the schedule of troops, mobilization, fortress defense, railway and other means of communication, as well as in all matters relating to the combat readiness of the army. especially in all organizational matters, weapons and equipment, in all matters of higher military legislation and instruction, and, finally, in the preparation of large maneuvers.

Thus, from the stated textual position, we must first of all note that the chief of the general staff had duties: 1) in military-political matters and 2) in purely military matters.

His participation in resolving military-political issues put the general staff in direct contact with the general imperial minister of foreign affairs. and on matters of domestic policy with the Minister-Presidents of both halves of the monarchy. As for the duties in the sphere of conduct of purely

military affairs, here the chief of the general staff had communication with the all-imperial

Minister of War, with two Ministers of War of the Landwehr, and finally with the Minister of Finance for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, in view of the nominal dependence of the fleet on the general imperial minister of war, the general staff had to have judgments on naval issues directly with the head of the 5th department of the (naval) military ministry and the commander of the naval forces.

We will not go into the details of all these complex bureaucratic connections of the chief of the general staff for the time being - we will do it below.

So, the first paragraph of the provision on the "chief of the general staff of all armed forces" speaks of his direct subordination to the highest authority in the empire. Such subordination gave the "brain of the army" exactly the meaning that would correspond to the correct functioning of this substance in the cranium of the military system. In other words, from the highest authority in the state, the general staff was supposed to receive both guidance for its work, and itself, in an initiative manner, enters it with reports and proposals that ensure the readiness of the state for war. With this understanding of the "direct" subordination of the highest authority in the monarchy, the General Staff became in the position of a state body of the 1st class, leaving the bowels of the military ministry, i.e. would turn into a "super-general staff" - so fashionable now in the west of Europe, and even finding many supporters with us. For now, we will not go into the analysis of the correctness of this theory, because we will return to it more than once, especially since the transformation of the General Staff into such an organ was not in the tradition of either the Habsburgs or the Wallenstein army itself, and even more so the Hungarian half of the state. The second paragraph of the provision immediately "placed" the General Staff in the place that, according to the concepts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as a whole, the General was appropriate for him. The "auxiliary body" of the all-imperial minister of war also turned out to be "directly" subordinate to the emperor, making his proposals, reports, etc. through him.

before which all three ministers of war acted as defenders of military interests, and given that in matters of landwehr, Bosno-Herzegovina and the navy, the general staff was also in essence an "auxiliary body", since all these issues were not within the competence of the all-imperial military minister, then the position of an assistant to all the above persons, in which the General Staff was placed, will be described with sufficient completeness.

From being "directly" subordinate to the supreme power of the state, the chief of the general staff turned into an "assistant" of several institutions, though with a wide range of duties, but also with the right for the "owners" to criticize and reject proposals coming to them from the general staff.

It can be said in advance that such an ambivalent position of the General Staff promised a number of conflicts, which actually existed and which we will acquaint ourselves with when considering the work of the General Staff. The chief of the general staff, Konrad, does

not otherwise consider his activities in peacetime as a "continuous battle" that he had to wage for several years, either defending or attacking the entire bureaucracy, which was not lacking in a dualistic state on the banks of the Danube. Victories, but also bitter defeats, fell to the lot of this highest representative of the general staff of the Wallenstein army. In moments of revelation, Franz Joseph frankly declared to his, on paper, "directly" subordinate, the chief of the general staff of "all armed forces," how many intrigues were waged against him from all sides. No wonder. Intrigues followed not only from "all the armed forces" of the empire, of which there were at least five, but also from the civil bureaucratic front, which did not exist.

numbers.

Above, in the third paragraph of the regulation on the chief of the general staff, we outlined the scope of the activities of the general staff, as it was established by law. In order to describe more clearly the very structure of the central apparatus of the general staff in the Austro-Hungarian army, we will allow ourselves to quote the personal views of

chief of the general staff for the circle of his work. Konrad defines them as follows:

"The most important work of the General Staff and the most responsible duty of the Chief of the General Staff in peacetime are the so-called specific military preparatory work." "Strictly speaking, the entire peaceful work of all armed forces must be preparatory work for war

and cannot be anything else. But still, it is divided into general preparatory activities, i.e. one that does not have in mind an exclusively definite war on this or that front, but sets as its goal the general development of the entire military organism, and the concrete one, which is aimed at preparing a completely definite war; this last activity constitutes concrete military preparatory work. "The main task of the general preparation for war is to create

a combat-ready, well-equipped, numerous and By possibilities
excellent army, while specific training should firmly determine which forces of the army - all or part of it - are put into action on a certain front, which predetermines the work that must be done for this. The latter should go as far as possible in order to achieve automatic work after issuing a brief telegraphic order for mobilization. "General training extends to an increase in combat forces, to their uniforms, supplies and weapons, to organization in general, to education and training, spirit and discipline, training of excellent officers and non-

commissioned officers, to the development of technology, all kinds of military means, especially manual weapons, tools and shells, sanitary facilities, wagon trains, food and other supplies, horse stock, staffing with people, horses and supplies of various kinds of supplies, for legal services for the army, for general mobilization preparatory measures, etc. The specific military preparations mainly consist in the fact that for every possible war it is firmly

it is established what forces are needed, how they should be specially supplied, where and how they are assembled (Anfmarsch).

Thus, according to the terminology adopted by us, general military training should form the military part of the plan as a whole, while specific military preparatory work corresponds to our concept of strategic deployment. This latter, according to Conrad, is the most important and most responsible part of the work of the General Staff, the influence of which, however, must be extended to general military training, i.e., in other words, to the entire military part of the war plan.

But if specific military preparatory work should be carried out directly by the general staff, then in the work according to the war plan, for the most part, other military command and control bodies had to be executors, and the general staff turned out to be only a "think tank" for them, giving impetus to life and work. these organs. Considering the external and internal

position of the state and its economic development, Conrad came to the conclusion that Austria-Hungary could not be ready for war in all cases, and therefore, in his words, "in no state is there a mutual connection between general, especially specific preparations for war, and foreign and domestic policy, was not as tangible as in Austria-Hungary.

"The chief of the general staff and the foreign minister," Konrad continues, "had to maintain close contact in their work. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had to be guided by the Chief of the General Staff on the size of the military forces, in accordance with which he should conduct foreign policy, and together with the Chief of the General Staff 110 times clearly establish for which specific fronts specific military preparatory work should be carried out. "The Minister of Foreign Affairs should make it a rule not to pursue a policy in

those directions that could promise an armed clash with a more powerful state or alliance of states. He must understand that military training is long term and cannot change quickly. This

demanded far-sightedness, clear and definite goals from the politician, and a true statesman had to follow this. Circumstances could develop in such a way, due to the position of the monarchy, that a new front was formed at a time when strategic deployment had actually already begun to be carried out on other fronts, or hostilities had already been opened, and these cases should also be provided for by specific preparation.

The strategic deployment works were as follows: "as soon as it became necessary to develop one or another specific front, the chief of the general staff personally issued a directive indicating the number of forces assigned to the front, their combat schedule (Orde de bataille), their area of concentration (Aufmarschen), the method of this concentration and the measures necessary to cover the concentration (Aliar), the appointment of personnel (Hoheren Personalien), and finally, all special special measures, especially those that were called for by supplies. In the future, these directives were worked out in detail.

At this point, we will stop our search for the details of the work of the General Staff and turn to the consideration of the structure of its central body. When the chief

of the general staff consisted: his deputy, the headquarters officer of the general staff for assignments and a personal adjutant. These persons formed a close circle around the Chief of the General Staff and, together with the Chief of the Operations Bureau, were the most aware of all the thoughts, assumptions, joys and sorrows of their chief. The latter shared everything with them, and the staff officer of the general staff was obliged to concisely record all those conversations and oral reports that the chief of staff conducted, even if in his absence. We do not know whether this envoy possessed the secrets of shorthand, but certainly in the archives of the chief of the general staff many documents accumulated, which now frighten some of the reviewers with their quantity. Perhaps this method of recording one's actions is both bureaucratic and designed to collect materials just in case, but that it has a certain positive basis behind it cannot be denied either. It is recommended that you write down the orders given by telephone,

why not record an important office conversation? Perhaps technology will come to the aid of future leaders, not only in the military, but also in all others, by placing at their disposal apparatuses that automatically record all conversations; while ours require special manipulations for this. The following were subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff: a) Directorate of the General Staff. b) Military Geographical Institute. c) military archive. d) Military Academy. e) Railway and Telegraph Regiment. The Directorate of the General Staff consisted of the following bureaus: 1. Administrative, in charge of the personnel of the entire General

Staff and the economic affairs of the Directorate with a common magazine section.

2. Operational issued by all operational work according to the war plan. drawing up various calculations on the directives of the chief of the general staff, together with the intelligence bureau and the bureau of military communications, on probable options for the concentration of the enemy, conducting work on drawing up a combat schedule, instructions for covering the concentration, and, finally, on the most important part of the war plan - strategic deployment. The same bureau was responsible for the development of all issues related to the engineering defense of the state, for which its composition was reinforced by specialists (artillerymen and engineers), who worked out special artillery and engineering issues, primarily projects for attacking long-term enemy fortifications, the reconnaissance of which was carried out by them together with intelligence bureau. Questions of organization were also one of the functions of the operational bureau, just as the development of charters and instructions on tactical and operational issues and the drafting of large maneuvers were within the terms of reference of this bureau. In addition, all correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

was conducted by the chief of the general staff through the operational bureau.

The outlined terms of reference of the operational bureau with sufficient clarity show all the responsibility and at the same time its completeness. It carried out the most important part of the work according to the war plan and, in accordance with this, outlined the grounds for the organization of troops and their combat training, because, of course, one cannot imagine for a minute the reverse order, when organizational questions and

the training of the troops depended on some other data, and not on the war plan, combined, of course, with the stage of economic development at which the country was located.

3. The reporting bureau was in charge of field trips, war games, various tests and business trips of general staff officers with special assignments.

4. The Military Geographic Bureau had as its task the compilation of military geographical descriptions of Austria-Hungary and neighboring countries.

5. The intelligence bureau carried out reconnaissance of foreign armies, assisting the operational bureau in its work on the war plan, and also having general supervision of the fight against enemy intelligence in its own country. 6. The

tasks of the Bureau of Railway Communications included the preparation of the railways for work on the war plan, including here and water transport. Participating together with the operational and intelligence bureau in developing possible options for transporting the enemy, monitoring the state and development of his network, the railway bureau, when working according to its own plan, considered the railway construction plan, gave opinions on it, entered with its projects to improve the network, taking into account the defense of the state, was in charge of preparing roads for mobilization, having their own apparatus in the person of line commandants, heads of military transportation in corps areas and management of maritime transportation in Trieste.

7. The Telegraph Bureau was in charge of the communications service. 8. The staging bureau, which had already arisen under Konrad, together with the operational bureau, developed all questions on the war plan related to the preparation of the staging area, the organization of supplies, the organization of management of the areas occupied by the enemy and their use in

types of supply. In these eight bureaus, constituting the Directorate of the General Staff, all the work on the war plan was concentrated in its ideological, main part. As for the details of the work, those were carried out in other numerous bodies of the War Ministry and the ministries of both landwehrs. The results of detailed study were included in the general work of the General Staff, supplementing and molding the war plan into one monolithic creation.

Table No. 15

Года	Генералы	Штаб-офицеры	Обер-офицеры	Причисленных	Прикомандированных	Чиновников	Служителей	Всего
1905**	2	17	32	1	28	2	8	90
1911**	2	26	36	3	50	6*	—	126

* 3 офицера инженерного штаба, без служителей число которых неизвестно

** Неучтены еще письмоводители

As noted above, in addition to the Directorate of the General Staff, the following were subordinate to its

chief: 1) the Military Geographic Institute, which carried out tasks for compiling and providing the army with the necessary maps. The Institute was divided into five departments: geodetic, surveying, cartographic, technical and administrative. At the head of the institute was a General of the General Staff. 2) The military

archive was in charge of the processing and storage of military historical material and was divided into 4 departments: military history, manuscripts, cartography and the library.

3) The military academy had the task of training officers for further service in the general staff. 4) The railway

and telegraph regiment, being a combat unit and serving as a cadre for the deployment of railway and signal troops, was subordinate to the chief of the general staff, as a combat commander.

We consider it necessary to bring the staffing of the Great General Staff of the Millionth Army in order to have a clear idea of the "brain" of the army. In this regard, it is absolutely necessary, on the one hand, not to load the staff with unnecessary ballast, and on the other hand, not to make the "brain" less efficient by cutting down on its individual centers in the number of employees.

Examining for this "Description of the Armed Forces of Austria-Hungary", editions of 190C and 1912 of the Russian General Staff, we establish that the Directorate of the General Staff, without the military geographical institute directly subordinate to the chief of staff, the military archive, the Military Academy and Zhel. dor. and the telegraph regiment, numbered, as indicated above - in table 15. Thus, over 6 years the

staff increased by 36 people, i.e., in other words, by more than 33%. This increase in staff is understandable.

1) in connection with the increase in the size of the army, 2) with the development of military equipment and 3) with the more complicated conditions of preparation for war. As you can see, the staff of 126 people can be considered not exaggerated. A large number of secondees attracts attention, but this is explained precisely by the desire to give experience in work, as well as to test those who graduated from the Military Academy who were preparing

for transfer to the general staff. Military agents (attaches) in foreign states have not yet been included in the indicated state, of which, according to the data of 1911, there were 11 staff officers and 2 chief officers and who, by the nature of their service, in fact, should be

considered part of the General Staff Directorate. As for the others, subordinate to the C institutions, their states, according to 1911, were as follows:

The military-geographical institute included in its composition: 1 general, 18 headquarters, 116 chief officers and 156 officials, of which the general staff was only the head of the institute. Military

archive: 1 general (head of the archive), 1 headquarters, 2 chief officers of the general staff (as part of the military history department) and 27 headquarters and chief officers.

The military academy in its state had a general staff of 15 people, the rest of the staff was not the general staff. As noted

above, the work on the war plan was not limited to one department of the general staff, but was distributed among numerous military command and control bodies with which the general staff had communication. These bodies include:

1) Army inspectors, future army commanders, who, on the instructions of the chief of the general staff, worked out a specific task within their army framework from the war plan on a particular front. Subordinate to the highest military authority, the army inspectors maintained contact with the chief of the general staff only in order to work out the indicated tasks, being otherwise completely independent of him. Here we are still sketching a general picture of the work of the General Staff,

and we will talk about the details below. 2) War Department. As is known from the situation, the General Staff was an auxiliary body of the all-imperial

war minister. We have already drawn attention to this duality in the situation, which, of course, was reflected in the work. The chief of the general staff with his apparatus was obliged to influence all aspects of the preparation for the war, and therefore, taking on the principal part of the emerging issues in the general preparation for the war, he raised a number of questions before the military ministry, demanding information, working out certain proposals and answers by them. The War Ministry did not always meet halfway between its "auxiliary" body, and personal misunderstandings between the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff immediately found a response in the relations between subordinate bodies. Konrad expresses regret more than once in his memoirs and even leads a conversation with the heads of departments of the War Ministry, the topic of which was that criticism of the proposals of the General Staff, which was conducted more than once within the walls of the departments of the War Ministry. The

General Staff had to work most closely with those departments of the War Ministry that were in charge of organization, mobilization and tactical training of the army. In view of the importance of the work of these departments, they were also headed by officers of the general staff. Here we must

note the division of work on organizational and mobilization issues between the two command and control bodies, because this was not the case in all armies, and even today the issue is not yet considered resolved.

It has already been pointed out more than once that in these matters only the fundamental part was included in the scope of work of the General Staff, while the very technique of work, detailing, belonged to the War Ministry. Both the organization of the army and its mobilization, in addition to its ideological side, require a lot of petty work, which should not load the "brain of the army". We don't think we need much evidence that requiring the brain to digest petty work only leads to overwork, and perhaps even paralysis. In particular, in organizational matters, the development of staffing, issues of barracks accommodation and other minor issues do not require especially qualified workers for study and can be performed by persons without higher special training, even officials, as was done in the German military.

ministry. The same can be said about military mobilization, which requires precise work according to once established patterns. A. Svechin in his "History of Military Art", discussing this issue, rightly writes: "Among the various "specialties" of the General Staff, a new one has appeared - mobilization. It must be remembered, however, that this extremely important administrative work is far from encompassing the art of war as a whole. In the illiterate Russian army of 1812, people who knew how to situation were held in high esteem, and Clausewitz was amazed how the Russians could appoint the commander-in-chief, Colonel Mukhin, who stood out from other officers as the best situationist, to the responsible post of quartermaster general. With the French, after 1870, mobilization issues were given such importance that the dominance of mobilizers in the general staff turned out. The translator of Clausewitz into French asked whether mobilization at the beginning of the 20th century was not the same threat to the art of war as the situation at the beginning of the 19th century, and whether it would not be the same mistake to oppose Schlieffen as a mobilizer, as it was to oppose Napoleon as a situationist.

Unfortunately, this question was not resolved in the first quarter of the 20th century, and in our work we had to face both oppositions. In this regard, the general staffs before the World War adhered to two points of view: the German, and after it the Austro-Hungarian general staffs, reserved only the general leadership of mobilization, transferring all the detailed work to the War Ministry; on the contrary, the French and Russian concentrated all mobilization questions in the hands of the general staff - both with the aim of increasing mobilization. "You'll burn yourself with milk, you'll blow on water too" - the French command came to such conclusions, transferring the mobilization, which was limping on all four legs after 1870, into the hands of the general staff. Well, the Russians, of course, could not lag behind their "masters". In fairness, we must note that the mobilization did

not get into the German General Staff largely because Roon, who prepared the successful mobilization of 1866 and 1870, was at the head of the War Ministry, and it would be difficult to wrest from the hands of the Minister of War, who proved victories on the battlefields the results of their work, to the Chief of the General Staff

mobilization in general. To the credit of Moltke, and then of his followers, it must be attributed that they did not even attempt to do this, but wisely left mobilization in the bowels of the War Ministry. The German general staff was followed by the general staff of Austria-Hungary - the defeat of 1866 did not force it to turn onto the wrong road, which happened to the French and which they have not abandoned to this day.

3) The Ministries of National Defense of both Landwehrs also had communication with the General Staff on the organization, mobilization and quartering of the Landwehr troops. 4) The navy,

as noted above, was de facto independent, although it was part of the all-imperial military ministry. In view of this, the designation of the chief of the general staff, as such, for "all armed forces" was limited to minor contact with the activities of the navy. Konrad notes in his memoirs that contact with the fleet was only in resolving issues of coastal defense, since they were budgeted for the land army and carried out with the assistance of coastal artillery, which was part of the army. In addition, communication with the fleet was maintained in the development of joint maneuvers for ground forces and naval forces. On the contrary, as we shall see below, the general staff had to find itself in opposition to the development of the navy to the

detriment of the interests of the army. 5) Finally, in view of the fact that war by its nature is an act of social relations, the continuous connection of the General Staff in its activities with the Minister of Foreign Affairs is understandable without further explanation, and then the need for careful orientation in matters of domestic policy and the economic life of the country. So far, only the activities of the General Staff Directorate in terms of the war plan have been spoken of, and nothing has been said about the military general staff. It was noted above that: 1) the general headquarters was a special corps and 2) that along with the general headquarters in Vienna there was also a military general headquarters, i.e. officers of the general staff who are with the troops: in the headquarters of corps, divisions, brigades and other military and local military institutions.

The military general staff was born already under Archduke Karl and was subsequently established not only in the general imperial army, but also in both landwehrs. It is not our task to dwell in detail on the functions and work of the military general staff, therefore we will confine ourselves here only to a general calculation of the entire corps of the general staff, which counted (table 16):

Table No. 16

Годы	Генералов	Штаб- офицеров	Обер-офицеров	Причисленных	Прикомандированных	Всего
1905	5	186	213	217	32	653
1911	6	170	116	155	32-?	529

Thus, over the six years, the general staff, assuming that the number of secondees did not increase, was reduced. The replenishment of the general staff

was carried out: 1) by graduating from the Military Academy and 2) from special corps schools. We will not deal here in

detail with both the leadership of the chief of the general staff of military educational institutions that replenish the general staff, and the passage of service in the general staff, because we will do this in the appropriate chapters. Conrad's opinion has

already been cited above that his activity was nothing but a continuous battle, since the situation was too difficult for a leader who laid forward movement at the basis of his work. Our further narrative of the activities of the Austrian General Staff will show how much the General Staff itself was the instigator in daily skirmishes, and also to what extent it had to be forced to accept these battles. Despite this line of work, however, the position of Chief of the Austrian General Staff was quite stable

and since the establishment of this post only two persons have occupied it; Konrad's predecessor, Beck, served as chief of the general staff for 25 years. It is difficult to say what contributed to the development of such a rare "change" of chiefs of general staffs: on the one hand, this can be seen as the personal influence of Franz

Joseph, a conservative man in his views, habits and attitudes towards

people, on the other hand, it may be that the imitation of their German allies played a certain role. In any case, this irremovability should be noted as a positive factor in the work of the General Staff. The Austrian chiefs of staff were much happier than their Russian or even French counterparts, who stayed in their places for so long that, without having time to familiarize themselves with the case, they quickly went into "abshid" (resignation), speaking the language of the Petrine era. That there was little benefit from such a leapfrog, this, of course, is better known to the reader of these lines

than we are. The outlined circle of activity of the chief of the general staff was so extensive that it required him to work hard not only in the office, but also in the field, which will be seen from our further narration. Here we will focus on the little things: how the normal day of the Chief of the Austrian General Staff flowed. In his memoirs, Konrad describes him this way: "In the morning (morning abroad is generally considered from 7-8 o'clock in the morning; B. Sh.) I rode my horse, then went to headquarters. Until 11 o'clock in the morning there was a reception of visitors and officials of other institutions and departments who were on official business. After 11 o'clock only the reports of the chiefs of the bureau of the general staff began. Of these, the chief of the operational bureau was the last to report, since the issues of his terms of reference required a very long time to be resolved. We do not know when Konrad ended his day, but judging

by his activities in general, such ended very late. To this normal distribution of time, one must add the reports of the Chief of the General Staff to Franz Josef, which occurred at least 2 times a month, and in busy times were almost daily, ignoring, of course, over time. The same reports to the heir Franz Ferdinand. Personal contact with the Minister of Foreign Affairs was also very frequent, sometimes more than once a day. Various missions for field trips, maneuvers, personal reconnaissance, trips to shooting ranges where new guns were tested, etc., etc.

The day was filled in excess, it was not enough even for a serious study of some issues. Krauss, in his book *The Reasons for Our Defeats*, cites his conversation with Conrad regarding

removal of greater attention to work on the stage service and the preparation of officers of the general staff for it. To Krauss' proposal to introduce military games specifically with the development of rear issues, which, according to Krauss, was the duty of the general staff, his chief replied: "I have no time for this." At Krauss's instruction that Konrad, as chief of the general staff, should find time for this, Konrad repeated again: "I don't have time." Konrad did not have time for such an important branch of the service of the general staff in modern warfare. We will not deny

that the bureaucratic regime, firmly nesting in Austria-Hungary, took up a lot of useful time, and the intrigues directed from all sides, which had to be fended off by stocking up with all kinds of documents, did not remain without consequences.

In a word, we have before us an old picture of working conditions, well known from any recollections of a former high-ranking person, not only in Austria-Hungary, but also in other bourgeois countries. A certain amount of energy and time was spent not only unproductively, but also to the detriment of the cause, introducing unevenness in relations with others, nervousness in work, creating excessive friction in the already creaking machine of the military administration of the Habsburg monarchy.

How the Chief of the General Staff assessed the severity of his service, let's listen best to Konrad himself. Dismissed from the post of chief of the general staff in December 1911 after five years in it for disagreements with Foreign Minister Erenthal and appointed army inspector, Konrad says: "I was glad that, leaving such an unattractive position of chief of the general staff, I could again return to the troops. Of course, I will not hide the fact that I was also happy with my personal freedom. From now on, I could distribute my official activities as I wished, I could make business trips of my choice, I was able, regardless of time, to ride my horse, I could also devote time to my mother, children, friends and acquaintances. "It was a respite after five years!" exclaims the Chief of the Austrian General Staff.

Exactly one year later, re-appointed to the post of chief of the general staff, Conrad, given the difficult situation in which Austria-Hungary found itself, was not happy with his appointment. Having received the order to do this, Conrad reveals to us that "Again, fate, with its weight, invaded my life!" "Reluctantly, I parted from my regular circle of activities," Konrad concludes, describing his transfer to a new, or rather, old position on the general staff. Perhaps some will say that this is nothing more than a

manifestation of cowardice on the part of Conrad, but after meeting this person, which we consider obliged to do in the next chapter, one can hardly accuse this person of weakness of spirit. We consider what Conrad said to be precisely his honest assessment of the position of chief of the general staff in the Habsburg monarchy, which, for a firm, independent in views, and enterprising person, was by no means strewn with roses.

And not only the Chief of the Austrian General Staff had such a road, full of labor and work. We are afraid to expand the scope of our book and get carried away by describing the work of the chiefs of staff of other states, but we think it will be allowed to point at least to Germany, where the chief of the general staff, more than anywhere else, reserved from all sorts of intrigues - and one like Schlieffen, who sat on a horse from 6 o'clock in the morning, then worked continuously throughout the day, after only 2 hours

at night he extinguished the lamp, retreating to the region of Morpheus. Even such a cheerful and philanthropic chief of the general staff as Sukhomlinov, who is known to everyone, speaks in his memoirs about the hard work in the position of chief of the general staff. True, this Sisyphean work still had less influence on Slavic and Romanesque natures, due to their greater ease in relation to the matter, but for that it happened and was fraught with consequences.

Maybe we should not have prevented events and talked like that about the "normal" work of the chief of the general staff, but state it as a conclusion from everything written below, since you can prematurely scare the reader, an example of which is V. Novitsky, who doubted the usefulness work because of only one fourth volume of Conrad's memoirs. We do not apply if

afraid to plunge into the details of the work of the chief of the general staff with us, will close this book. But anyone who wants to get acquainted with it or even dreams of being the chief of the general staff in the future, and dreaming, of course, is not forbidden to anyone, should know in advance about the thorny path that is inscribed for this position. If fate promises him to embark on this road, then let him not deceive himself with worldly joys, but, with the consciousness of tremendous responsibility, heap a heavy burden on his

shoulders. Let us now take a quick look at the work of the Great General Staff in Vienna. Unfortunately, the witnesses whose testimonies we could use in this, except for the narrations of Conrad himself, are few and short in their conclusions. We rely on the evidence of Krauss, whom we have mentioned more than once, and the German representatives at the headquarters of the Austro-Hungarian army Cramon (his book is "Our Austro-Hungarian Ally") and Freytag von Loringofen (his work is "Circumstances and people, as they seemed to me") .

Without going into a detailed description of the Austro-Hungarian general staff in general, we must nevertheless note its main features. Above was given the appearance of an officer of the former army of Wallenstein at the turn of the 20th century, which was also characteristic, of course, of representatives of its general staff. The latter were the same "carriers" of the idea of the Habsburg monarchy, the same officers of Wallenstein's army, whose interests were mainly concentrated within this army. Careerism, characteristic of

the commanding staff of the Austrian army in general, in the presence of a special caste consciousness of belonging to the general staff, created in the latter a pronounced type, infected in excess with swagger. Representatives of the general staff of the army of the Danube Empire were distinguished by the usual "gaiety" characteristic of the inhabitants of this state in general. But it must be admitted that, despite this, they were theoretically well prepared in military affairs. Much attention was paid to the theory, which was a fundamental mistake, since willpower and responsibility in decision-making were not developed. "The Austrian General Staff has always suffered from exaggerated theorizing, while front-line service was alien to it, and any desire for

independent work was often suppressed by orders from above, "Ludendorff writes in his Memoirs.

As a result of such training, the general staff broke away from the troops, did not know them, not to mention public life. The latter was regarded by the majority as the "brain of the army", as a source of pleasure, of which there were so many in cheerful

Vienna. In the following chapters, we will personally introduce some of the representatives of the General Staff, but here we consider ourselves obliged to note, according to Kramon, that the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian army was distinguished by its efficiency, tirelessness in it, over many years of joint work in the management of the General Staff, it rallied into a close circle. This was especially noticeable in the operational bureau. Such a statement of Cramon does not seem to fit with what was said about careerism, but from the following lines the causes and

consequences will be clear. Krauss, speaking of the development of patronage in the social life of Austria, points out that the army was not free from this either. Around such high-profile persons as the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff, special groups were formed, caring exclusively about their well-

being. Outstanding personalities, of course, were not only far from such groups, but deliberately kept in the shadows on the part of the latter, were removed by them so as not to harm mediocre individuals in high positions. Krauss especially notes this disease of the General Staff, where it acquired the character of an infection. It should be noted that

Krauss, as a former candidate for the post of chief of the general staff, can be biased in his judgments, but Konrad himself does not hide the fact that there was a close circle of people around him with whom he shared everything. Considering that the former Chief of the Austrian General Staff was not known for his ability to recognize people, we will not be far from Krauss's conclusions. Of course, this is not the place to dwell on the dangers of staffs selected on the basis of "family" or "friend" and other signs. Speaking about the fact that during the Crimean campaign the British "do not have a properly organized headquarters corps: each general forms his own headquarters from his relatives and adherents from regimental officers, regardless of special

knowledge," Engels came to the absolutely indisputable conclusion that "such a headquarters is worse than the absence of any headquarters."

So, there is no doubt that the administration of the General Staff in Vienna, in other words, the Great General Staff, was replenished on the basis of patronage. True, a similar institution in St. Petersburg, and in other capitals of Europe, suffered from this. Vienna was not a trendsetter in this.

We do not know the normal distribution of the day for an ordinary employee of the Austrian Great General Staff. There is no doubt that a lot of work was done at the headquarters, if not in terms of usefulness, then in terms of the expenditure of effort and time. We vouch for this, given the bureaucratic regime that was generally characteristic of the Habsburg monarchy. From the outside it is difficult to judge the work of the Great General Staff, but Konrad testifies to it as significant and difficult.

In order to give an idea of this work, we take the liberty of introducing it to the German Great General Staff.

Kuhl, in his work "The German General Staff," says this about her: "By the very nature of its activity, the Great General Staff in peacetime was not particularly visible. Wide circles knew about his work only from imperial maneuvers or from publications of the military history department, which interpreted the experience of the war and what could be useful to the troops. Nevertheless, what matured in the silence of this work of the Great General Staff was of tremendous importance for the war. Then listing in detail the work of the general staff according to the war plan and others similar to those indicated above for the Austrian general staff, Kuhl continues: . in the afternoon, that this was the end of their service. In fact, it began only at home, where thick folders arrived, delivered to apartments in the afternoon. "The officers of the General Staff were completely absorbed in their work and they had no time for anything else. Recreation, along with short vacations, was only field trips and maneuvers in the summer.

We do not at all want to say that for an officer of the Austrian General Staff life went the same way and that he "had no time for anything else." He worked, and worked a lot, but due to his characteristic "gaiety" he did not avoid the pleasure of sitting

in the famous Viennese cafes for long hours after the service, reading newspapers, and then talking about official business, up to discussing war plans, which were so secretly developed. These plans were taken out of the cafe to the street, and, for example, Krauss was acquainted with the plan of war against Serbia by one officer he knew when they met on the street, who, in turn, heard him during the discussion in the cafe. It is superfluous, of course, to talk about the inadmissibility of such conversations in places that are completely not intended for this. Restraint in conversations and silence should be characteristic of representatives of the General Staff more than anyone else. Moltke Sr. set a good example in this, deserving even the epithet "silent". These qualities were not characteristic of most representatives of the general staff from the banks of the Danube.

In this chapter, we have only taken a general look at the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, and therefore we will refrain from drawing any definite conclusions for the time being. We believe that those will be more conspicuous when we manage to present in more detail the work of this "brain of the army". Below we set only the

starting points for our research. It cannot be recognized as a healthy phenomenon that there are institutions in a state that do not correspond to the stage of development of the productive forces at which this state is at a given time. However, this phenomenon must be taken into account in reality. Quite often in bourgeois states, such as Austria-Hungary, such institutions continue to live, being a "living corpse." The process of decay, although slowly but surely, is moving forward, and for the death of such an institution, either time or some violence is needed, which would put an end to this living dead. There were a considerable number of the latter in the Habsburg monarchy, and she herself was nothing but a living dead on the map of Europe. Every year this view of it was

assimilated more and more not only in revolutionary circles, but also among bourgeois politicians in other European countries and even in Austria itself. On the one hand, the flourishing of bureaucracy, and on the other hand, the centrifugal forces of individual nationalities of this state put their stamp on the entire political system of Austria-Hungary, on this

machine of government both the whole country, and, in particular, armed

forces.

Thus, the Great General Staff in Vienna had to be a model of one of the dying institutions of the monarchy. There is no doubt that he was. His way of life and work could not go far from the general condition of other state institutions, and if, as we will see below, the general staff tried to rise to the top, tried to fight, fight, then often all its blows, according to the chief of the general staff himself, were nothing more than air strikes.

We saw that nominally it was subordinate to the highest state and military authority, but in reality it turned out to be an auxiliary body of "all armed forces."

As an auxiliary body, the General Staff was not responsible to representative institutions, and even within the government itself, the Chief of the General Staff found himself only in the role of consultant. Meanwhile, preparations for war lay on him, as the

position indicated, and it was considered possible, with such a position of the General Staff, to leave this first and most important of his duties on him. Yes, and the General Staff itself found this quite normal, because such views on their duties existed in almost all the General Staffs of Europe and were not inherent only in one of its representatives from the banks of the Danube.

It is well known from the history of the General Staff that the General Staff, even in Germany, did not immediately win leadership in preparing for war, but waged a rather active struggle with the War Ministry and even with the Chancellor. Bismarck, of course, knowingly attached the label of "demigods" to representatives of the German General Staff, headed by Moltke. The General Staff went uphill and got a taste for this journey. Whether or not such an ascension of the General Staff was correct is another question. The imperialist war was the culminating point in the striving for the seizure of power by the general staff not only in the military department, but even in state life.

The "demigods", however, remained "demigods", not turning into true gods and living up to the time when their overthrow began. Today we know that the preparation for war and the war itself is primarily the business of the state itself, and not only its appendage, the General Staff. "New strategies" entered the arena of literature and even life - "the strategy of the state" and others with complex names from quite ancient times.

In general, we recognize one strategy, because if we embark on its classification, then we can reach such absurdities, to such scholasticism, which, in the words of Clausewitz, "will be mocked
sensible outstanding military."

After the global upheaval, it became clear even to the "demigods" that the whole state as a whole was waging war, that it should prepare for war in its entirety, etc. In a word, they reached the truth, which was good. known in hoary antiquity.

Nowadays, according to the definition of A. Svechin, "strategy is the art of combining preparation for war and grouping operations to achieve the goal put forward by war for the armed forces. The strategy solves the issues. associated with the use of both the armed forces and all the resources of the country to achieve the ultimate military goal.

Hence the logical conclusion is that the preparations for war should go out of the hands of the General Staff and be transferred to higher institutions in the country. Theoretically, this is recognized by the introduction of a new term - the strategy of the state. But in practice, the General Staff does not want to let the "strategy", even the "state", out of its hands.

War as such is once again seen primarily as its military side - hence the name of the "new strategy" - "strategy of the state". Well, once a strategy has appeared on the scene, then the holy calendar is in the hands of the general

staff. Without speaking clearly and openly about this, the general staff delivered a sermon on the need to create a "super-general staff" in the form of various commissions of studies, etc. The "demigods" lost their positions, but not completely. Hiding behind the entry into these institutions of representatives of other departments and even heading them with the highest state power, the "demigods" left behind the technical and operational part of the work of these newly created institutions, i.e., in other words, called the "super-general headquarters" to life, providing to the general staff the position of an assistant.

We are afraid that we have been carried away by the story of the prestige of the modern general staff, and therefore, having promised to return to this issue once again, we will end with the following conclusion: who "on a holiday" should fit all concepts of war into the framework of the concept of strategy, elevating strategy to the highest rank - the strategies of the state or the emperor - let him do it, but to transfer the preparation and conduct of the war into the hands of at least one "super-general headquarters", deliberately created for this, is unacceptable, even for the cheerful mood of the "holiday". War is one of the types of social relations and must remain so, being the business of the entire state as a whole, the work

his entire state body, and not just the qualified representatives of his armed forces. We considered it necessary to express our

definite view on this question in order to understand more clearly in the future the role of the General Staff in preparation for war. They have the right to demand from us an explanation of how the work of the entire

state mechanism for preparing for war will be linked. True, we have not given an answer to this question, but we ask you to allow us to express it below in the analysis of specific cases. Now back to Vienna. Here, the Big General Staff was not called by the official position, nor by the state and military management

structure itself, to the duties of a modern super-general staff. It was supposed to be an auxiliary body of the Ministry of War in the defense of the country and included in the work of other departments to the extent that military activities required. The Chief of the General Staff is a military consultant to the government and a specialist in the preparation of the operational part of the war. It should be noted that in wartime the chief of the general staff was transferred to the post of chief of staff of the headquarters, and was not in peacetime a hidden commander in chief. So it was legally, but de facto in peacetime the chief of the general staff did all the work to prepare

for the war for the future commander in chief, representing his interests. Therefore, if we consider the terms of reference of the general staff from a theoretical point of view, then we need to approach it in the scope of the duties of the main command or, speaking in modern terms, pursuing the strategy of the main command and that part of the strategy of the state that should be attributed to the activities

main command.

To some extent, the "direct subordination" of the chief of the general staff to the highest state authority gave the latter the opportunity to represent the interests of the main command, but his dual position in the military command and control system was also a source of conflict on this basis. We think that in a functional examination of the activities of the General Staff, we will understand more clearly the significance and role of the General Staff in the modern structure of military command and control.

the life of the country, and therefore, above, we ask for permission to postpone the final judgment on the highest governing bodies of

preparation for war. We have developed in this chapter a diagram of the construction of the general staff, from which it is clear that the particular tasks assigned to the general staff were worked out in special bureaus, and all more or less closely connected with the operational idea, such as the question of engineering defense of the state, the question of organization armies, troop training, and command of large maneuvers—all this was combined into

one operations bureau. Next, we find the direct subordination of the chiefs of the bureau to the chief of the general staff, in which only his deputy is, but without a definite leadership of one or another bureau. It is not clear to recognize such a scheme of subordination as the most vital, since, especially in operational work, the fewer steps through which the idea itself is refracted, reaching the performer, the better it will be preserved in its essence. Indeed, the chief of the operational bureau was, of course, incomparably closer to the chief of the general staff than the latter's deputy. As we will see below, even the essence of all Franz Josef reports and the decisions made on them, even the personal joys or grievances of the chief of the general staff were always known to the chief of the operational bureau, who was thus aware of all the events and assumptions of the chief of the general staff. In other general staffs of the armies of Europe, between the chief of the general staff and the executors - the heads of the department, there were intermediate instances in the form of quartermaster generals, assistant chiefs of staff, etc. We tend to recognize the Austrian structure as more perfect than the order of subordination with a service superstructure. The only thing that could be objected to the direct subordination of the chiefs of the bureau to the chief of staff is the large number of speakers from the latter, but we are not fans of Napoleon's quaternary system and recognize that more than 4 people can be subordinate to one person.

We may be told that the author himself pointed out how busy the Chief of the Austrian General Staff was, who found himself unable to devote time to working out important issues, such as,

for example, training for rear service in the army. We emphasize that this workload must be largely attributed to the battles waged by the Chief of the General Staff on various bureaucratic fronts of the Austro-Hungarian bureaucratic machine. We have shown that the work of the chief of the general staff of the German army was no less difficult, even on such a scale as Schlieffen. The chief of the general staff, as Moltke did, can read novels only during the actual mobilization and concentration of armies, exemplarily prepared by him, and during the preparation period he will hardly have time for "easy" reading, and even more so "easy" pastime, and especially in modern conditions, when the pace of political life and, along with it, military life has accelerated significantly compared to the beginning of the 20th century.

We briefly noted that the same hard and responsible work lies with the rest of the employees of the Great General Staff, their path is thorny, if only they honestly walk along it, and not turn into cheerful cafes, as was typical of individual individuals from the Austrian General Staff. Looking ahead, we will point out below that the representative of the "brain of the army" should not tear himself away from the life of the country and sit only "in the barracks", we will ardently protest against this, but we think of contact with public life not in pleasure, but in serious work in other areas of social life and understanding the course of the latter, both in the present and in establishing a forecast for the future. "Big" people are given a lot, but a lot is asked of them...

Chapter IV

Chief of the General Staff Konrad

Conrad's view of personality in history. - The identity of the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff Konrad. - Military education. - Combat experience. - Lecturer in tactics at the academy. - Further military service. - Appointment as chief of the general staff - autumn 1906. - The value of the command of combat units for the general staff. - The mind of Conrad. - Conrad's strong-willed qualities are initiative and independence. - The passion of the chief of staff. - Its closure. - The marriage of Conrad and its consequences. — Conrad's military views. – Passion for the study of the war of 1870 and German military literature. - Admiration for Moltke (senior). - The study of modern tactics and checking it on the history of wars. - Konrad on the battlefields of the last wars. - Conrad's military-literary works. - Strategic thoughts of the chief of staff. - Conrad's views on the training of troops. - "Combat is the primary military action" and its understanding by Conrad. - The ability of the army to great tensions. - The views of the chief of staff on the method of introducing military knowledge into the army. Konrad is a politician. - Political training of the chief of staff. - Conrad's involvement in politics. - His imaginary apoliticality. - Conrad's views on the internal politics of the monarchy. - Konrad and foreign policy. - Franz Joseph and Conrad. - Relationship with Konrad Franz-Ferdinand. - Private offices and general staff. - Chief of the General Staff and host of ministers of Austria-Hungary. - The politicians of the monarchy and Conrad. "Conrad's conne

“It is not individuals who create history, but, on the contrary, history creates people,” Konrad, the former chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, now modestly narrates in his memoirs. The past world war, which ended with the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy, struck with its shaking up the mind of a faithful servant of this

monarchy, and now he looks at his path, at all his actions, as independent of his will. Thus, considering

the activities of the General Staff of the Danube Empire, it seemed that one could not dwell on getting to know its individual representatives. Needless to say, this "brain of the army" reflected not only the characteristic features of the army, but also of the ruling classes of the whole country.

It is known that certain economic relations also create the corresponding psychology of people. Therefore, we cannot take the point of view of the former chief of the general staff and refuse to get acquainted with individual individuals of the Austro-Hungarian general staff and, first of all, with Conrad himself. If, as mentioned above, he defined the nature of his activity as a continuous battle, then, apparently, he was far from "non-resistance to evil", but in his work he strove to reverse the psychology of the high-ranking environment surrounding him, to carry out his assumptions and measures in that the spirit in which they were conceived by him as the only true ones and corresponding to the then prevailing situation.

Therefore, we take the liberty of introducing individual characters of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, leaving aside their activities for the time being. It should be noted that writing fair attestations is a rather difficult thing, and we are not inclined to assure that the characteristics given below will be completely impartial. In addition, we have doubts about the appropriateness of placing them now, without familiarity with the activities of the persons being certified, which we will do in detail below. Perhaps it would be more expedient if we left these characteristics for the end, making them as a conclusion from the entire description of the work of the chief of the general staff and his closest employees. However, for the sake of clarity of presentation of the work of the General Staff, we preferred to present these think tanks now, so that the main lines of their work could be understood. We will not mind if the following narrative corrects our attestations and if we err in our premises. Our desire is to guard against them, but to say that this will certainly be observed by us - we do not undertake.

So, let's start getting acquainted with the faces of the "brain" of the Austro-Hungarian army. We would like for this time to turn into a "raeshnik", and we will not hide the fact that his ingenuous story would be much more useful than the boring outline of personalities that have already left the stage, but, unfortunately, this form of presentation has not been assimilated by us and we willy-nilly forced to start with the usual story.

First of all, we recommend the Chief of the General Staff Konrad himself. Some consider him Moltke (senior) for the Austro-Hungarian army. We will beware of such a hasty conclusion, but we will not deny that Konrad was a far from ordinary personality among the military characters of the era of the imperialist war. Born on November 11, 1852 in a German aristocratic family, Konrad

graduated from a military school in Vienna (the Theresian Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt) in 1871 and began his officer service in the 11th Jaeger Battalion. In the period from 1874 to 1876, Konrad took a course at the Military Academy (general staff) and in

1878, with the rank of lieutenant, made a campaign during the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Continuing to serve on the southern border, in 1882 Konrad was sent on a secret trip to Serbia, in which he became closely acquainted with the life of this country.

In 1882, Konrad, as a company commander, takes part in suppression of the insurgent movement in southern Dalmatia.

Participation in these two military operations: 1) made it possible for Konrad to get to know the southern border of the state closely; 2) exhausted all his combat experience, leaving, as we will see below, traces on his military thinking and 3) reflected in his understanding of the political tasks of Austria in the south, which henceforth became a matter of paramount importance for Conrad. From 1883 to 1887,

Konrad was the chief of staff of the 11th Infantry Division (in Lvov), and in 1888 we again meet Konrad at the Military Academy as a lecturer in tactics, in which position he remains until 1892.

In 1892, Konrad returned to duty for the qualified command of a battalion (in the 93rd infantry regiment) and then was appointed commander of an infantry regiment. In the autumn of 1903, Konrad was already in

the post of chief of the 8th infantry division (in Innsbruck - in Tyrol), gradually advancing to the post of corps commander.

However, fate decides otherwise, and in the autumn of 1906 Konrad appointed by the Chief of the General Staff.

Thus, only after 35 years of service in the officer ranks, at the age of 54, Konrad is called to the post of chief of the general staff. For our fleeting time, such a promotion must be recognized as very, very belated, but for an era that has departed into the field of history, such a career ladder was normal. Of the 35 years of service, Konrad spent only 12 years out of

action (2 years of the Military Academy, 4 years as division chief of staff and 6 years as a lecturer in tactics), while the rest of the time is devoted exclusively to their service in combat units. This circumstance is highly valued by Conrad himself, and he more than once proudly declares his combat experience. There is no doubt that long-term service in the ranks has benefited the chief of the general staff, but not to the extent that he thinks. The main accusation thrown by critics to this highest representative of the General Staff is that he was far from the troops, did not know their life and did not understand it. Obviously, Conrad, imperceptibly to himself, was likened to that mule of the famous commander Eugene of Savoy, who did many, many campaigns, but did not become a commander from this. Let them not think that on our part the entire usefulness of military service for the general staff is denied. Far from it. On the contrary, we consider it necessary and even obligatory to serve the general staff in combat units, but the service is meaningful and gives real experience for the activities of the general staff, and not just flaunting a long stay in the ranks. The military service gives the representative of the general staff not only acquaintance with the troops, but experience in driving them, develops in him the character of the chief, independence and responsibility in the decisions made - qualities of high value for the employee of the general staff and especially necessary for him. Thus, it would seem that a long stay in combat positions will provide the representative of the General Staff with the most important thing in his work, but, on the other hand, we must not forget that the very activity of the General Staff also requires time for

gaining experience in it, and therefore it is necessary to pay due attention to it. This living question in its analysis would lead us far, we would digress from our acquaintance with Conrad. We promise to return to him in his place, and now we take an apology from the Chief of the General Staff for the fact that we made him wait with our reasoning.

Before us is a man with an outstanding mind. The majority of contemporaries who came close to Conrad unconditionally recognize in him a wide development of mental abilities. Ludendorff recommends him to us as "the spiritual leader of the operations of the Austrian army" and considers him "an intelligent, extraordinarily resilient, mentally outstanding general." "He was a commander with a rare wealth of ideas and always strove to maintain in the Austrian army the desire for victory, which will forever remain his merit," Ludendorff thinks. The representative of the German army at the Austro-Hungarian

headquarters Kramon also considers Konrad an educated person, a worthy statesman. However, his mental abilities were manifested mainly in office work, in broad plans that often crashed against the harsh reality and Conrad's inability to delve into the practical implementation of his rich ideas. Even the Austrian general Krauss, who is to some extent hostile to Konrad, recognizes his clear and bright mind, wealth

of ideas, but also unwillingness and lack of time for a detailed study of emerging plans and assumptions. A well-known associate of Ludendorff, Bauer, considers Konrad an intelligent man who clearly weighs the situation, whose operational ideas carried something majestic in themselves.

In a word, it is impossible to deny the former Chief of the Austrian General Staff that he has outstanding mental abilities. Another thing is how much the mind was in balance with other properties necessary for a high-ranking military leader. This lack of balance seems to have prompted Ritter in his article "A Strategic Review of the Operations of the Austro-Hungarian Army in August and September". 1914" ("War and Peace" No. 15) to the conclusion that "in him (Conrad) we do not find a sober, cold, reasonable

mind; his clear assessment of the situation was clouded by nationalistic feelings and aspirations. We do not agree with this conclusion of the German writer and see in it the same superficial deepening into the character of Conrad, which the latter had in detailing the work.

We believe that in the person of Konrad we are faced with a highly developed person, with an individual thinker who pays little attention to "little things" (details in work) in his work. activities. We

noted that the development of mental abilities to the detriment of strong-willed properties was inherent in all the officers of the Habsburg army, and therefore. Konrad was no exception to the general rule, and the country's bureaucratic way of life further contributed to the development of him as an armchair worker, soaring in high spheres of thinking and not descending to "little things", to a detailed study of his assumptions. With that bureaucratic life of high officials, full of intrigues and internal battles, which was in Austria, there was no time left for the chief of the general staff to deepen his purely military work. It cannot be said that volitional qualities were not developed in Conrad. On the contrary, we

must first of all note his broad initiative, which he himself considered a necessary attribute for work in the post of chief of the general staff. Then the desire for independence in work, for the open expression of one's opinions to everyone and everyone, not

excluding Franz Joseph, before whom more than one "soul" of the Austrian bureaucrat trembled - all this was inherent in Konrad and even painfully absorbed by him. This "independence" was carried out by the Chief of the Austrian General Staff everywhere in his work, both in the field of foreign and domestic policy, and in purely military activities. The struggle for "prestige" in the Austro-German alliance, which was waged by Conrad, which was one of the types of his desire for independence, more than once delivered several bitter hours and even days in the relations of the allies with each other, which is noted by most German writers. In the field of foreign policy, the struggle for independence at one time even led Konrad to leave the post of chief

General Staff, and in military affairs, the same struggle created a number of conflicts with Franz Ferdinand, the military and other ministers.

Such an independent character of Conrad is evidenced by a number of military persons close to him, and Chernin, in his memoirs, speaking of persons who, intriguingly, hid behind Franz Ferdinand's back, does not include Conrad among them. "Among those who hid behind the Archduke, there was never the chief of the general staff, Konrad. This one did not push anyone forward. He personally and openly defended before everyone what he considered necessary," Chernin rightly says. "Independence" in judgments and actions was a duty for Konrad, which he firmly and steadily fulfilled, considering this his highest duty. This "straightforwardness" of Conrad's character has to

be explained by his developed strong-willed qualities, which sharply distinguished him from the Austrian general staff. Rather, he was characterized by energy, perseverance and, perhaps, even stubbornness in pursuing the intended goals.

Konrad knew how to love and hate with all the ardor of his nature; in people he saw either supporters of his ideas, or mortal enemies - he did not recognize a different classification of those around him. As is typical of people with such a development of strong-willed qualities, Konrad was distinguished by myopia in recognizing the character and abilities of the faces around him. This shortcoming is sharply emphasized by Krauss in his work "The Causes of Our Defeats".

Thus, not only are we not going to deny the characterization of Konrad given to him by Ritter, but we will add to this the fact that Konrad's strong-willed qualities sometimes took precedence over his mind, and the latter was often obscured by the element of passion introduced by the chief of the general staff into this or that issue. It must not be forgotten that Conrad was a South German, more sensitive and passionate in character than a German from the banks of the Spree. It is not the lack of a sober mind in Konrad that we find, but quite often the disturbed balance between mental development and those feelings that overwhelmed the chief of staff in his work, which, in his own words, was nothing more than a continuous battle,

Konrad, who entered it, was a closed nature. A limited circle of acquaintances, rare visits to restaurants and dinners in a comradely circle, the family life of a widower and a heavy service burden on his shoulders, as well as the state of siege that the chief of the general staff had to endure in his activities, left their mark on Konrad's character. Cramon describes him as a man who

had gone into himself, who liked to walk alone for long hours, who, for example, spoke very little at dinner at Headquarters, did not smoke, drank almost nothing, ate quickly and was regularly late for the beginning of dinner. In a word, Konrad created a tense atmosphere around him and it seemed that this person only appeared in a public place out of necessity. True, we know from the lips of Konrad himself that worldly pleasures were not alien to him, which the position of chief of the general staff deprived him of and which he dreamed of returning to after his resignation in 1911. We do not see a contradiction in this, since we do not deprive human weaknesses and such closed natures as Konrad. On the contrary, these weaknesses have an even greater influence on them than on people who enjoy all the "benefits" of life. Aspiring to achieve the latter, people who have withdrawn into themselves dream about it to the point of pain and, finally, waving their hands, set sail with all their passion on the sea of life. So, Konrad, concentrated in himself, having been a widow for a long time, could not stand it, and in 1916 he remarried, this created one of the reasons for his resignation. We do not at all want to praise celibacy and note it only as a characteristic fact for Konrad himself. Despite all the busyness of the service, for his gloomy and uncommunicative character, Konrad turned out to be unprotected from female influences - the world war was too long for the hermit of the general staff.

We repeat again that we do not find anything unnatural in Konrad's act, since life, of course, took its toll, and if a reproach was thrown at the chief of the general staff for his marriage, it was not for the fact itself, but for the choice of his wife - according to his social position not suitable "to the court" and, moreover, still divorced. It is known that both Napoleon himself and his marshals had a lot of wives in their numerous campaigns and, apparently, the presence of a woman did not

can have a pernicious effect on the military prowess of a person - if only a reasonable measure were observed in this. In these views, we are not inclined to throw a stone of condemnation at the hero of our story.

In the following chapters, we will get acquainted in detail with both the political and military contemplation of Conrad, but here, only for the sake of completeness of the outline of this figure, we will confine ourselves to his main thoughts on these issues.

Let's start with an examination of Conrad's military views, which, naturally, were developed by him most of all, were carried out in literary works and throughout his 35-year career.

Released from the military school on September 1, 1871, young Conrad set about studying the Franco-Prussian war that had just ended with great interest. The study of this war, mainly from German sources, served as the main stone in the military thinking of the future Chief of the General Staff. In general, Prussian military authors were preferred by Konrad and, according to him, the works of Boguslavsky, Sherf, Helmut, May, Tellenbach, Verdy du Vernoy. Kuhne, and later Hoenig, Natzmer and many others, opened up new paths for Conrad in the study of combat and the preparation of individual fighters and small military formations for it.

It is not surprising that the image of Moltke Sr. attracted the whole being of Konrad and served as an example for him in his future activities as chief of the general staff. With enthusiastic inner experiences, Konrad, in the autumn of 1913, invited to the German maneuvers, laid a wreath on the coffin of the great Prussian field marshal. All the thoughts of the latter, as we will see below, were well absorbed by Conrad, who tried to get them into the Austro-Hungarian army. Already from the first steps of his military activity, Konrad, who, under the influence of

German military literature, preached an offensive in small units in battle with good fire preparation, saw that the Austrian infantry charter, built on a massive bayonet attack in deep columns, was outdated. The young platoon leader, like Konrad, abandons this charter, and after making sure that the German methods of attack are by no means

are available only to developed German soldiers, transfers these methods of warfare to his platoon. Staying at the academy (from 1874

to 1876) deepens Conrad's assimilation of modern tactics, especially infantry. After graduating from the academy, Konrad continues his tactical education with great interest, becoming widely acquainted with the literature on the Franco-Prussian war, and then on the Russian-Turkish 1876-1877 from German sources and Russian, of the latter, mainly from the works of Kuropatkin and Puzyrevsky.

The 1882 campaign against the insurgents in southern Dalmatia consolidates Konrad's theoretical knowledge with combat experience. In

subsequent years, Konrad continued to study the tactics and combat training of the infantry on the basis of the experience of the latest wars (1870-71, 1876-77 and the Serbo-Bulgarian of 1886).

Appointed in 1888 as a lecturer in tactics at the Military Academy, Konrad visits the battlefields of the 1870-71 war before starting the course, and in 1889 he tours the battlefields of the Russian-Turkish and Serbian-Bulgarian wars.

"Studying the

terrain with a book and a map in the hands of the battlefields was a rich source for me to expand my tactical horizons, especially for me the enormous importance of a fire strike when attacking fortifications when examining the battlefields of the Russian-Turkish war (Plevna, Gorny Dubnyak, Telish) ", Konrad writes in his memoirs. Thus, military history with a tour of the battlefields turned out to be the primary source of military

knowledge of the young professor of tactics, and later the chief of the general staff.

Simultaneously with lecturing on tactics both at the Military Academy and at the Higher Shooting School, Konrad's literary activity begins. His first work, "On the Study of Tactics," was published in 1891, followed by a collection of "Tactical Problems," presented in an applied way. Commanding a regiment, Konrad wrote An Introduction to the Study of Tactical Regulations, and from 1900 to 1906 he published Infantry Combat Training, which was widely distributed not only in Austria, but also in Germany and also translated into foreign languages. In 1903, along the way, Conrad wrote "Infantry Questions and the Experience of the Boer War."

The literary works we have listed make it possible to navigate the military views of the Austro-Hungarian chief of the general staff, which, as he himself confirms, were guiding in his activities. Although these works mainly concern the field of tactics, Konrad also builds his strategic thinking on simple tactical principles.

An ardent admirer of German military thought, Conrad, of course, did not bypass its primary source - Clausewitz's doctrine of war, but in the interpretation of it by Moltke Sr. This premise of ours may seem strange, but we do it because, for example, in understanding the connection between politics and strategy, the German field marshal found himself on a point of view far from the understanding of Clausewitz.

The driving of troops, which is usually called strategy, according to Conrad, is not any special secret knowledge, but ordinary actions based on the simplest principle - the principle of combat. In essence, strategic actions take place on the same basis as an ordinary duel, only it is not individual fighters who take part in it, but armies numbering millions in their ranks.

"War is nothing more than a wide-spread duel," Clausewitz taught, and the Austro-Hungarian chief of staff only paraphrases this concept, transferring it to modern mass armies. Proving that no solution can be found

in defense, Konrad sees
such only in the offensive.

Comparing war with a duel, Conrad points out that, just as a duelist must know his sword to perfection, so a modern commander must study in detail his weapon - the mass army at his disposal. He must know and be able to control these weapons, used on the basis of general principles, as in ordinary combat, he must be familiar not only with the principles of control, but also with the technique of such.

Elsewhere, Conrad notes that modern warfare is such a complex military phenomenon that only a collective concerted effort to wage it can ensure success. Each fighter has his own specific duties in the war and must fulfill them. If courage is in the first place when being in the battle lines, then in the activities of the highest governing bodies

independence, intense and full of responsibility work should prevail. The end of the war depends on many reasons, and not the first place among them is the genius of the commander. First of all, from the experience of the Boer War, Conrad became convinced that success or failure lay in the very password that led the war. No ingenious leadership, no perfectly trained and armed army is able to replace the weakness of the spirit in the people, the lack of the will to win in them. With a strong spirit, the people inspire their army, and the latter goes to victory. The weakness of the state is determined not by the absence of a strong army, but precisely by its internal and, consequently, its external weakness. Strong Rome had strong victorious legions, and with the fall of Rome the glory of her legions withered.

Thus, war is the business of the state, and victory depends on its internal state, as well as on the foreign policy pursued by the state. Conrad does not forget Clausewitz's precepts that "war is the continuation of politics, but only by other means," but he gives this teaching an interpretation in the spirit of the elder Moltke. "Politics, unfortunately, is inseparable from strategy: politics uses war to achieve its goals and has a decisive influence on its beginning and end, while it reserves the right to increase its demands at all times or be content with less success ... The commander should never be guided by political motives alone, and to put success in war first.

We have seen above that Conrad considered it necessary to receive guiding lines for drawing up plans for war from foreign policy and, as will be repeatedly indicated later, Conrad always considered war as one of the means of politics. The latter, in his opinion, should use the war at the right moment. Conrad does not conceive of any active policy that does not rely on armed force, that does not always have at its disposal means ready for war. state policy. "Unfortunately," and for him politics is inseparable from strategy, but politics must always have the idea of turning to war, and therefore

all political and other measures of the state must be directed towards achieving military success. In these types, the general staff, responsible for the preparation and conduct of the war, must be closely involved in the foreign policy of the state. Clausewitz's precept that "in any case, the art of war is not a decree for politics" did not resonate with either Moltke or Conrad - both with "regret" put up with the dependence of strategy on politics, limiting its influence to the beginning and end of the war. Conrad went further in his conclusions, finding that the beginning of the war should depend primarily on military interests, which we will discuss below.

In his numerous documents, Conrad sharply draws his views on foreign policy and does not at all think, as he stated, to receive guiding lines from her, but rather prescribes them himself. We will dwell on this important issue further.

In a word, in our views on the relationship between politics and strategy, we are not dealing with original thoughts, not with the classical interpretation of this issue according to Clausewitz, but with the general current of military thought before the World War, fed by the philosophizing of Moltke Sr., in line with which our hero also followed. . "Demigods" in Vienna sought to imitate the same unearthly beings in Berlin, and in other capitals of European states.

The development of mass armies at the end of the 19th century, as a guarantee of success in war - the meaning of "number" in victory - was shaken by the Boer War at the beginning of the 20th century. Studying intently all the latest wars, Conrad immediately considered it necessary to draw lessons

from the war in South Africa. Warning in his work "Infantry Questions and the Experience of the Boer War" against hasty conclusions, Conrad does not lean towards the superiority of the militia, but recognizes the need for the existence of a standing army, as personnel for the deployment of

wartime armies. Recognizing that all battles since 1870 have been won by superiority in strength and, as a decisive form of battle, by enveloping the enemy from both flanks, Conrad still casts some doubt on the significance of "number" in victory, which is given to it by modern military men. There are no words that the technology of the 20th century gives the mobility and power of fire to modern mass armies the same

like the small armies of Napoleon, but one should not go over the limit in pursuit of "number" to the detriment of the "qualities" of the army. "Number" has a meaning in war, but relative. With the groupings of hostile states in Europe that began to take shape in the 20th century, one cannot, of course, be in superior strength against a hostile coalition.

The essence of success lies not in the pursuit of "numbers", but in the creation of a combat-ready active mass army, strong in numbers, but also well prepared. This army should be staffed with a really excellent human element that would be capable of combat operations, and not with people who would only corrupt the entire army, increasing the number of deserters, rears, etc., that is, in other words, they would be a heavy weight on the legs of this army abandoned for victory. Without a doubt, all states liable for military service should be used for

war, but with a division in training: "for the army in the field" and "for auxiliary service."

States liable for military service are subdivided into those eligible for military service. service and unfit for it.

The first category of those liable for military service must replenish: a) the active army; b) troops and institutions of the rear service; c) auxiliary service (various specialists, clerks, etc.). Those assigned to serve in the active

army receive training in the permanent troops, those who are enrolled in the rear service in the stage troops and intended for auxiliary service undergo a short military training without weapons. Persons liable for military service who are unfit for military service

shall pay or money tax, or, due to their poverty, are exempted from it.

By such a division of those liable for military service in the state, Konrad intended to create a combat-ready mass army. This

desire for the "quality" of the troops, especially the infantry, Conrad's native branch of service, led him to recognize the need for proper preparation of troops for war, which is not one of the works of Conrad listed above. For obvious reasons, we will focus only on the general provisions put forward by Konrad. Arguing in his "Infantry Combat Training" that

success in war depends on various reasons, Konrad is one of them in the first line

puts forward the armament with modern weapons and the ability to use them, and then the tactical training of the troops, corresponding to the modern combat situation.

Proving the need for good combat training of troops in peacetime, Konrad considers this a matter of honor for all commanders, who should be proud of a well-trained unit. "Combat is the primary military action," teaches Clausewitz, and Conrad, following the precepts of the old man, first of all demands the preparation of troops for battle, as a decisive act of war. This training is characterized by: the development in the troops of the ability to quickly maneuver in battle, to use the terrain and the prevailing situation, the ability to conduct actual fire, weaken the effect of enemy fire, put him in a tactical disadvantage and, finally, achieve results with fewer losses. In modern conditions of warfare, Konrad considers it necessary to have a good training of an independent fighter and the training of small tactical units - to which special attention should be paid. The basis for it, as already

indicated above, should be a battle with his modern physiognomy, and by no means a passion for parade tricks. Formality-free training for combat, however, should pursue the introduction of known forms of combat into the trainees, as well as a sense of danger. related to combat requires a certain automation of actions in combat. According to Konrad, this form of combat should result in the following: the boss must quickly understand each of his positions, make an appropriate decision and then carry it out with all his energy; when the goal is reached, the boss again evaluates the situation and again makes a decision, putting it into practice energetically. Thus, the battle breaks up into a number of separate tasks, the solution of which must follow quickly and without stopping, which requires not only skill, but energy and character to move troops forward, usually losing their combat capability, and leads to the art of fighting.

Only with such a system of warfare, free from formalism, the infantry, according to Conrad, can win the battle that develops on the ground, which is by no means a parade ground for exercises. Modern infantry fights, and does not produce statutory evolution.

As an extremely important factor in modern warfare, Konrad notes the ability of the army to great tensions, which may be required in a war and for which the troops must be prepared. However, Konrad, faithful to the precepts of Moltke, makes it an indispensable condition for the commanders to know the limits of those requirements that can be presented to the troops in their combat work. It is impossible to overexert the forces of people, and therefore, when setting a task in the preparation of troops, one must be clear about whether it is feasible, then, during the performance of the task by the troops, monitor the tension shown. If the troops are cheerful and cheerful after their labors, then the limit has not been crossed. Training troops for hard work is of great educational importance, as it strengthens the will, the ability to sacrifice - in a word, makes the troops combat-ready. The troops undergoing great stress during peaceful preparations give confidence that in war they will also be at the proper level. These are Conrad's main views on the combat training of troops. As for the method of introducing military knowledge into the army, the chief of the Austrian General Staff gave all the advantages to the applied method, popularizing it widely during his long-term activity in command posts. Already in his youth, carried away by the work of Verdier du Vernoy in this area, Konrad introduced the applied method into his teaching activities within the walls of the Military Academy, compiled a collection of tasks on tactics and in his further service, especially as chief of the general staff, he widely used it during military games, field trips and other activities with command personnel.

What we have stated above about the military views of Conrad is by no means exhaustive, and we will get to know this commander of our days in more detail in the future. We consider it

necessary for the time being to dwell on the accusation that Krauss, already well known, throws at the Chief of the General Staff. This head of the Military Academy recognizes in Conrad only

specialist in

tactics, who studied well only this side of military affairs, and in strategic thinking, if he was not weak, then, in any case, he was not fond of it and regarded it from a tactical point of view.

Conrad did not like to engage in operational training of the army, and he did not have time. Krauss says that during his visit to the Military Academy, Konrad listened languidly and analyzed operational issues, but as soon as the matter concerned a battalion or a company, the chief of the general staff was completely transformed, animated, he himself began to lead the classes - in a word, he was in his own sphere.

There is no doubt that the tactics of small units, which Konrad was engaged in for a long time both in teaching and in practical activities, were his forte, but that the area of strategy was also accessible to him no less than tactics, this is evidenced by Ludendorff, Bauer, Cramon and other of his contemporaries. We do not see any particular blunders on the part of Conrad in his love of tactics, since in the latter he carried out new ideas for his time. If you take the point of view of Krauss, then top leaders should only hover in the clouds of strategy. We will not prove that such flights often lead to the construction of castles in the air, to the development of pure theorists - this is known even without us. It is necessary to know the strategy, but one cannot do without tactics, and besides, tactics and strategy are now so intertwined in military affairs that it is harmful to introduce any line into their division on the merits. Passion for the development of one strategic thinking in oneself, recognizing it as dominant in the head of a senior commander, would impose a ban on the participation of the latter in the development of new tactics, and, following Krauss, we should leave this to the middle command staff. That this is not so is shown by the reality we are experiencing, when the minds of not only command platoons, battalion commanders and regimental commanders, but myself and top commanders, were occupied with the "new" company. This is how it was now in all armies. True, some of his contemporaries consider this to be a "non-commissioned officer's" matter, but we regard it higher and attribute it to the duties of any of the senior commanders. In these views, Krauss's reproach to Konrad is considered unfair by us, as well as his assurance of Conrad's false predilection for mountain warfare to the heights, to the detriment of the valleys, explained by Krauss by the fact that Konrad served for a long time on the Italian (mountainous) border and often, as a tourist, visited mountains. Without a doubt, a certain way of life affects the paths along which thinking proceeds, but this was not so with Conrad.

It must be said that the question of "pure tactics" in the training of army command personnel is topical today. As you know, the commander of the 2nd German Army in the Marne operation Bülow was a prominent representative of the "tactician-commander". Having gained wide fame in peacetime for his brilliant preparation of the corps on the Juteborg parade ground for "purely tactical" actions, Bülow was surrounded by the halo of a future commander, considered in the German army a serious candidate for the post of chief of the general staff. First tactics, then strategy - were his creeds, and he could not understand that tactics should be in the service of strategy. The reality of modern warfare severely punished not only Bülow himself, but the entire German army in the battle of the Marne for such a belittling of operational thinking. Bülow proved to be a good tactician and a poor leader of the operation. The first failure of the German army is connected with his name, and German literature condemns this excellent peacetime corps commander.

We noted above that in modern warfare there is no line between tactics and strategy, and that operational art is now being introduced between them, finally erasing any boundaries. In a modern operation, strategy and strategy are closely intertwined.

tactics.

Based on the foregoing, we come to the conclusion that a modern commander must be well prepared both tactically and operationally. This is the minimum that needs to be demanded of him. A. Svechin in his "Strategy" comes to the conclusion: "no matter how important the tactical requirements for the high command, we warn against being carried away by tactical specialists in high positions, since the main activity of the high command is of a completely different nature" With this provision, of course, one must agree, for the higher the commander, the more he must be immersed in the secrets of this military discipline. We are all familiar with the modern principle of "democratization of strategy". "A soldier becomes a general," Ludendorff tells us. To achieve the friendly work of huge masses on fronts stretching hundreds of miles, serious strategic training of private commanders is necessary ... Corps commanders in a maneuverable environment

wars very often have to make responsible decisions that give the operation one or another strategic bias ... "

... "The need for efforts to raise the level of strategic thinking of the command staff is everywhere recognized ... The strategy should not be Latin, dividing the army into initiates and uninitiated." L. Svechin comes to such fair conclusions in his "Strategy". If the strategy, as the doctrine of war as a whole,

must necessarily be recognized by the highest commander, then the strategy of the theater of operations and the operational activities of the troops must be known and understood by all commanders. This should now be considered a basic requirement for command personnel. At this point, we break off our acquaintance

with Conrad "in military uniform", and get to know him as a political figure, and we again warn that we will not go into details, but only set milestones. The former Chief of the Austrian General Staff more than once admits to

us that he did not receive political training, and his views on politics were developed mainly by reading historical literature. acquaintance with the history of the nationalities of the monarchy, acquaintance in practice with the life of these nationalities in various parts of the state, where Conrad's service threw, and, finally, communication with politicians of the Danube Empire.

It must be taken into account that all this was, of course, "legal", as befits an Austrian official, and therefore other political literature and communication with other political parties than those recognized by the state power were inaccessible to Conrad. Yes, he did not seek to study, considering them "dangerous" for the life of the state.

Coming out of the ruling bourgeois class, Conrad lived entirely by its interests and defended them in every possible way in his life and activities. In

his judgments about the policy of the state, Conrad mainly proceeded from the general interests of the state, of course, in that concept. which he was developing, although he repeatedly tells us that he was a stranger to politics, that when he took office he had to reluctantly plunge into it, that in the depths of his soul he

remained a "soldier", that is, apolitical. However, the former chief of the general staff was keenly interested in political issues, introducing an element of passion into the discussion and causing criticism for it, up to the loss of the post of chief of the general staff and to the request not to influence the weak-willed foreign minister Berchtold. Politics widely gripped Conrad.

Of course, in his political views, he was far from recognizing the economy as "primary" not only in the internal relations of citizens, but also in foreign policy, but it cannot be denied that he did not take into account economic interests. Konrad rightly notes that one

cannot speak clearly about foreign policy of the state, not taking into account domestic.

In the latter, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff was above all a typical and convinced "bearer" of the idea of the Habsburg monarchy as a whole and indivisible organism. In a patchwork monarchy, according to Conrad, all patchworks should be inspired first and foremost by the idea of the "state", putting their national interests in the background. In the concept of "state", as in a focus, her aspirations of the sons of the Danubian Empire should have been concentrated. All the centrifugal aspirations of individual nationalities, all steps taken by the Social Democracy—all this had to be curtailed as harmful to the unity of the state. The ideal for Austria-Hungary was to be Germany and the North American United States, in which various peoples got along with each other, considering themselves primarily "German" or "American". In his desire to create a "sun king" from the Habsburgs, Conrad went even further than the Habsburgs

themselves. Proposing to dwell on the firm and decisive management of a constitutional state, Conrad put forward a dictatorship, seeing in it almost the only way to save the monarchy. Even for Franz Josef, frozen after 1867 in the ramparts of constitutional dualism, such thoughts of the chief of the general staff seemed too bold and erroneous. In a word, Conrad was a representative of the far right in domestic politics on the banks of the Danube. Needless to say, of course, that this was taken into account by the various nationalities of the monarchy and, for example, the Hungarians

paid with a coin of malice and mistrust to the representative of the General Staff.

We fear that our categorical identification of Conrad's ultra-centralist views on the state may lead to the conclusion that he denied any autonomy for the various nationalities that were part of the monarchy. We hasten to make a reservation that the concept of autonomous control is by no means alien to the chief of the general staff, but only on such a scale that this does not damage the integrity and unity of the Habsburg empire. In short, autonomy was recognized by Conrad as a necessary evil rather than a definite political line.

It should be noted that Conrad, of course, did not recognize any intrusion from the outside into the internal affairs of the monarchy, painfully defending the independence of the state life of Austria-Hungary. We will discuss Conrad's views on foreign policy in more detail below, and now we will allow ourselves to outline only their concept, to give the results as they were conceived by the chief of the general staff himself. After the

withdrawal of Austria in 1866 from the German Union, according to Conrad, its "historical" task was to unite the Western and Southern Slavs, to familiarize them with European culture. Under the auspices of the Habsburgs, the descendants of the Mongol-Tatars, the Slavs, had to adopt a high culture, for which it was necessary to extinguish their hatred of the Germans and the Magyars, so that a strong state association could be formed. Thus, the cultural and economic development of Austria-Hungary required the opening of routes to the Balkans and could only end in Asia Minor.

This is Conrad's thinking in the field of foreign policy, and if we recall what we stated in chapter I about the development of this policy in Austria-Hungary by the beginning of the 20th century, then without making a mistake we can enroll the chief of the general staff in the camp of the "imperialists" of the dualistic monarchy.

Of course, Austria-Hungary alone was not up to such tasks, it needed support, and this was primarily conceived by Conrad in the person of Germany, an alliance with which he considered alpha and omega not only for himself, but also for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From this union, in his opinion, both sides benefited, and its strength could never be shaken by anything. Italy

is another matter. Almost from birth, inflamed with hatred for this age-old enemy of the Habsburgs, Conrad all the time warmed it up and was ready to wipe this state off the face of the earth. Of course, Conrad was aware that Italy stood in the way of Austrian expansion in the Balkans, but personal relations were mixed in with this. Having served for a long time on the Italian frontier, the chief of the general staff came into close contact with the so-called Italian irredenta, which left a deep mark on Conrad. We have already noted above that in itself he was a nature in which the mind did not balance passions, which he could either love or hate. This is what most clearly affected relations with Italy. Once enlisted in the lists of enemies (it should be noted, not without reason), Italy could never earn the trust of the chief of the general staff, and the defeat of the Italian army was his cherished dream.

Another ally, Romania, enjoyed his great sympathy, since he was needed in the war with Russia, and Conrad insisted on an alliance with Romania until Romania itself leaned towards the Entente.

Needless to say, Russia stood in the way of solving the "historical" task of Austria-Hungary, first of all, which was also on the list of enemies and not only of Austria, but also of Germany. Sooner or later, Russia would have to face off with weapons, and Konrad did not believe, therefore, in any other victory over her, but only by blood. A clash with Russia,

on the one hand, and on the other, the possibility of a military conflict between Germany and France, in which Austria was obliged to take the side of its ally, determined the entire European policy of Austria-Hungary.

From this point of view, Conrad is regarded as the policy of other European states, so the lines for the foreign policy of Austria are determined.

Although the chief of the general staff did not like to understand foreign policy issues, however, he closely followed them in all states not only of Europe, but also of Asia, since they had one or another relation to the general directing lines of external relations of Austria-Hungary.

We promised not to delve into this issue in this chapter, and therefore we cut it off and move on to other aspects of Conrad's personality. The position of Chief of the General Staff brought him into contact with many people both in the Danubian Empire and beyond. Subordinate directly to

the highest state authority in the person of Franz Joseph, Conrad in relations with him always revealed loyal feelings that were not feigned, but stemmed from Conrad's convictions in the merits and rights of the monarchical principle as a form of government. Always correct, disciplined and strictly observing all the complex etiquette of the Viennese court, the chief of the general staff, however, did not hesitate to express his opinions openly, even if they were not to the taste of the Habsburgs. Konrad himself tells how sometimes, when reading his reports, the impassive face of Franz Joseph twisted with anger, strong excitement was visible in him, but the old emperor knew how to control himself, accustomed to often listening to the bitter truth, and the reports ended without any special incidents. Even the last report of Konrad before his dismissal in 1911 from office due to disagreements with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which passed under the sign of "disgrace", as Konrad puts it, did not leave a special mark on the relationship of these two people. Franz Joseph's high goodwill towards Conrad is not important for us, but we consider it our duty to note the independence of the latter, by nature a courtier, in the conditions of the medieval etiquette of a gloomy Vienna court. Few of Conrad's contemporary statesmen possessed such civic courage.

The latter found the chief of staff much more trials and communication with the heir Franz Ferdinand, whose characteristics we have given above. Clothed with the authority of an army inspector, and in case of war - probable

commander-in-chief, Franz Ferdinand considered it his duty to go into all the details of preparing the country for defense.

At first appreciating Konrad as an outstanding military man, facilitating his appointment as chief of the general staff, Franz Ferdinand soon began to move away from his future chief of staff in the war. Two sharp incidents between Franz Ferdinand and Conrad, in one of which the latter was suspected of disrespect for the high person of the heir and in the absence of piety proper for Catholics, and in the second and the desire to obscure the person of the heir before Wilhelm, further contributed to the cooling of these two people.

The independent Konrad had to maneuver between two "independent" rulers of the peoples of the Danubian Empire and, of course, such a voyage was not always without storms and was almost close to an accident. There is no doubt that with the death of Franz Joseph, Conrad would certainly have been shipwrecked, which indeed happened in 1917 with the coming to power of Charles.

Maintained in court etiquette, Conrad endured the insults of the sovereign, but did not leave his path and sometimes stubbornly carried out his proposals in front of Franz Joseph, concerning even activities of the heir.

As was customary for more than one Viennese court, behind these two tall figures stood their heads of private offices, who had a great influence on the affairs that passed through them. These customs were also characteristic of St. Petersburg. Willy-nilly, maintaining good relations

with these intermediaries, using them for preliminary orientation not only in the direction of certain affairs, but, perhaps, even in reconnaissance of this or that mood among the high Habsburgs, Conrad, however, was aware of all the harm of such institutions and frankly reported to Franz Joseph. Conrad personally presented the most important reports on the war plan to him, and Franz Ferdinand received a categorical refusal from the chief of the general staff to a request to dedicate the head of the heir's personal office to the war plan. Conrad was adamant. Further, most often the chief of the general staff had to deal with the all-imperial minister of war, minister

Foreign Affairs and then with other ministers of the state machine of Austria-Hungary. In dealing with these people, who sometimes put Konrad in the role of a simple military consultant, the chief of the general staff fought that continuous battle that we mentioned above. Persistent in his demands, striving at all costs to carry out his views on certain issues, Konrad did not hesitate to enter not only into a cruel verbal tournament, according to Krauss, but did not even see the Minister of War, who to some extent was also subordinate. Here the figure of Conrad loomed in full growth - "independence" - was the slogan for this "demigod" from the banks of the Danube, who preferred to fall in the struggle, but not make concessions to his enemies. There is no doubt that no matter how fair the requirements of the chief of the general staff were, such relations with equals, but powerful persons, created even greater friction in the military machine, which was driven by Konrad. Irresponsible to the representative institutions of the state, the chief of the general

staff entered into communication with the political figures of the country insofar as the latter considered it necessary to turn to Conrad for service or out of friendship. Of course, under such conditions, the chief of the general staff plunged into the depths of politics in directions that corresponded to his personal views, was far from other parties and groups, considering them hostile to the integrity of the monarchy and, being a passionate nature, included them in the host of enemies.

The maintenance of military and political ties by Conrad was not limited to only Austria-Hungary, but went beyond them. First of all, it is necessary to note the frequent personal communication and correspondence with the Chief of the German General Staff, meetings with the Chiefs of the Italian and Romanian General Staffs. Finally, personal contact with Wilhelm, the Romanian Karl, Chancellor Bülow, and other political figures in Germany, as well as Romania, introduced Conrad to a wide range of creators of European politics at the beginning of the 20th century. With all of these persons, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff was straightforward in his political and military proposals and used among them

a well-known authority, regarded at the same time as a representative of the military party of the Danube Empire.

Above, we noted the negative qualities of Conrad, namely: his inability to choose people and the formation of an intimate circle around him. Conrad himself reveals to us that in dealing with his subordinates, he provided complete freedom in work, encouraged every manifestation of initiative and demanded careful, detailed and energetic work from his assistants. Our later acquaintance with his closest assistants will to some extent confirm these arguments of the chief of the general staff, although ignorance of people was and remained his fundamental shortcoming. We also cited the distribution of Conrad's working day and his thoughts on leaving the post of chief of the general staff, which indicate that his personal life was

distinguished by isolation, visiting relatives and a small circle of acquaintances. For the cheerful Vienna of that time, such a way of life of the chief of the general staff could be considered ascetic, especially since at least the minister of foreign affairs and other representatives of the military and civilian control machine did not follow it, not to mention ordinary workers of the same general staff. On the one hand, such asceticism of Conrad must be explained by his character, and on the other hand, to a rather greater extent, of course, by the service itself, which is further complicated by the bureaucracy characteristic of the Habsburg empire. With this we will limit the invasion of the personal life of the chief of the general staff, let it remain his private

deed.

Our attempt to describe the image of Conrad turned out to be long-winded and perhaps even overly detailed. We regret this, but we do not consider it possible to interrupt even a superficial acquaintance with this person without drawing a conclusion about what this person is.

Human.

Chapter V

Shadows of the past

The difficulty of evaluating Conrad. – Appeal to the classics and history. - Schlieffen about the commander. - Opening of the Chief of Staff. – Causes of Schlieffen's "pessimism". - Engels on brilliant commanders. - "Collective" commander. "The chief of the general staff is the hidden commander in chief. - Napoleon about the commander. "The balance of mind and character." - Courage. - Moral courage. - The efficiency of the commander. – Thoughts of Clausewitz on the commander. - "Fusion of the spirit with the mind." - The position of the commander-in-chief in the government. - Moltke about the commander and chief of staff. - "Complete freedom" of the commander, his "responsibility" "before God and his conscience." -The army is the focus of the entire life of the state. - "Commander" of France in the concept of the 70s of the XIX century. - "Commander" but to Schlieffen. - Bernhardt about the commander. - Leval School. - Russian views on the c

Having met Konrad, Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff in the previous chapter, and having said goodbye to him, we begin to understand the impressions received, which we intend to share, abusing the patience of the one who turns over these pages.

It is very difficult to make an assessment of Konrad's suitability for the post of Chief of the General Staff. We refuse to take this boldness upon ourselves and let us go over in our memory what the classics say about people who have held or should hold such high positions. Of course, iterate over all the classics by affected

We are not going to the question - it would take up a lot of space, and it would distract to the

side. Our intention does not go further than to outline the starting points for judging such a great personality as the chief of the general staff. We apologize in advance that we recall several truths that are well known even without us.

to the reader.

In his article "The Commander" Schlieffen says that "War is only a means of politics. For this remedy to be effective, the preparatory work of a statesman is needed ... Therefore, the commander must be both an outstanding statesman and a diplomat. In addition, he must have at his disposal those huge sums that the war absorbs. "Only the monarch, who has the totality of all the means of the state, can satisfy all these requirements. Therefore, concludes Schlieffen, the commander

must be a monarch. However, there was a crisis in the availability of monarch commanders, and it had an acute effect when "when on the throne of the hereditary monarchy were persons who did not consider themselves capable or called to become the head

of the army and yet wanted or had to wage war. They were forced to entrust to one of the generals the most advantageous prerogative of the monarch. Getting around was not easy. The general must win. But if he won too often and was revealed as a commander, then the dignity of the monarch was in danger ... The threat of this rivalry already once put a spear into Saul's hands to pin a competitor to the wall.

The way out was outlined in 1813, when one of the commanders of the allied armies operating against Napoleon turned out to be a capable chief of staff. "This military duumvirate achieved independence, dragged along the leaders of the other armies and made possible the defeat of the invincible, but already aging world

conqueror."

"The discovery of the role of chief of staff," according to Schlieffen, "led to the restoration of the situation:" the king is the leader in war. Monarch no longer marches as a spectator that is a hindrance to a general assigned

commander-in-chief, and he himself takes on the role of commander, but has with him the chief of staff, who reports to him the situation and the demands it causes. Speaking about the resolution of the military problem in Prussia, Schlieffen points out: "In 1866, the king himself leads his own army created by him. With him are a politician and the chief of the general staff. None of these three connects in itself all the data required for a commander: but each has in more or less those qualities that create a commander, and has the ability to complement the other two. So Schlieffen draws us the birth of the chief of staff, as one of the constituent particles of a common whole, called the commander. The

principle of the division of the commander, the system of the triumvirate, which in our days is moving into the system of collective control, is being put forward on the stage of world history.

Above, we threw out the phrase that the chief of the general staff in peacetime must be considered as the future commander in chief. We feel obliged to clarify this.

The editorial to "Strategy in the Works of the Military Classics", which contains the article by Schlieffen cited above, suggests: "to be able to read between the lines and understand that Schlieffen scoffs at fatalism, sees the impotence of monarchs to cope with the tasks lying to them, is afraid for that replacement commander a committee from Wilhelm II with his weak political adviser and the younger Moltke, who would have to carry out their war plan. The significance of personality does not disappear in the collective of commanders, although one of its members must be marked with the stamp of genius. Schlieffen does not see it in any of his deputies - and deep pessimism permeates the entire article.

Following the advice of the editors, we delved into reading between the lines, which told us something. The article "The Commander" was written by Schlieffen already in retirement, into which he did not go of his own free will, and it is clear that a certain amount of this author's pessimism must be attributed to the bitterness of the nobleman who remained out of work. Above this, he did not rise, looking for the reasons for the appearance of the triumvirate, which consisted mainly in the fear of Wilhelm II, as if, reading between the lines, the genius of Schlieffen did not compete with him and did not force

imitate Saul. We readily acknowledge Schlieffen's fears of being pierced by a biblical spear, but nevertheless we see the reasons for the dismemberment of the commander not in this, but in the very essence of war, which is nothing but a socio-historical phenomenon that affects all aspects of life.

Under modern conditions, a commander, no matter how much you stand "before the altar of Baal", dedicating yourself to the generals; or don't steal the "sacred fire", like Napoleon, "the son of the revolution, who, like the second Prometheus, himself stole fire from heaven", as Schlieffen writes about this, nevertheless, he will not become a commander in the old sense of it with one-man command as a necessary attribute .

In these views, we would not recommend every honest citizen to take the path recommended by Schlieffen. Saying that: "armament, composition, organization, tactics and strategy primarily depend on the stage of development of production reached at the given moment and on the means of communication," Engels comes to the conclusion that the "non-free creativity of the mind" of brilliant commanders acted in in this direction in a transformative way, but the invention of improved weapons and the change in soldier material; the influence of brilliant commanders is at most limited to adapting the conduct of the struggle to new weapons and new fighters. This is what determines the influence of an individual, a commander, in purely military affairs, not to mention the fact that war is not covered by one strategy or tactics.

With the development of the country's economic life, such a decomposition of the commander's personality, its transformation into a collective, was bound to come inevitably. It came from the very first years of the World War, when even the triumvirate turned out to be insolvent, and not just any thief of the general fire. Such personalities tried to take the place of a "modern commander" entirely in their own person, like Ludendorff, for example, and were thrown out of there by nothing but the same economic force.

Thus, we do not intend to interpret the commander-in-chief as a commander of biblical times, but understand him in modern conditions as one of the members of the team leading the war.

We consider it clear without proof that this team is not created for a screen that hides the genius of the commander-in-chief, but for

real leadership of the war, and no matter how ironic Schlieffen was about his contemporary committee, such was a natural necessity. If this is so, then it seems that genius can be inherent in each of the members of the team, and not just its military representative. If we admit that the genius entered the elder Moltke, then in fairness we must point out that Bismarck also turned out to be involved in stealing fire from the sky, only military, but diplomatic, as a result of which he was able to measure his strength with such a "demigod" as the head of the German general staff. In the triumvirate, which before the war was recognized as a

legitimate form of government, according to the established concept, the role of the commander, commander in chief, should have belonged to the monarch or that person, mainly from representatives of the dynasty, who would be entrusted with the command of the armed forces during the war. Thus, for the time of the latter, the chief of the general staff was again nothing more than the chief of staff, but not the commander in chief, and only in France and Italy did he actually become one. However, under the commander-in-chief-emperor, who at the same time represented the highest civil authority, the role of the chief of staff changed significantly, moving from giving advice to actually directing operations. In peacetime, when civilian life distracted the future commander-in-chief from military affairs even more, the only actual defendant for the latter was the chief of the general staff, as an official in charge and responsible for preparing the country for defense. Being, therefore, the second commander in chief, and in France the actual one for the duration of the war, the chief of the general staff had to have all the qualities necessary for a commander, since work in the conditions of

preparing for a war requires the same mental and moral strength as during the conduct of combat operations. On this basis, we have compared the Chief of the General Staff with the future Commander-in-Chief and, considering the latter from the theoretical side, we will apply what has been stated equally to the Chief of the General Staff.

There are military researchers in our time who begin their work from the earliest times of military history and reach a "rational" strategy. We are afraid to follow their example, because "unfortunately, writers are very inclined to refer to the events of ancient times," says Clausewitz. "Let us leave aside the question of what role vanity and quackery play here; for our part, we do not see in the majority an honest desire to convince and teach, and therefore we consider all such hints to be nothing more than patterned patches imposed on glaring holes," the philosopher of war teaches. Therefore, leaving the Hannibals, Alexanders of Macedon and other illustrious generals of antiquity in the hay. Let us turn to this sort of people of the times that are near to us. Let's start with the "son of the revolution" - Napoleon, who was accused by Schlieffen of such a crime as stealing the "sacred fire". We are by no means

going to give all the thoughts of the little corporal about the commander, because we would be distracted too much, and therefore we confine ourselves to only the main ones. Despite such a successful, according to Schlieffen, initiation into commanders, Napoleon, however, did not confess and said: "War is a serious matter in which you can belittle your reputation

and the importance of your country. If you are reasonable, then you need to realize and understand: whether I was created for war or not. Very good advice not only for the generals of the Napoleonic era, but also for our day.

Having stolen the fire, Napoleon did not think to deny the meaning of "genius" in the art of generalship, but he also put
experience.

The road to generals, according to Napoleon, is open not only to geniuses, but also to people who will take up military history and learn the essence of war from it. "Knowledge of the higher side of war is acquired only by experience and study of the history of wars waged by great generals," teaches the little corporal. However, history provides only starting data for the knowledge of war, and by no means ready-made recipes. "The books write that Frederick or Napoleon studied the campaigns of Caesar and Eugene from a young age and thus prepared themselves for their great calling as a commander. From the point of view of science, - says Schlichting in his work "The Foundations of Modern Tactics and Strategy", - such a fable does not stand up to any criticism.

The great deeds of these military people, of course, could ignite the militant fantasy of such readers, but they hardly served as suitable grounds for their own exploits.

One way or another, Napoleon certainly recognized the well-known message for the mind as necessary, and suggested studying such areas of military affairs as "tactics, rebuilding, engineering and artillery sciences" from textbooks "how geometry is studied", i.e. exact science. In the commander, the main property was considered to be the balance of mind and character. "The first quality that elevates a general above mediocrity is the balance of mind and character, or courage. As for the character and mind, they should be a square. If courage prevails in him, then in fulfillment of his considerations he will mistakenly go beyond his intentions; and, on the contrary, he will not have the enterprise and courage to carry out his plans of action, when his mind dominates character or courage. Elsewhere, Napoleon points out: "The first quality of a commander in chief is to have a cold mind, capable of receiving the right impressions, unable to ever get excited or darkened, be intoxicated by good or bad news." To what we have already said about the balance of mind and character, let us add the words of Napoleon himself: "I am convinced that in

order to be a good general, one must not only have great talent, but also great knowledge. The eye and the speed of decision of the great generals only prove that they are unusually familiar with the knowledge they need. The mental development of the commander, according to Napoleon, should be higher than that of ordinary military commanders. On this occasion, Napoleon writes to his

brother: "Your letter is too clever, which is not needed in war, where accuracy, strength of character and simplicity are needed." Let's not forget that this referred to the general of Napoleon's time, but in our days, for a subordinate commander, in addition to the above qualities, mental development is necessary in war, because, according to Ludendorff, now "a soldier becomes a commander." Napoleon recognized courage as a necessary quality of a commander and pointed out that all the wars waged by great commanders

reveal this in the latter, but the commander's courage, of course, is different,

than the courage of an ordinary military commander. "The courage of the commander in chief, he said, is different from the courage of the head of a division and from the courage of the captain of a grenadier company." For a commander, Napoleon demanded such courage "which, in unexpected cases, does not constrain the freedom of mind, considerations and intentions." It is known what personal courage Murat was distinguished for. "He spent his whole life in wars, he is a hero, although a limited person," Napoleon said about him, and in a letter to Murat's wife noted: "Your husband is very brave on the battlefield, weaker than a woman or a monk when he does not see the enemy. He has no moral courage at all." The presence of this moral courage should distinguish the true commander.

We believe that there is no need to recall what kind of efficiency Napoleon himself possessed, how his time was occupied almost by official business. In this regard, the little corporal left us a model worthy of emulation, declaring: "If it seems that I have a ready answer for everything and nothing takes me by surprise, then this is a consequence of the fact that before doing anything, but for a long time I think and foresee everything that can happen. It is not a genius that suddenly, secretly, tells me what I should say in circumstances that are unexpected for others; no, it is the result of my education and my reflections. I always work". With this little acquaintance with the views of the commander, who plied Europe in different directions, we will allow ourselves to confine

ourselves, and we will now turn to his contemporary, opponent in arms, and then the philosopher of war - Clausewitz. It is difficult to give in a concise form the appearance of a commander as described by Clausewitz, it is necessary to be imbued with the

views of this person in general on military activity in order to correctly grasp his thoughts about the commander, and therefore we do not give a guarantee in an unmistakable interpretation of the provisions of the philosopher of war. "For excellent activity in the war, a special kind of genius is required from top to bottom.

However, history and posterity recognize as geniuses only those who shone in the front row in the rank of commanders, "says Clausewitz and explains this:" the reason is that the demands from the mind and spirit here really increase greatly at once.

Thus, genius, according to Clausewitz, should be characteristic of every military man, and not only the military, since "every special kind of human activity requires special properties of the soul and mind, otherwise it cannot be brought to artistry (art). Where these properties are expressed in a special degree and declare themselves by extraordinary actions, the spirit that caused them is called genius.

By the word "genius" Clausewitz means "a very high ability of the mind (spirit), directed to a certain cause" and "in order to comprehend its essence, it is necessary to include and bear in mind the totality of mental and spiritual forces directed to military activity. Their entire sum should be considered the essence of military genius. We said the whole totality, the whole sum, because the military genius does not fit in only one manifestation of the soul. Genius is not simply the highest degree of one-sided talent; it, on the contrary, consists of a harmonious combination of various forces, of which another can take precedence, but none should become across the others.

Pointing out that "for the highest military genius, great mental strength is required", that his "mind, so to speak, has to stand" under the gun without time or rest", that "war requires outstanding mental abilities", the philosopher of war immediately notes : "War is an area of danger, and therefore courage will be the foremost dignity of a warrior." "The composition of the complex

atmosphere in which war lives and revolves includes four principles, namely: danger, bodily tension, suspense and chance. It is clear that a lot of spiritual and mental strength is required in order to successfully move in such an aggravating element. These forces, depending on the modifications of circumstances, among which they manifest themselves in war, are called energy, firmness, confidence, strength of soul and strength of character. All these qualities, which are necessary for any military man in general, are necessary for a commander in particular, since "the demands on the mind and spirit here really immediately increase greatly." "In order to brilliantly bring to the

desired end a whole war, or at least one campaign, it is necessary to penetrate deeply into the highest state relations. War and politics merge here together, and the commander becomes the husband of the state.

the philosopher of war comes to such conclusions and asserts: "that the commander becomes a statesman, but still he must remain a commander. On the one hand, he embraces all state relations and, on the other, he is fully aware of what exactly he can achieve with the means entrusted to him.

"Here there is an extraordinary variety of all kinds of ratios, many unknown quantities have to be taken into account and measured only by the law of probability. If the commander is not able to grasp all this with his mind, then he will not be able to cope with the confusion of all kinds of views. "The higher forces of the soul

are required here such integrity, such an ability to solve problems that the ordinary mind can only bring to light with difficulty at the cost of exhausting work. But even this higher activity of the mind, this look of genius, will not leave a mark on the tablets of history if it is not supported by the strength of the soul and character.

"The consciousness of truth alone is powerless to push to action; from knowing is far from wanting, almost as far as from knowledge to ability; you can be aware of the situation and still not decide on the matter; in the same way it is possible to know that it is necessary to act, and yet not be able to get down to business. Feeling drives you to action. The most reliable engine will be, so to speak, the alloy of the spirit with the mind, which we met above under the name: determination, firmness, stability and strength of character.

"If in conclusion to raise the question," says Clausewitz, "what kind of mind is most appropriate for military genius, then we, relying on the essence of the matter and experience, will answer that we would entrust the fate of our brothers and children, the honor and integrity of the fatherland rather to the inquisitive mind rather than creative, rather embracing than studying one-sidedly, finally, let

us prefer a cold head to a hot one. Outlining those mental and spiritual qualities that are required from the commander, Clausewitz, however, requires the development of knowledge of war: "Every human occupation requires a preliminary supply of certain ideas; but these representations are for the most part not innate to man, but are acquired by him, constituting his knowl

"Representations will not be the same, adapting to the position of the head; in the lower levels they concern smaller, limited objects; on higher-larger and more extensive. There are

commanders who would not shine at the head of a cavalry regiment; happens the other

way around." "Even leaving aside the difficulties that are overcome by courage, we affirm that mental work is simple and easy only at the lower levels; but the difficulty increases in the higher ones, so that the mental "work of a commander-in-chief belongs to the most difficult that has ever been assigned to the human mind."

Further, Clausewitz defines the amount of knowledge for the commander. According to him, "the commander does not need to be either a scientist, or a historian, or a publicist, but he should be familiar with and correctly assessed by him the highest state life, the dominant direction, the interests involved, pressing issues and actors. There is no need for him to be a great observer, able to analyze human characters to the smallest subtlety; but he must know the disposition, the way of thinking, the virtues and vices of those whom he will have to command. The commander does not care about the arrangement of the wagon, the harness of the gun; but he is obliged to correctly trace the success of the march of a column of troops under various circumstances. All this knowledge cannot be obtained by force, by means of scientific formulas; they are developed solely by the contemplation of deeds and the correct assessment of what is observed in life, when there is enough innate talent for that.

"So, a special property of knowledge required for high military activity is that it is acquired by contemplation, i.e. study and reflection, but only under the condition of a special kind of talent. However, knowledge is acquired not only by contemplation and study, but also by life experience, through the same talent, spiritual instinct, which from under the external life phenomena is able to extract the spirit of every deed everywhere, just as a bee extracts honey from the depths of flower petals. . "So," concludes the philosopher of war, "there is no

need to resort to lies, or wretched pedantry, in order to save the spiritual dignity of military activity. A limited person has never been an excellent commander, but it happens very often that those who served with great distinction at the lower levels turned out to be below mediocrity at the highest, precisely because they lacked spiritual abilities.

“Whoever is to manage the war is obliged to study only that which concerns war. The last conclusion is unavoidable, but any other is untrustworthy,” says Clausewitz, and further finds out that when analyzing means, the theory of war goes as far as it is necessary to find out the effect of these means when they are used in case.

“The range of combat and the action of firearms are very important in terms of tactics; but the device of the weapon itself does not interest her at all, although the effect of the weapon is not based on its design. The Warlord is not in the business of fabricating the means; he does not dispose of sulfur, saltpeter, coal and metal for the manufacture of weapons and gunpowder; he gets everything he needs ready-made; both the weapon itself and its action, for it the magnitudes are already given. The strategy uses maps without being given trigonometric measurements. It does not deal with questions of how the state should be organized and managed; how the people should be educated in order to ensure their military successes. Theory takes the state with its institutions and relations as they are in reality; it only indicates the important features encountered that can have a noticeable impact on the war. Pointing to the simplification in this way of the field of military

knowledge, Clausewitz continues: “To prepare an army capable of entering the field and successfully operating in war, a lot of knowledge and skill is required; but all this operates even before being used in war, merging into a few large results just like various tributaries into one large river; reaching to the sea.” Simplifying the knowledge of war, its philosopher convinces us that “only in this

way can one understand why it was so often that people turned out to be wonderful commanders and even commanders in the war, whose activities had previously been directed to a completely different one. This also explains why excellent generals never left the ranks of knowledgeable, much less learned officers; they, on the contrary, in their former position were not weighed down by the excessive burden of knowledge. Therefore, they justly scoffed at those ridiculous pedants who considered the education of the future commander to be necessary, or at least useful, to begin with the study of all the little things.

We considered ourselves obligated to acquaint Clausewitz with these judgments, since the theories of other authors cited below will be somewhat different, and the modern idea of the commander by Clausewitz. For the commander-in-chief of our day, one cannot discard the knowledge that from specified cannot discard the knowledge Clausewitz did not include in the strategy, both from well-known life and from the field of technology. The philosopher of war strove not to overload the commander's brain with knowledge; which are not directly related to the war. One can agree with this even now, but since, in his own words, "the war is spreading in almost all directions, not finding definite boundaries for itself" and if the commander must embrace "public life", "the dominant direction", "affected interests", etc. etc., then today his knowledge should also "spread out in all directions", but only "find boundaries defined for himself", without plunging into trifles, and especially into the pedantry of learning. We believe that in this we do not disagree with the venerable old man, for he himself asserts that each historical epoch must correspond to its military art, and the historical epoch is determined by us by nothing other than a certain stage in the development of the productive forces. Without understanding this development and the changes resulting from it in the life of society in general and in military affairs in

in particular, the commander in our days can by no means be revered such and hardly even will "shine at the head of the cavalry shelf".

To put an end to Clausewitz's views on the role of the general, we should focus on the following. Saying that "the art of war at its

highest point becomes politics, but politics, replacing diplomatic correspondence with bloody battles," Clausewitz points out: Based on the foregoing, we argue that it would be unfounded and even harmful such a unit, according to which a major military event or plan for it could not be subjected to a purely military discussion, just as it makes no sense, as cabinets do) to involve military people in the discussion so that they give their purely military conclusion. But it is even more senseless if the commander is given the available combat means so that, in accordance with them, he draws up a purely military plan for a war or campaign. Yes and

constant experience teaches that despite the great diversity and development of the present warfare, its main directors have always been appointed by cabinets, i.e. department, technically speaking, not military, but only political. It was in keeping with nature.

affairs".

Considering it necessary "that those who govern political relations to a certain extent understand military matters," Clausewitz is far from "believing that the best minister of state will be a military or scientific engineer buried in papers, or even a military man who is efficient in the field; namely, when the monarch himself is not at the same time his minister of state. Similarly, we do not believe that the main duty of the monarch was the knowledge of military affairs. The main thing here is a strong bright head and a strong character, as for understanding military affairs, you can

replenish one way or another.

One of these means is recommended by Clausewitz: "Where a statesman is not united with a military man in one person, one good means remains, namely: to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet so that he can participate in his most important actions; but this, in turn, is possible only when the cabinet, i.e. the government itself, is close to the field of action in order to solve cases without appreciable loss of time. But Clausewitz warns: "The presence in the office of any other military man, instead of the commander in chief himself, is very dangerous. Rarely will this lead to sound, practical measures. This is where we end with the personality of the commander, as it is outlined.

acknowledged practical commander Napoleon, a contemporary philosopher of war And his
Clausewitz. Both of them interpret a certain era of military art, at the end of which their image of the commander had already begun, as we saw above, to turn into a duumvirate - the commander and his chief of staff, and then, with the appearance on the scene of the history of Moltke and Bismarck, into a triumvirate that has come down to our days. days. With the name of Moltke Sr., we have associated the idea of a transition in management from one-man management to a triumvirate. However, if you think about the provisions of the German field marshal, it turns out that the "collective" management of him was recognized only as a cruel necessity. The commander, according to Moltke, must have

with the full power of a single decision, and since "unfortunately" politics interferes in military affairs, only a monarch can be a true commander. Here is the concept of Moltke's judgments about "collective" management and the role of the commander in it. In order not to be

unfounded in these statements, we turn to Moltke himself. "There are commanders

who do not need advice, who weigh everything and decide on their own; those around him should only fulfill their predestinations. But these are stars of the first magnitude, appearing hardly in every century, - says the field marshal, and continues like this: in most cases, the commander will not want to do without the advice of persons who, by virtue of their education and experience, can correctly assess the situation. But of all opinions, only one should acquire decisive importance. "The Commander-in-Chief

should be offered, at his own discretion, only this opinion and only one authorized person. Let the commander choose him not according to the list of seniority, but guided by complete personal confidence in him. Resolutely rebelling against various councils under the commander-in-chief,

Moltke says: "The most unfortunate commander, however, is the one who still has control over himself when he must give an account at the first request about his assumptions, plans, and intentions: this control is a representative of the highest authorities and the main apartment, or a telegraph wire in the rear.

"With such a system, any independence must be broken. every quick decision, every bold risk, without which no war can be waged. Only a commander with full power can make a bold decision." "It is dangerous to give even

good orders from a distance. If there is no supreme military authority in the army, then the commander must have complete freedom of action. One cannot wage war while sitting at a desk; questions requiring immediate solution can only be taken on the spot, depending on the situation.

"Therefore, once war has been declared, the commander-in-chief must be given complete freedom to act at his own discretion.

The choice of the commander-in-chief is a matter of extreme importance, which, unfortunately, in many cases is decided not on merit, but on personal grounds. A heavy responsibility rests on him—before God and his conscience; in comparison, accountability to the government disappears. The commander of the army in his actions, the success of which is never guaranteed, just like the statesman who directs politics. should not be afraid of judicial responsibility. He bears a completely different responsibility before God and his conscience for the lives of many thousands of people and for the good of the state. He loses something more than freedom and

state".

“And therefore everywhere the true commander-in-chief is the monarch, who, being irresponsible in theory, in reality bears the heaviest responsibility - for who stakes more than he when it comes to crown and scepter.” Thus, the field marshal quite transparently outlines those personal motives that should

cover the commander in his management. Far from being truly responsible for the work they have undertaken, everything lies in how not to lose the “crown and scepter.” But the field marshal has little faith in “first-rate” commanders, and one person appears on the stage near the commander-in-chief, which, of course, must. be embodied in the chief of the general staff. To trace the relationship of these two persons, we turn to the description of a battle day in 1870 at the German headquarters, which will be given by Moltke.

“In 1870, the days passed as follows: if there were no battles or marching movements, then regularly at 10 o'clock. in the morning, a report was made to the king, at which the chief of the general staff of the army, accompanied by the quartermaster general (the person in charge of the rear; B. Sh.), was obliged to report all the information and reports he received and, on the basis of them, make new proposals. At the same time, the chairman of the military council, the minister of war, and at the time when the headquarters of the III army was in Versailles, also the crown prince were present, but they were all only listeners. Then the king demanded information from them on this or that matter, but

he never asked them for advice on an operation or suggestions made by the chief of the general staff of the army.

"The projects of the chief of the general staff were previously discussed by him together with staff officers; then the king subjected them to a very detailed examination. With military insight, with an always correct assessment of the strategic situation, he pointed out all the fears that might be encountered during the test, but, in view of the fact that in war every step is fraught with danger, all these projects remained unchanged.

Pointing out that "King Wilhelm was a real commander, Moltke comes to the conclusion: the monarch, who has the state with his auxiliary means, only then rightfully becomes the head of the army if he is able to be the leader of his troops and take over heavy responsibility for whatever happens in the war. If these assumptions are not justified, then his presence should always have a paralyzing effect on the army ... Only one single will can manage operations.

We think that without our extra arguments, both the role of the "true" commander - the monarch, and the "one person" - the chief of the general staff, whose assumptions, albeit with reservations, were always accepted, are clear, and the responsibility should lie with the king. Not a bad position for the chief of the general staff, who did not limit himself to the fact that only "in operations" his positions were not criticized, but even in the whole conduct of the war he came into conflict with Bismarck. This is quite understandable, because, according to Moltke, "politics, unfortunately, is inseparable from strategy" and "military considerations are guiding the course of the war, political ones only in so far as they do not require anything from a military point of view unacceptable. The commander, on the other hand, should never be guided by political motives alone, but should put success in war first. How politics will take advantage of "dinners or defeats, this does not concern the commander - this is exclusively a business." For the time being, we will go into an

analysis of Moltke's thoughts on politics and strategy, for we will do it in our place. Now it is important for us only to establish his point of view on the commander.

As you can see, the commander must almost subjugate politics, and not only politics, but the rest of the life of the state. Pointing out that the presence of Germany is a guarantee of peace, Moltke frankly declares that the desire for a peaceful policy "can be carried out by relying on an army always ready for war. If this huge flywheel were missing, then the state machine would stop, the diplomatic notes of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not have the proper weight. "The army is the most important institution in the country, since it is only thanks to it that all other institutions can exist; every freedom, political and civil, everything that is created by culture, finances and states prosper and perish with the army. "To wage war," the field marshal teaches us, "in comparison with the past, new auxiliary means are now needed.

Now we cannot do without the help of science and technology in all their forms. All must act together in order to emerge victorious in the great struggle of nations. But this is still not enough for all these forces to unite. Everyone tends to somewhat exaggerate the significance of his activity, and many forget that their activity is only a means, not an end. In peacetime, such erroneous views are easier to paralyze and will not matter much, but in a fleeting war, even the slightest mistake of ours can cause failure. Therefore, for successful warfare, technology and science must not be allies. but vassals of the military administration.

Thus, in the army, as in focus, the life of the entire state should be concentrated, and since the commander is at the head of the army, and behind him is the chief of the general staff, who is the actual commander, the latter should regulate the entire life of the state. This is how we understand Moltke, unless we are mistaken. How far is the triumvirate!!?

The German field marshal, in his Military Teachings, to which we have referred so far, will not give us such a vividly outlined image of a commander as Clausewitz did.

However, we know that the commander should not be afraid of judicial responsibility, because his responsibility before "God and his own conscience" is much higher, that he can lose the "crown or scepter", attributes that are quite significant, according to Moltke.

The commander must make bold decisions, but "it is a mistake to think that it is possible to carry out a war plan drawn up in advance from beginning to end. The first encounter with enemy armed forces creates, depending on its outcome, always a new situation; much that was previously meant becomes impossible, and much that previously could not be counted on becomes possible. The commander must correctly assess the changed situation, make the necessary orders for the near future and vigorously carry them out. Elsewhere Moltke writes: "The commander never loses sight of his main goal and is

not embarrassed by the inevitable partial deviations from it, but he cannot determine in advance with certainty the way in which he hopes to achieve this goal." Pointing to the "clouded obscurity" situation in the war, Moltke continues: "and yet the conduct of troops is not a matter of blind arbitrariness. All these accidents, in the end, are equally beneficial or harmful to one side or the other; therefore, a general whose measures, if not the most successful, but still expedient, still has a chance to achieve his goal. It is clear that theoretical knowledge alone is not enough for this; war provides an opportunity to develop the mind and temper the character until complete perfection is achieved in this respect; a preparatory military education, as well as military historical and life experience, can serve as an important help.

We believe that the last three qualities for a commander will be much more necessary than his fear "of God and his own conscience."

It would be superfluous to say that Moltke himself, as a commander, is backed by his enormous capacity for work, his mind, his wide development both military and general, his secrecy and silence, as well as the eternal share of intrigue. The future field marshal, already in his mature years, embarked on the road marked for generals, slowly approaching it along the roundabout paths of "life experience". As befits an honest German, he did not steal the "sacred fire" from the sky, like Napoleon, but with his excellent manners and ability to dance, according to the concept of aristocrats, made himself famous. Unfortunately, the philosopher of war Clausewitz for some reason did not foresee this path for the future commander, much more

decent than engaging in theft. Schlieffen himself, apparently out of a sense of admiration for his predecessor as chief of the general staff, kept silent about him. Perhaps, for Moltke there was no other way, because by his nature he was not a "son of the revolution", like Napoleon. But if it is necessary to choose the road to the generals, then we would rather take the path that Napoleon took, although he is harsh and reprehensible, rather than resorting to the help of legs for his glory.

The promotion of generals in France took a different path, where the cult of the "soldier" flourished, expressed in personal courage and a certain rudeness among the marshals of the III Empire. France remained on the recognition of the need for full power for the commander, putting forward in the latter, mainly, his strong-willed qualities and his military experience, which was generously drawn from various colonial expeditions.

"Collective" command, a product of the invention of German brains, was not recognized by French military thought until the second year of the World War, but then it made its way, more thorny than that of the Central Powers. Be

that as it may, but behind the screen of the monarch in the role of commander in Germany, the chief of the general staff had to act with all the data for this high position.

Before Schlieffen, German military thought lived on the precepts of the elder Moltke and did not put forward new provisions. Therefore, we turn to Schlieffen's already well-known article "The Commander" and see how a true commander-in-chief should differ. "If

a commander starting his career," writes Schlieffen, "relies solely on his divine destiny, on his genius, on the support and patronage of a higher power, then his victory will be poorly secured. Hard work prepares the commander for his high calling; his spiritual and mental powers must rise to full clarity."

"But how much knowledge is required from a commander! - exclaims Schlieffen and continues: - he must not only be able to lead the army to victory, he must create it, arm it, equip it, train it, equip it and feed it. It is possible, of course, that there will be other persons who will take on these tasks, but it is unlikely that they will succeed.

please the commander. The commander cannot become the head of any army. He must have his own army." "However, the

troops, even the best, are not enough to wage war. War is only a means of politics. For this remedy to be effective, the preparatory work of the statesman is necessary. "Consequently, the commander must be both an outstanding statesman and a diplomat. In addition, he must have at his disposal those huge sums that the war absorbs. After showing then the work of the commander in the conduct of the war, Schlieffen comes to the conclusion: "nevertheless, the condition for present

and past success is a true commander" and predicts: "In 1866 and 1870. the commander was presented in the form of a triumvirate, and this experience was a success, but this does not mean at all that he must always succeed.

A contemporary of Schlieffen, a singer of German militarism, Bernhardi, in his work "Modern War", which appeared before the world war, gives the following image of the commander. "The art of war cannot exist without

freedom," says Bernhardi, "and therefore the need for conscious freedom of action within certain limits makes demands on the commander that only a few can satisfy, and meanwhile, the fate of the army and the state depends on their fulfillment. The general content of these requirements extends to the most diverse areas and calls to work all the abilities and forces

person."

"Let us first take the field of practical control of troops," continues Bernhardi, "we will see that only a complete knowledge of the means with which a war is waged will allow the commander to carry out his strategic will. If he has not become accustomed to the material conditions of warfare, then he runs the risk of becoming dependent on them and, consequently, losing some of his freedom.

“Meanwhile, in these questions of practical skill, we are talking about the simplest requirements from the commander, about knowledge and abilities acquired by continuous studies, reflections and practical exercises. To objects of a completely different order are the demands placed on his mental and moral personality.

“The commander must begin his task free from prejudice and prejudice, from fear of people and from the fetters of selfishness, from submission to his own passions and weaknesses, from fear of responsibility and risk; he must selflessly serve only the cause and be able to endure physical and moral stress. His task takes two forms: assumptions and actions; these forms, of course, mutually condition and complement each other, but they presuppose completely different types of working capacity. In the development of plans, the mental personality of the commander plays a role primarily, and in actions, the moral one, and yet mental power and moral strength must always support and complement each other. The preservation of the commander's mental balance and clear judgment is so important that it must be recognized as the most indispensable basis of military art. However, it is infinitely difficult to satisfy these requirements among the thousand difficulties that the commander presents hourly. “First of all, it is necessary to understand the general political situation, correctly assess the

means of struggle both one's own and the enemy's, and, together with the leaders of state policy, outline the military goal necessary to achieve the political goal. Then it is necessary to develop a plan of war, to correctly assess the persons called upon to direct the actions, as well as the enemy commanders, their intentions and characteristics. All this work is primarily mental, but it also requires considerable firmness of character to reject various demands that are unacceptable from a military point of view. “These demands are already revealed in peacetime, in preparation for war, which in a certain sense should be relegated to the realm of strategy.

Financial difficulties, public opinion, misjudgment of the political situation, philistinism,

a materialistic understanding of life, and finally, parties hostile to the state among the people themselves - all this presses the organizer of the war from all sides and tries to divert his attention from the strict requirements of military necessity. On the other hand, peaceful and ceremonial fun with a serious weapon of war, false views on the engineering defense of the state and the conduct of war, connivance and concession to war-hostile interests too often led to the neglect of military affairs, the weakening of the combat readiness of the army and the involvement of the state in the gravest catastrophe.

Speaking about the difficulties that arise before the commander during a strategic deployment, Bernhardi lists them: "Here they cry for help to the provinces, which would be more advantageous militarily to give to the enemy for a while; there it is necessary to use the railway network, at which the apparent advantage in fact in the field of strategy and tactics turns into disadvantages; political and dynastic influences, personal ambition and envy of senior commanders and all the weaknesses that are inherent in a person make themselves felt - and all this often led the commander onto a path that was completely irreconcilable with his military conscience. "It is

extremely difficult for the commander to get rid of all these side influences, especially since very often they try to rely on the external authority of officials and seeming justice. Only a firm character and a clear mind can lead purely military ideas in the struggle of views, desires and demands, creating success, which alone can remove all obstacles and satisfy all desires.

"The same demands and obstacles that have to be overcome in drawing up a plan for war," says Bernhardi, "often make themselves felt when conducting it." "Do not succumb to

these influences, neither deadly pessimism nor excessive optimism, maintain under all circumstances a calm balance of the soul, which only contributes to clarity of judgment and decisiveness of action, and nevertheless preserve the strength of will and thinking, which allows you to achieve the highest results, show the highest courage and to keep the initiative in victory and defeat - all this makes the highest demands on the strength of mind and the moral and mental freedom of the commander.

“Only with this freedom can he remain at the right height, and in happiness and in misfortune retain the versatility and variability of decisions that do not allow him to act according to preconceived notions, and who is able in each individual case to apply such means that, under given conditions, ensure victory.”

“We are on the borderline of an area that is not amenable to scientific research and penetration into the theory of military art and, despite this, which has a very significant influence on the conduct of war. This is an area of the highest expediency, determined not by military successes, but by people's psychological, moral and world historical moments. “We recognize,” Bernhardt concludes his image of a

commander, “that in all actions in a war that decides the fate of peoples and states, one must be guided by higher considerations and that a commander can completely freely fulfill his duties only if he rises high above the crowd and learns on a par with a statesman worthy of this name, to look at things and evaluate them in the national and world historical light. Only under this condition will he be able to know the true essence of war and conduct it expediently in the highest sense.

this word.”

This is how military thought worked on the banks of the Spree, while on the other side of the Rhine it gets a bias, namely, towards intellectualism. “Free martial art! Leval

exclaims. “But this is a speculative strategy, the art of combinations, and the mechanism is the positive or scientific part.” “The war is not only fought in the brain, as some people think.

The brain is more of a designing organ than a creative organ. Brains need to deliver all sorts of data, and the latter are

positive.

Reason, judgment and induction process these data, resulting in a combination, a project of an operation (the speculative part). Then, in order to understand how this idea is feasible in life, the intervention of calculation (the positive part) is necessary.

“Depending on the phase, the essence and conditional tasks change. In the field of theory, mind and will dominate: action here has

predominantly spiritual. This is art with its accompanying surprises, arbitrariness, impulses and infinity. "Then one must leave these heights, where complete

freedom reigns, and descend to the earth, where everything is a continuous obstacle, pass from the imaginary to the real, set in motion individual units, impulse the masses, overcome resistance, satisfy all requirements, foresee, calculate. Here art fades, and science enters the scene with all its precision and positivism. "The poetic side of the war is gradually fading away," Leval concludes. Her glittering charm gives way to machinery. Art turns away from the

ideal and more and more deviates towards realism; it is a consequence of technology."

According to Leval, "they talk a lot about genius... Genius is undoubtedly a natural talent, since its prerequisites are broad intellectuality and a very comprehensive mind..." Hence the conclusion: "Natural talents alone are not enough to create a military leader. The proponents of innate ideas strive in vain to bring inspiration back to the fore. Inspiration is no more, if it ever existed at all"... "Knowledge is now more useful than ever. The widespread dissemination of new inventions tends more and more to smooth out the moral differences between nations: superiority will go to the best drilled, to the more skilled, to the better trained: but the scales of fate, of course, will always sensitively respond if the genius of the leader is placed on one of the cups.

Moltke's success Leval explains precisely by the greater presence of science than art: "Field Marshal Moltke showed much more science than art, mechanization prevailed over his idea."

"Organization and command are more important than everything," Bonal wrote. "Military virtues alone are not enough. It is necessary that, besides them, there be large intelligent forces that would work for a long time according to a good method and in an environment favorable to them.

The idea of a "military mandarinat" filled the Gallic minds, who explained their failures in 70 by illiteracy in their military affairs.

marshals of the III Empire, who sought to base their actions on the strong-willed qualities of the commander.

We have not touched on Russian views on the commander; they, with the light hand of Leer, carried a preference for intellectualism, and thinkers like Dragomirov turned out to be prophets in the desert. True, it must be said that intellectualism, especially among the Russians, was not inculcated, and the Russian generals were not averse to putting "inspiration" in the first place, because it did not bother the brains in preliminary work - an advantage very important for Russian generals. Rather, Russian military thought did not have stable views on the role and importance of the commander in modern conditions and lovingly cultivated Suvorov's idea: "Full power to the elected commander," especially since it provided "military mandarins" well, which were Russian commanders before the world war. war, and even during this time.

During the last period, many different "military mandarins" - intellectualists and voluntarists - passed in our memory, and now most of them, having lost their distinctive balls, sometimes think about what is required from the commanders of our days, and share their thoughts with us.

Some of these thoughts, especially those tangerines that turned out not to be in the wreckage, we will allow us to offer to the readers of our story. We now find it difficult to seek the truth in the statements of the commanders who are still in glory because of the personal nature of these people.

So, let's turn to the famous "pair" of tangerines, which are especially claimed the role of great people - Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

These "statesmen" of our day frankly to us they say that they were not particularly interested in politics.

"I have never been interested in politicians and parties," Ludendorff tells us, but at the same time he reveals that this, in fact, concerned those parties that spoke "of an agreement, instead of raising the fighting capacity of the nation." "The government and the majority parties came together and internally rejected me with my soldier's thinking."

"It is clear that I found more followers among those parties which, like myself, considered the agreement, in view of the destructive

aspirations of the enemy, impossible, and therefore advocated the maximum manifestation of energy in the conduct of war. I never approached them, but they trusted me. It was a right-wing minority. That's why those others labeled me a 'reactionary' even though I was only thinking about waging war." "I am neither a

'reactionary' nor a 'democrat'," continues the well-known chief of staff. "During the war, my goal was this: the greatest energy in the conduct of the war and the strengthening of military and equivalent agricultural vitality for the future of Germany." It turns out that ill-wishers and friends

dragged Ludendorff into "party differences", and his protests turned out to be futile, because "it was convenient for the government to find a lightning rod", which was essentially guided by "direct soldier thinking."

We know perfectly well that this was far from the way Ludendorff, who tried to take control of the whole country into his own hands, paints for us. What he did not have enough for this is also known; he was not a "statesman", but only after the war did he study questions that influence the war no less than purely military factors. "Guided by the direct thinking of

a soldier," Ludendorff reveals to us that "management of the front, concern for the army and for maintaining the combat readiness of the homeland were in the first place among all jobs. Military-political questions of the future were only in the second line. Now we know what the first line gave, and the second, unfamiliar to the first quartermaster general, could no longer support it. Meanwhile, the German brains of Clausewitz thought about this as follows: "no one starts a war (or, for a reason, acting reasonably, should not start) without saying to himself: "What does he want to achieve with the war and what in the war itself. "The first is the aim of the war," teaches Clausewitz, "and the last is the aim of the war."

Ludendorff's patron Hindenburg, in his memoirs, which are weaker in literary terms, echoes his chief of staff.

"And during my activity in the highest command posts in the East, and after my appointment as chief of the general staff of the army, I had no need to deal with issues of modern

more politics than was absolutely necessary. True, in the conditions of a positional war, I considered it impossible for the military command to completely dissociate itself from politics. "It will be

agreed with me that there is no sharp boundary between politics and military leadership," Hindenburg reveals to us. "They must coordinate their actions even in peacetime. In a time of war that consumes all their strength, they must complement each other." In

essence, all the commanders of the world war had such views on politics and strategy, and when in one army or another the government, the political parties of the majority, wanted to take control of the country into their own hands, they met with a sharp rebuff from their "military mandarins".

It is not our task to give an assessment of the German mandarins mentioned above, which made Delbrück better than us in Germany in relation to Ludendorff. Proving the political illiteracy of this evil Teuton, the professor of history comes to the conclusion that "the most important strategists turned out to be statesmen to a greater extent." What did Ludendorff represent in the "primary" of all social relations - the economy. Delbrück gives us the answer through the mouth of another figure, an economist: "We are ruled by a mad Cadet," he once told me with dull despair at a turn in 1917-18. one of those close to the solution of these (economic) cases. Apparently, this leader was not from among the "rightists", to whom the "crazy Cadet" was and remains kind. No matter how seductive the path of criticism of Ludendorff's actions and thoughts, we have no right to take this path. because it will distract us from our task. We will cast a cursory glance only at his judgments about the military qualities of the commander.

Recognizing "war as a crude craft," the first quartermaster general, after cruel lessons, clarified the essence of this phenomenon in the life of mankind, without leaving, however, his craft view of it.

"In all respects, the army and the people, in my deepest conviction, should be one whole," he now teaches. "The conduct of war requires not only will and far-sightedness," says Ludendorff, "but also the mastery of all mighty military

apparatus, which is achieved and maintained only by iron diligence. One more thing must be added here: an understanding of the psyche of the troops and the characteristics of the enemy. This is no longer developed, but lies, like many other things, in the very individuality of a person. When solving complex combat missions, it is necessary to be able to reckon with surprises. But the most important thing is mutual trust and faith in victory, which unite the troops and

generals." The war materialized. Such a voluntarist as Ludendorff was, and he admits that "coal is as important for the conduct of war as oil", that "coal and iron form the basis of any war industry"; that agriculture is as important to warfare as the war industry.

Therefore, the "military couple", according to Ludendorff, "sought to avoid any boundless plans" and "in all activities proceeded solely from military requirements."

The war crushed with its grandiosity such people who were "guided by simple soldier thinking", and Ludendorff himself admits this more than once. "Many tests fall on the share of the commander," he says. - The laymen simply look at the war as an arithmetic problem with certain values, in fact, it is anything but this. This is a struggle of great unexplored physical and mental forces, especially difficult for the side that fights in the minority. We have to reckon with the different characters and subjective properties of people, and only the will of the leader is the regulating value in this chaos."

"Only the head of state or statesman who decides to go to war, if he does it with a pure heart, experiences the same, or even more, than the commander. But still, for him, the question lies in one major decision, while these decisions are required from the commander daily and hourly. The well-being of hundreds of thousands of people, even entire nations, constantly depends on it. For a military man, nothing can be greater, but also more difficult, than to stand at the head of an army or an entire people's army.

"Every leader is obliged to engage in preparatory reflections. He has no right to live for today, since both military operations and troops suffer from it. Iron reality takes care of itself so that the intentions in which

the strength of the troops does not correspond to the strength of the enemy's resistance, they did not turn into life. "War is so grandiose," concludes Ludendorff, "and gives such a wide scope for brilliant creativity that one person cannot fulfill all the requirements it imposes." Thus, the

commander is dismembered even with the military leadership of the war. "With my

monstrous work overload and my heavy responsibility, I could only tolerate independent direct people around me, from whom I demanded that they frankly express their opinions, which they sometimes did very thoroughly. With deep faith in their own strength, my employees stood steadfastly and firmly by my side. They were selfless and at the same time independent assistants imbued with the highest consciousness of duty. The right to decide, of course, belonged to me, since the responsibility that I bore allowed no hesitation. The war demanded swift action. But there was no self-will in my decisions, and when I evaded the offers of my employees, I never insulted them. In these cases, and also when there was an exchange of opinions, I tried, without falling into ambiguity, to recognize views that did not coincide with mine.

True, according to Hoffmann, Ludendorff's closest assistant in the East, the latter is insincere in his statements, and in 1918 Hoffmann, already the chief of staff of the commander-in-chief in the East, having diverged in views with Ludendorff on the conditions of the Brest peace, suffered a lot of trouble from the headquarters, having come to the conclusion , "that even big people are

petty." We will not go into Ludendorff's personal life. He was official sociable, and "in general, I kept myself completely closed, since I knew people very well," he confesses.

This concludes our excursion to get acquainted with the theoretical appearance of the commander.

From this cursory acquaintance, without unnecessary evidence, it is clear how right Napoleon was, who advised "to realize and understand whether I was created for war or not." Very, very good advice for our day, and we would warmly recommend that it be followed not only by candidates for generals, but in general by every military leader.

True, someone else may overestimate his strength, but still such an internal analysis will be useful for him, forcing him to think about his actions and what is missing to replenish the necessary qualities and knowledge.

Chapter VI

Thoughts on the Chief of the General Staff

A. Svechin about the "integral commander". - Conrad's mind is "one-sided study". - Konrad is a politician. - Conrad's independent policy. - The lack of "political instinct" in Konrad. – Politics and strategy in modern coverage. - Conrad's military knowledge: - Conrad is an "intellectualist". - The meaning of "combat experience". - Proportion of the end with the means. – Conrad's lack of ability to understand people. - Strong character, ardor and stubbornness of Conrad. - The absence of Napoleon's "square" in Conrad. - Conrad's performance. – His isolation and the reasons for it. Mass work. – Konrad is an "ordinary person", a member of the "collective" that manages the war in action.

In the previous chapter, we dwelled more or less in detail on the theory of the "commander", since we will need its provisions not only to understand the personality of Konrad), but also in further research on the service of the general staff in general. We will not bother the reader with an

exposition of our theory about the commander, because we believe that the classics said everything for us and much more authoritatively than we would begin to state, or rather, retell their thoughts. We will only note some of the thoughts of our time.

Let us return to the former Chief of the Austrian General Staff. Our first acquaintance with him cannot, of course, be exhaustive, but the impression received allows us to give Konrad some assessment.

We consider the chief of the general staff as a "commander", but not in the old sense, but only as a "statesman", as a member of the "collective" that directs the war. What we have outlined above indicates that we are far from transferring "complete freedom" to the hands of a "commander" in directing the war. It must be said that in our military literature there are already quite sound

thoughts on this question. A. Svechin in the "Strategy", speaking of the "integral commander", comes to the conclusion that "the war is waged by the supreme power of the state; too important and responsible are the decisions that the leadership of the war must make to be entrusted to any agent of the executive

authorities".

"Our ideas of leadership are perverted by the use of the term 'supreme commander'," he continues, "we associate him with the person to whom the active armies and navies are subordinate and who consolidates all power in the theater of operations. In reality, such a commander-in-chief is not supreme, since the leadership of foreign and domestic policy and the entire rear of the active armies is not subordinate to him, since he does not have all the power in the entire state. The commander-in-chief strategist represents only part of the leadership of the war ... Full power to the elected commander is an outdated, however, never reflecting any reality formula.

Recognizing the need to unite the leadership of the war on the fronts of "political, economic and armed struggle", A. Svechin finds that "only the leading head of the ruling class, personifying the highest political competence in the state, exercising supreme power ... The team of this head is integral commander. We heard that Clausewitz also saw in the commander-in-chief a commander without the prefix "supreme", and therefore we consider the chief of the general

staff as "the strategist commander-in-chief, representing only part of the leadership of the war."

The theory indisputably speaks of the need for a commander to have a balance of mind and character, and both of them must be highly developed, distinguishing the commander from other military leaders. As for Konrad's

mental abilities, they certainly distinguished him not only among the generals of the Austro-Hungarian army, but also among the chiefs of general staffs of other European armies. The mind of the commander, according to Clausewitz, should be more inquisitive, comprehensive, rather than creative and one-sided studying. In the first property of the mind - inquisitiveness, we cannot refuse Konrad, but as regards his breadth, grasping more or less correctly military phenomena, the chief of the Austrian general staff in setting up a political forecast did not rise above the rest of the bureaucrats of the Danubian Empire. In this respect, Conrad's mind was precisely a "one-sided study", which did not correspond much to the high position that was occupied by the hero of our story.

From a young age, Konrad has been intensively studying military affairs. A wide acquaintance with the history of recent wars, up to visiting the battlefields, extracting experimental data from these wars, constant reflection on the war - all this contributed to the development of the mental abilities of the Chief of the Austrian General Staff. It cannot be said that Conrad understood and foresaw the nature of the future world war - no, in this he did not reach the greatness of the commander, but that here too he was no lower than the other chiefs of the general staffs of other armies, and perhaps even surpassed them, there can be no doubt Maybe.

Conrad confesses to us that he was reluctantly drawn into political life, for which he had no prior preparation. In this, of course, we see a natural consequence of the education of military leaders of the late 19th century, reinforced, moreover, by the views of Moltke. But, once embarking on the path of politics, Conrad boldly moved forward, revealing in his judgments the thoughts of the famous German field marshal. For Konrad, politics, "unfortunately", was also inseparable from strategy, so all the aspirations of the chief of the general staff were directed towards the neutralization of politics. Receiving instructions from above about working in contact with politics, often repeating this himself, Konrad actually sought to lead

independent policy, which, according to his concepts, best meets the military situation of the state.

We cannot testify that the political views of the Chief of the Austrian General Staff correctly grasped both the "state life, the dominant direction, the interests involved and the pressing issues" of Austria-Hungary, as well as its "state relations" with other states. They did not rise above the concepts of a convinced monarchist, who frightened even Franz Joseph with extremes in domestic politics and no less embarrassed all political figures not only in Austria, but also abroad with his militant mood.

Like Moltke, so Conrad's whole life was concentrated only in the war and in the army. Clausewitz's understanding of war was alien to these militarists. We cannot find any justification for this even in the well-known political illiteracy of the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, recognized by himself, since the philosopher of war did not demand scholarship from the commander, but a true political instinct. This was not given to Conrad, why in political judgments he turned out to be a mere echo of the right-wing parties, and not a true statesman, which a commander should be.

We may be told that this could not have been required of Conrad, since under the system of the triumvirate, political life should be presented not by the general, but by the chancellor or foreign minister, or by the monarch himself. As an apostle to Moltke, Conrad faithfully followed his doctrine of the triumvirate and interpreted it in the same spirit as the German field marshal. Behind the screen of the triumvirate, Conrad hid a wide military power over politics. We have seen how all German theorists, starting with Moltke, present us with this power of a commander, and only Clausewitz was ahead of them, recognizing the collective management of the war and exposing the monarch as a necessary attribute of its successful conduct. From the monarch, Clausewitz requires only: "a strong, bright head and a strong character." Needless

to say, the triumvirate has decisively failed, as a system of directing the war, into the imperialist war. Already during it, the "collective" of the leadership of the war appeared on the scene.

The philosopher of war we have indicated also determined the functions of the commander-in-chief in this "collective". Recognizing that the commander must be a "statesman", Clausewitz demanded that he first of all remain a "commander", i.e. military leader. The nature of his work should be directed to the knowledge of the military essence of war, without losing sight of the other sides. In interpreting this position; the descendants of Clausewitz by blood, the Germans from the banks of the Spree, and after them Konrad, came to the interpretation of the military dictatorship in the conduct of the war, which so dramatically failed in our memory. "Mandarins of the General Staff" were far from the true knowledge of the higher side of the war and paid for it with their heads.

A. Svechin in his "Strategy" explains this by the fact that "the dominance of politics over strategy" ... "is always in doubt in those states" that represent an organized state of an already obsolete class, in a position of historical defense, whose regime has rotted and which is forced to lead an unhealthy politician to sacrifice the interests of the whole for the preservation

his **domination...** Strategy seeks to emancipate itself from bad politics, but without politics, in a vacuum, strategy cannot exist; it is doomed to pay for all the sins of politics." According to the author, "the dominance of politics over strategy" "is not subject to any doubt when the creator of politics is a young class moving towards a broad future, whose historical health is also reflected in the form of the healthy politics pursued by it."

There is no doubt that a "healthy policy" leads to a "healthy strategy," but "emancipation" of such was caused by other reasons. If we take the war of 1870, it cannot be denied that Bismarck pursued a "healthy policy", that the war contributed to the development of the productive forces of Germany, that the Germans in their desire for unification were to some extent a "young class". However, we well know how Moltke strove to "emancipate" himself from this policy, which, apparently, he considered "sick", and very "regretted" that the strategist had to reckon with politics. We will not be far from the truth if we say that the General Staff considered the only "healthy" policy -

"his" politics and no one else's, that it was about the subordination of politics to strategy, which in general is "politics is the opium of strategy", as Leval

declared it. If today the bourgeois states are in a state of "historical defense", then they do not want to hand over politics and the hands of strategists for a single minute, taking the worldview of the general staff into blinkers, and if the latter, under the guise of a "super-general staff", seeks to maintain its former positions, then these are its last efforts.

Thus,

unfortunately, we have no right to enroll Conrad, as an admirer of Moltke's theory, in the ranks of "statesmen", among whom the commander should have been. Now let's turn to

the military knowledge of the former chief of the general staff. It was noted above that, through a long study of military history, through his little combat experience and long military service, he tried to understand the essence of modern warfare. In this area, we observe the work of his inquisitive mind,

striving to grasp the nature of the future war as a whole, trying to find hollow ways to wage war and battle. Verifying the knowledge gained from books by experience, drawing the

necessary conclusions himself, speaking with a pen in his hands in defense of his positions, preaching them from the pulpit at the Military Academy, Konrad tried not only to expand his knowledge, not only to develop his mind, but also to transfer this knowledge into the depths of the army. In other words, he was preparing "his own army."

Whether it was only within the power of the chief of the general staff is another

question. One way or another, but the above views of Conrad on war, on its conduct by the state, on modern combat training of troops, on the need for knowledge of the army for its correct management, reveal in him a military figure with a broad theoretical background, standing on the right path of thinking. Some of his views have not lost their freshness to this day.

In view of this, we will rather join the opinion of Ludendorff and other contemporary witnesses, who recognize from the former

Chief of the Austrian General Staff has a broad military mind, than we agree with the opinion of Krauss, who considers him a narrow tactician.

There are no words that the department of tactics, followed by military service, left a mark on Konrad and he was really more interested in the tactical side of the battle, but it is impossible to deprive him of sound strategic thinking. Tactics should also be in use by the commander, as well as high strategic plans. We heard Leval's ardent preaching of a positive strategy and we think that the commander's knowledge of the "geometry" of military affairs - tactics, is far from useless.

Defending and widely preaching the applied method of studying military affairs, Conrad, however, was more inclined to develop knowledge in a military figure than character. In this, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff was not able to overcome, but rather even deepened the desire that reigned in the army for the broad development of military knowledge to the detriment of developing a strong will and character. Theoretically, he certainly recognized the necessity of the latter, and even the applied method itself should have served to strengthen them, but it was difficult to overcome the already established way of life in the army. Conrad went with the flow...

This preference for knowledge in military affairs by the Chief of the General Staff of the Danube Army, despite his admiration for German military thought, for its prominent authorities, gives us reason to include him in the ranks of the "intellectualists" who reigned supreme west of the Rhine.

Such a transition of Konrad to the ranks of scientific "tadpoles", in the figurative expression of A. Svechin, was facilitated by the little combat experience that fell to his lot, and, moreover, in lower command positions. Two insignificant campaigns - that's the whole combat experience that Konrad could be guided by, moving up the career ladder to the commanders. There was only one way to know the higher side of the war - its study on historical samples, which was followed by the chief of the general staff, without avoiding the passion for science. True, combat experience is not everything. Dragomirov characterized Moltke in 1867: "General Moltke is one of those strong and rare people for whom a deep theoretical study of military affairs has almost replaced practice." You can not have the latter, but correctly understand the essence of the war and be able to conduct it,

bringing it to a victorious end. Many of Konrad's peers found themselves in an even worse position, such as Ludendorff, but still victory fell to their lot. Therefore, we by no means intend to introduce the experience of war as an indispensable given for the future commander, but we consider it useful, regulating the book study of such a phenomenon as war. For someone who does not have this experience, it is much more difficult to stay on the right path to knowledge of the higher side of the war, but nevertheless these paths are

not ordered for him. We have seen both from the theory and from Conrad's reasoning that the modern military leader must "know the army" and even "create" it. Such knowledge is not based, of course, on one close acquaintance with the troops, but is achieved: 1) direct service in combat units and 2) personal tour of the troops, inspecting them and directing them on maneuvers. We noted that military service should be included as mandatory steps in the career ladder of a candidate for chief of the general staff. Konrad proudly celebrates his long stay in combat units, which should have given him the opportunity to study the Habsburg army. However, as Krauss testifies, as well as other contemporaries of Konrad, it was he who lacked this knowledge of the instrument of war, since all his operational plans, magnificent in theory, were smashed first of all by his own army. The chief of the general staff himself theoretically demanded proportionality of plans with the strength of the troops, and no one else, like him, violated this, being carried away by the romantic side of warfare. If the commander is obliged to balance the end with the means, then in this we cannot see in Conrad qualities that bring him closer to the host of great people. Clausewitz pointed out that "there is no need for him (the commander) to be a great observer, able to analyze

human characters to the smallest detail; but he must know the temper, the way of thinking, the merits and demerits of those whom he will have to order. Other theorists repeat this, adding the need to understand the characters of enemy leaders. The former chief of the Austrian General Staff, according to his contemporaries, was not an expert on people, and subsequently was bitterly disappointed in the candidates nominated by him, not

proven themselves on the battlefields. We noted that personal sympathies, family ties and attachments played an important role in Conrad's assessment of people, which, on the one hand, is explained by his special character traits, and, on the other, by that corrupting environment. the ruling class and the top of the army, which

was in the Danubian Empire. If the philosopher of war did not demand from the commander a petty knowledge of the nature of his subordinates, but only a definition of their basic qualities that depict their suitability for military activity, then in Conrad we will rather find precisely the desire to be based on the petty properties of people, rather than, given the main positive features, put up with human weaknesses.

So far, we have studied the mental development of the former chief of the general staff, but this is not yet a patent for generals, since the latter must also be characterized by a strong character. The theory makes high demands on the latter, revealing the need for energy, firmness, confidence, courage and

strength.

When meeting with the former Chief of the Austrian General Staff, his independence in judgments and actions was noted. He himself spoke of the need for energy and initiative in work, which was inherent in him. Persistent in his reports and demands on his subordinates, Konrad possessed the necessary courage and strength of character, but this courage sometimes hampered the freedom of mind, considerations and intentions. Leading a "continuous battle" in his position, Conrad was so carried away by the very process of it that he was ready to fight for the sake of art, but not expediency. A painful feeling of "prestige" penetrated the whole being of the chief of the general staff, and only before the Habsburgs did this servant who was devoted to them bend his neck, patiently enduring the wounds inflicted on his pride. Only these rulers forced Conrad to drown out in himself a painful self-esteem, which in relation to the rest was revealed so sharply that we noted above the presence of those two camps in which the chief of the general staff divided those around him - friends and enemies.

All of the above suggests that we have an energetic, persistent nature with a fairly strong character, but at the same time passionate and stubborn. These last features were so

developed, which sometimes obscured the mind of Conrad, making him a slave to his feelings. In a word, it was a "hot" head, which Clausewitz contrasted with a "cold head" in a true commander.

True to the teachings of Moltke, the former chief of the general staff was not afraid of any judicial responsibility, apparently, just like the German field marshal, considering himself responsible only "before God and his own conscience." We do not want to instill in modern commanders the fear of responsibility for their actions. On the contrary, we affirm that in this they should show courage and readiness to always give an account of their actions, that they should have a love for responsibility, that responsibility should only arouse in them a feeling of joy, but we resolutely deny those idols before whom they, according to Moltke, should be accountable. They are solely responsible to the government that appointed them. So, the balance of mind and

character, which should reveal the commander, we do not notice in the former chief of the Austrian general staff to the extent that was necessary for him in his high position. If we follow the theory of Bernhardi outlined above, we will see that in the plans where the mind should dominate, Conrad was strong there, but even then sometimes passion burst into his calculations. As for putting plans into practice, here the "hot" head of the chief of staff often brought him over the top - the Habsburg commander lacked proper restraint, and he was far from the "square" that the little corporal recommended for great generals.

"I am always working," said Napoleon; the same can rightfully be said about himself by Konrad, wholly devoted himself to his heavy duties. We

would begin to break through the "open door" if we proceeded to prove the need for a great capacity for work in the chief of staff. Modern military affairs have become so complicated, they are advancing so rapidly that the need to go toe-to-toe with them forces us to hard work. The days of the modern chief of the general staff do not have excessive hours, but, on the contrary, there is a lack of them, because the workload is great. There are no words that it is not far from such a load to overload, and then overwork and neurasthenia, and therefore for

It is very important for the chief of staff to normalize their work, perhaps by resorting to the NOT system, it is necessary to support your body and spirit, not bringing them to exhaustion. We do not want to give recipes for normal days of the chief of the general staff, because such "high" people should have their own "genre" not only to wage war, but also to

work. We would not like to intrude into the personal life of the chief of the general staff, and we will focus on only one thing - this is his isolation from others. As we saw above, this isolation was not characteristic of him alone, Ludendorff recognized it in himself, Joffre, Falkenhain and other modern generals of Konrad, not to mention Moltke (senior) and Schlieffen, were the same people who had gone into themselves.

This indication of the closed nature of the character of modern leaders, perhaps, can be recognized as a necessary property of the "military mandarins" of the era that has just gone through, if there were no natural explanation for it. Ludendorff frankly stated that those around him, whom he "knew the price", forced him to withdraw. A tangle of intrigues, gossip, eternal squabbles - this is the atmosphere in which the generals of the recent past had to live. There is no need to recall the intrigues of Moltke and Bismarck and describe those that reigned in various armies before and during the world war - they are well known without us. The "military mandarin", in addition to fulfilling his direct duties, also found himself forced to protect his high place, to fend off intrigue in time, to inquire about the health of candidates for his place, so that they would also be removed from their path in time, as Joffre did, and others from contemporary leaders of both camps. In a word, the most prosaic reality has left the seal of silence on the lips of the great mandarins of our day.

We absolutely do not want to say that the modern commander should be a cheerful fellow, which is called "the soul to plow." No, he is obliged to be restrained in his judgments and in his treatment of those around him, but at the same time to keep aloof from the latter, not to bring with him that tense atmosphere of grandeur, poisoned by distrust of those around him, which we observed everywhere in the imperialist war. The authority of the commander must

to keep not on isolation, but on his inner qualities that distinguish him from those around him. In the old days, the rulers of the eastern countries considered it necessary to show themselves to the people as little as possible, so that, by creating and maintaining in the latter legends about their "divine" origin, they would further strengthen their power. Today, authority is created not by alienation from the masses, but, on the contrary, by extensive work in their thickness. Therefore, isolation is not only not useful, but, on the contrary, is harmful to the modern military leader. The age of military

mandarins has already passed ... We apologize for our detailed acquaintance with the personality of Konrad, which forced us to recall the theory. We ask for indulgence in our attempt to understand the modern commander, which, we admit, may be weak and suffers from unnecessary length and repetition. We repeat again that our work does not pretend to be "commandments" for the commander - the chief of the general staff, that all our reasoning is undertaken for the correct depiction of the personality of Conrad.

We have noted so many negative aspects of the "military mandarin" of the Habsburg monarchy that has sunk into history that we can pass a harsh sentence on this man who once went to military glory, and now recently ended his life with a pen in his hands.

There are no words that if we were to demand from Conrad all the qualities that a commander should have had in Napoleon's understanding of him, then our conclusions would certainly be negative. But we have tried to show that today you cannot find a commander as a whole, as an individual, that his being has turned into a "collective", that even the famous triumvirate has turned out to be powerless in modern warfare. We are not inclined

to seek salvation in "geniuses" and have tried to find out that a "genius" also needs both education and strength of character, like a mere mortal. Therefore, it is most correct to consider Konrad as a military member of the "collective", who alone controls the war and in general, as a military leader of high brand. We do not think to hide the fact that such a figure needs many of the qualities that theory attributed to the commander.

Of the others, the former chief of the general staff was missing, and if he cannot therefore be enrolled in the "stars of the first

size", then nevertheless he also possessed the valuable qualities of a military man, being able to "shine" in senior command positions, and not just "at the head of a cavalry regiment."

First of all, it is not our intention to seek out "heroes", and therefore we do not think, repeating again all the advantages and disadvantages of Conrad, to elevate him to the high rank of "modern commander".

Yes, and after the world war, Conrad himself knew all the futility, perhaps, of his innermost thoughts, to be numbered among the commanders of our days. After the war, the former chief of the general staff modestly states: "at the core of this (world) war ... was more a war of masses and material means than a war of generals, and it should be considered mainly from this point of view." "Masses" and "material

resources", derivatives of the current state of the economy, crushed Conrad, who today recognized the impotence of one commander to turn the wheel of fortune in his favor. Strong in his monarchical foundations, far from the socialist doctrine and even hostile to it, the chief of the Austrian general staff, in the face of heavy sacrifices and collapses, comes to the conclusions announced long ago by Engels. The "primary" in life invariably paves the way even in the inert brains of the bureaucrats of the former Austria-Hungary.

The "war mandarin" finally disappears from the scene, replaced by "collective" work in the management of modern warfare, and today a sane person does not sing "songs" and does not tell "tales" about former "individual commanders." Neither did we intend to

compose hymns of praise to the former Chief of the Austrian General Staff, not because he found himself in the camp of the vanquished, but because of our sincere conviction that this occupation is idle in our time. Before us is an "ordinary" person, whom

we were very glad to meet and do not think of breaking him in the subsequent pages of our work, the purpose of which is to evaluate the military system of the Danubian Empire, and by no means lyric about its leaders. Such people have left the arena of life, and, frankly, we are glad of this! ..

Chapter VII

Austro-Hungarian General Staff in persons

Konrad on the relationship of the chief of staff with the command. - Conrad's views on the importance of the work of the headquarters. - What is required from the staff of the headquarters. — Conrad's relationship to his governing bodies. — Implementation by the chief of staff of his views. — Conrad's concern for the physical strength of his subordinates. - The intimate circle of the chief of the general staff. - Headquarters characters. - Staff officer for assignment under the chief of staff - Putz and Kundman. - Konrad's deputy - Hofer. - Head of the Operations Bureau - Metzger. - Office staff. - The Intelligence Bureau and its staff. - Head of military communications - Straub. - Heads of the stage and telegraph bureau. - The head of the archive - Hoen. - Head of

Our narrative clearly shows that modern war, even within the framework of its military nature, crushes the commander with its weight, making it absolutely necessary to cooperate with a well-organized military administration, and first of all, the headquarters. Now we intend to acquaint the

reader with the personnel of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, recommending its individual representatives, and on this acquaintance to understand: what kind of headquarters should be. First of all, we consider it

necessary to listen to the opinion of the chief of the general staff himself about what he set the task for the headquarters, how he selected and led it.

Introducing us to the official version of the position on the chief of staff, Konrad points out that the chief of staff is the most important body of the high command, that he prepares, proposes and implements all decisions of the command, that he is responsible for conducting operations. Inviolable harmony between the high command and the chief of staff is the key to successful command and control of troops. If the proposal of the chief of staff was not accepted by the command, then the chief of staff is still obliged to carry out the instructions of the command with all energy and knowledge. All this Konrad considered obligatory for himself personally during all the days of his work as chief of the

general staff. The consciousness of his responsibility for preparing for war and its conduct never left Conrad. In case of success, he saw in him a share of his participation and was proud of it, in case of failure, he alone shouldered the responsibility to the country.

However, as we know, one commander is not able to manage the conduct of operations. All his actions are connected with a well-developed and conducted technical side of operations. The management of a major war at the front belongs to a numerous, well-organized apparatus, to organize the work of which and conduct it at an appropriate pace is one of the main duties of the chief of staff.

Thus, special attention should be paid to the work of the headquarters. If the conduct of war requires bravery and other qualities of a high moral level from the foremost fighters, then the governing bodies must be distinguished by selfless, conscious work, far from careerism. The greater the confidence in one's governing bodies, the more secure is the leadership of the entire military apparatus. In modern warfare, with the participation of technology, this requirement is even more important than before.

The chief of staff and other chiefs of the control organs must strictly observe that the efficiency of these organs does not decrease. Pettiness and nervousness harm the work. Wherever possible, the boss should remain calm in order to ensure the same calm work in busy times for his

subordinates.

"First of all, I never brought nervousness," Konrad says to himself. Attaching such

importance to the work of subordinate bodies, the former chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, when choosing them personally, preferred hard-working, intelligent heads, with an independent character, with self-control. The performance of these bodies must correspond to their range of activities, and they should by no means be mere assistants. The work of the high command, according to Konrad, is not limited to the detailed management of individual control bodies, but should only put pressure on the general

direction of their work. As for the rest, a wide scope opens up for the mentioned bodies on the paths of independent activity. The high command must use its forces in the general direction of the work of the entire apparatus and find satisfaction in this.

Speaking about the relationship with his subordinate agencies, the chief of the general staff considers it necessary to note their work in the spirit of the basic instructions given to them. The assignments received from him in the military administration bodies were subjected to detailed study, as a result of which the very foundations of the assignment had to be changed. This did not upset Konrad, just as he considered it his duty to listen to all proposals made by subordinate authorities. "I never thought of rejecting the opinions of my organs just because they came from them," Konrad says. Inexpedient proposals were gently rejected by him and, on the contrary, deserving attention were approved by Conrad and subject to further development and implementation. The former chief of the general staff does not forget to note that he never allowed himself to address lower subordinates, bypassing the chiefs of the bureau, whom they were directly

subordinate.

Konrad's constant exchange of opinions with his subordinates at military games, field trips and maneuvers, both on fundamental issues of military affairs and on control techniques, contributed to the introduction of the views of the chief of the general staff into subordinates and the establishment of certain methods of work. All this, according to

Konrad, brilliantly justified itself in the war, making the military apparatus workable. Konrad

attached great importance to physical strength and endurance of subordinates, which was achieved by involving employees in various kinds of sports, especially horse riding and mountain excursions.

Every year, Konrad held a large horse race, lasting several days, with a minimum daily transition of 60 miles. Prior to the start, throughout the year, of classes, usually in the morning, bureau employees had to leave for a certain time on horseback, for which classes began only at 10 o'clock in the morning. On Sundays, the employees, during normal work, took part in various sports exercises

and, in addition, parties were made annually for mountain excursions. Strengthening the spirit and body in his subordinates was revered by Konrad as one of his duties. We have already noted Krauss' testimony that a special close circle

of his employees formed around the Chief of the General Staff, who often used their position for personal gain.

The existence of such an intimate circle is not denied by Konrad himself. It consisted of: the chief of the operational bureau, his assistant and a staff officer for assignments under Konrad. With this circle of people, the chief of staff shared his secrets, they turned out to be initiated into all his operational plans and assumptions, all the ideas that arose in the head of the chief of staff were discussed with them, with this circle of people Konrad exchanged thoughts about the qualities

certain superiors and subordinates.

In a word, the said trio enjoyed the full confidence of Konrad and, together with him, experienced the joys and sorrows with which the path of the chief of staff was rich.

We now allow ourselves to begin our acquaintance with the members of the Austrian General Staff, and above all with those who formed a close circle around Konrad.

Closest of all of him stood to the Chief of the General Staff errand officer.

Until 1910, this position was held by Franz Putz, whom Konrad recommends as a man of strong mind and spirit, enormous capacity for work and excellent health. Already a young officer, Putz attracted the attention of Conrad in Trieste, when he was commander of a brigade, of which Putz was the headquarters officer. It was Conrad's faithful, silent companion, who enjoyed his full confidence.

With the departure of Putz to serve as a military agent, he was replaced by Rudolf Kundman, a former regimental adjutant of the regiment commanded by Conrad. The latter characterizes him as a man with a clear, quickly grasping mind, excellent performance, the ability to deal with others, deserving their sympathy. From 1910 to 1917, Kundman was the shadow of his chief of staff, following him everywhere, fixing orders given to him and all negotiations with other persons, carrying out diplomatic assignments in relations with foreign military representatives. Kundman was Conrad's most trusted man. The German Cramon, already known to us, describes Kundman as also an intelligent, and

even witty, person with a decisive character and pleasant to work with.

In addition to Kundman, the chief of staff had a personal adjutant to carry out secondary assignments, but he did not enjoy such official confidence as Kundman. Thus, both Putz

and Kundman were, in fact, chosen by Konrad on the basis of his acquaintance with their former service, and, in any case, Kundman, in his official activities, deserved the place he occupied, and, apparently, also by his trust in Konrad. donated without reason.

The deputy chief of the general staff was first Langer, and then, from 1911, Hofer. In essence, the deputy chief of the general staff had no specific functions. Being fully oriented in the course of all affairs, the deputy worked on separate assignments for the chief of staff, represented him in various commissions, and only with the departure of Konrad on vacation or

on a business trip, he assumed the duties of chief of staff, and even then he tried to receive, if possible, appropriate instructions on important issues. Before taking up the post of Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Hofer was the head of the 5th department of the War Ministry. Contemporaries characterize him as an ordinary worker, who left his post a year after the start of the war and went back to the military ministry. The real deputy chief of the general staff was the chief of the operational bureau, the second member of the intimate circle.

With Conrad taking over as chief of staff in 1906, Colonel Krauss-Elissiaga, an excellent and capable worker, who later proved himself well during the war, was the head of the operations bureau. In 1910, Krauss left to command a brigade, and Metzger was appointed in his place, at the suggestion of Konrad, who in 1915 took the post of deputy chief of the general staff and, together with Konrad, left in 1917 from

rates.

Until the end of his days, Konrad was proud of the successful choice of the head of the operational bureau in the person of Metzger. With him, the chief of the general staff discussed not only all the most important operational and organizational issues, but all political ones, as well as consulted in the selection of senior command personnel. There was

complete agreement between these two people, both in principle and in other matters, and their opinions seldom came into conflict. Conrad, in giving guidance to the Chief of Operations, did not consider them irrefutable before subjecting them to Metzger's analysis. With joy, Konrad always accepted proposals coming from the latter, not seeing in this any derogation from his dignity. The joint work of the chief of the general staff with his closest subordinate, according to the testimony of the first, went without friction. Together they experienced joys and sorrows, hopes and hesitations.

Conrad recommends Metzger to us as a man of outstanding intelligence, enormous capacity for work, strict towards himself and others in the service, sometimes even harsh in relations with his subordinates. But at the same time, Menger was tactful, he always knew how to work in contact. far from

court tricks, especially needed in Vienna, Metzger always went his own way and in the service he valued business, not personality. In private life, the sociable, cheerful and cheerful Metzger tied those around him to himself, arousing only sympathy in them.

German contemporaries from the banks of the Spree also pay tribute to this personality. Both Cramon and Freitag von Loringofen speak of the chief of the operations bureau as a strong-willed, hard-working and highly military-educated person. In all branches of the service of the General Staff, Metzger turned out to be a very experienced, diligent, calm and silent worker, who meekly bore the hard time of his position. "It was Conrad's right hand," concludes Cramon.

The rest of the staff of the operational bureau, according to the testimony of not only Konrad himself, but also Cramon, was distinguished by their efficiency, knowledge and, over many years of joint work, a certain solidarity.

Cramon points to the absence of criticism among him, which partly due to the well-known selection of it by Conrad himself.

Of the personnel of this bureau, we will focus only on Metzger's assistant - Slamechka, who stood out with his pen, which in the Austro-Hungarian army should have had special properties: an external gloss, subtlety and beauty of style. All this was given to Slamechka, and his talents were used by Konrad in the area that demanded it most of all, namely, in politics. Quickly grasping the essence of the instructions given to him, able to develop them with a surcharge, go to the relevant documents, Slamechka, as the former "military clerk of the Cossacks", wrote letters from Konrad to the "Turkish Sultan", embodied in the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the German high command. For the "continuous" paper battles, Konrad Slamechki turned out to be an indispensable person, which is why he recommends him as a capable and tireless worker, Metzger's right hand. In view of such talents, Slamechka was admitted into Konrad's intimate circle.

"Metzger, Slamechka and Kundman formed a close circle around me," the chief of the general staff tells us, noting that such an "excellent" one of his members, Kik Slamechka, often

subjected to tendentious attacks in parliament, the press and public circles.

Giving the personnel of the operational bureau an assessment of how highly educated and tireless people in their work, who coped well with operational issues, Konrad does not pass by Flug, an artilleryman. who contributed to the work of the headquarters his broad technical knowledge of the type of troops and contributed by his initiative to the improvement of Austrian artillery, in particular heavy, hand weapons, as well as the accumulation of appropriate combat stocks.

Joseph Schneider, who was in charge of organizational matters, and during the war the matter of replenishing the army, skillfully coped with his duties, which were so important both in time of peace and in time of war. The intelligence

bureau, with Conrad's entry into office, was headed by Urbansky, who remained in place until May 1914, when he was replaced by Garnilovich, a former military agent in Romania. The chief of the general staff does not give us a personal description of Urbansky, just as wartime eyewitnesses do not testify to this personality. The replacement of Urbansky was carried out on the orders of Franz Ferdinand, in connection with the well-known espionage of the former chief of staff of the 8th Corps Redl, which left a bitter aftertaste in Konrad's soul, which, apparently, can explain his suppression of the identity of his head of the intelligence bureau. However, it should be noted that Urbansky enjoyed the great confidence of the Chief of the General Staff and more than once with secret assignments according to the war plan was sent by him to Berlin to the Chief of the German General Staff.

Of the other employees of this bureau, Konrad recommends Rote to us, as he was in charge of counterintelligence and turned out to be a very active worker in this area, as well as Pokorny, who was in charge of the radio interception service, and his initiative work in the war, which made it possible to decipher all Russian radio messages, gave an excellent orientation to the command. It should be noted that, along

with the intelligence bureau, accounting of the enemy's forces and intentions according to the war plan was also carried out in

relevant sectors of the operational bureau, about which we read more
say below.

The Bureau of Military Communications was in the hands of Straub, who was very active, quickly got out of difficulties and knew his own way. the business of

man, All the difficult preparation of the communications of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in the war, which were generally not in a brilliant state, the development of all possible plans for transportation according to the war plan, the development of measures to improve the communications of the state - all this lay on Straub, and with all this, according to Conrad, he did an excellent job. In describing the work of the bureau in carrying out strategic deployment, we will dwell on this person more than once, but now we must testify that Konrad's assessment of him is not far from the truth.

The stage bureau, created by Konrad, was entrusted to Metzencheffi, also an excellent worker with great knowledge, who spent all the preparations for the war of stage service, and then, at the end of the world war, who fell as head of the 6th division of the Red Hungarian army. Rudolf Shamshula was chief of the telegraph bureau, and Konrad notes

his work during the war as full of initiative and impeccable in keeping in touch even with distant armies, especially with regard to the organization and service of the radio.

The head of the military archive was Hoen, who contributed valuable historical works, and now, after the World War, is again essentially in the same position, but only now in the "state" archive, because the "military" archive was persecuted by the Entente.

The head of the Military Academy was Krauss, the author of the work "The Causes of Our Defeats", to which we have referred more than once and will refer later. Well-educated, with a practical way of his scientific activity, far from court intrigues, a "Prussian" - as he was regarded in the army, Krauss during the war showed himself to be an excellent practitioner both in the headquarters service and in command of the troops. This concludes our acquaintance with the

personnel of the central apparatus of the Austrian General Staff. We will not go into an exposition of the training and education in general of the general

headquarters of the Danubian Empire, as we will do below. Let's focus on the next little thing. Everywhere we have recommended personnel without indicating the ranks and the number of years of service, and therefore, for clarification, we must indicate that all the persons noted by us had a decent number of years spent in military service and were in the headquarters of officer positions.

Chapter VIII

Portrait Gallery of the General Staff

Pre-revolutionary General Staff of France. - Napoleon and his staff. - Berthier. - The emergence of the "duumvirate". - Russian General Staff at the beginning of the 20th century. - The German General Staff under Moltke (senior). - Struggle for power. - Battles of the German General Staff on the political front. — Bismarck on Waldersee. - Bismarck and Kaprivi. "Politics is not a battlefield." - "The Spy of the Emperor" - Birdy du Vernoy. - Struggle of the General Staff on the military front. – Training Moltke of the staff of the General Staff. - The influence of the general staff on the combat command in decision-making in battle. - Schlieffen and his non-interference and politics. - Schlieffen - as an educator of the German General Staff. - Moltke (junior) and his work on the preparation of the General Staff. - "Intimate" circle of Moltke. - Characteristics of the staff of Moltke's headquarters. - Ludendorff and Stein. - Waldersee and Tappen. - "The greatness and isolation of the operational department." — Ludendorff about his headquarters. - The French General Staff after Napoleon. - Gouvion Saint-Cyr and his draft of the General Staff. - The defeat of 1870. - The General Staff at the beginning of the 20th century. - "Young Turks" of the General Staff and their attack. - Grandmaison and the death of Michel. - Joffre is the chief of the general staff and his "main apartment". - Joffre - in the representation of Pierrefe. - Employees of the operational department and their chief Gamelin. - I

In order to make an assessment of the personnel of Konrad's headquarters, we consider it necessary to digress a little and look both into history and into other headquarters that existed along with the Austrian one before the World War.

Every commander, of course, had a headquarters as soon as armies began to develop in numbers, and especially when technology imperiously invaded military affairs. It is known that even Machiavelli, defining

the functions of the headquarters, which are still remembered by the pace, who approaches the question of the general staff.

Without going into the gray times of military history, we will dwell only briefly on Napoleon, who, as we noted above, was both a commander and chief of staff. The beginnings of the general staff in the French army were still in pre-revolutionary times. Created mainly from "raznochintsy", i.e. people of non-noble and bourgeois origin, the General Staff showed vigorous activity on issues close to the terms of reference of the modern General Staff. However, this work exposed in the French pre-revolutionary general staff narrow technical specialists, of course, who did not understand the nature of the outbreak of revolution. Therefore, it is clear without explanation that the revolution, although it did not destroy the general staff from the first steps, not only did the latter not turn out to be the brain of the army in its course, but gradually faded away and disappeared

under Napoleon. Individual representatives of the old general staff, either in staff positions or in command positions, inscribed their names in the history of the revolutionary army, but, as a corps, the general staff ceased to exist. Napoleon was not particularly friendly to the general staff, although he liked his chief of staff, Berthier, one of the representatives of the old general staff. Turning our attention to Berthier, we can understand what Napoleon required from the general staff. Berthier was, in essence, nothing more than Napoleon's good communications chief,

but by no means the chief of staff, or even the chief of the iterative department. Maintaining constant contact with the subordinate command, fully transmitting Napoleon's orders, dictated by him personally or compiled at his direction, Berthier was a tireless worker, but without an idea, representing only a well-established machine. When Berthier was faced with making independent decisions in his work, he was known to be a poor assistant. Napoleon had to rectify the situation, rummaging through and sorting through the heap of reports received from the marshals of his intelligence. We would be wrong if we did not note that Napoleon valued the service of the General Staff only on separate assignments, but, as an apparatus

management, the general staff under him ceased to exist, and there were no hints of its revival.

However, with the growth of the army, the importance of the staff service grew, but until the death of the little corporal, it did not crystallize into the service of the

general staff. We see the reasons for the destruction of the General Staff in the French revolutionary army in the following. In its general mass, found itself with insufficient political development, brought up in the old military school, the French General Staff could be used by the revolution only in work in its narrow specialty - the technique of staff service, which, of course, was needed at that time. In the latter, he was required to be precise, accurate, efficient and have a healthy body that could endure hard work. In our understanding, politicians, revolutionaries and such masters of military affairs as Napoleon did not need other qualities of staff workers in those days, especially before 1810.

We said "until 1810," since already in subsequent years the importance of the general staff in opposing armies rises, and the chief of staff enters as an essential link in the ideological field of the commander, which at that time was in close contact with politics. As noted earlier, from now on, the "duumvirate" becomes the head of the war.

The Russian general staff of this era basically did not rise above the general level, and, for example, the "quartermaster general" in 1812 was a certain Mukhin, who stood out for his ability to situationally. Even then, Clausewitz's mind was struck by such a choice of the most important employee of the operational unit. If we recall that the "idea" was excluded from the everyday life of the General Staff and was considered the property of the command, then the explanations for this

phenomenon are simple. Born with its modern functions in Germany, the General Staff begins to flourish only in the hands of Moltke. Seizing more and more power every year, first in the military department, then making attempts in this direction and in politics, Moltke meets stubborn resistance, on the one hand, the War Minister Roon, and on the other, a decisive rebuff in the person of Bismarck.

In the preceding chapter, we have given Moltke's views on the significance of his position as Chief of the General Staff. The desire to secure all the prerogatives for her and not to diminish her authority with Moltke went not only on an equal plane with the rest of the posts of the state, but also went down to the very general staff.

We know that the commander-in-chief, according to Moltke, should be offered only "one opinion" and only "one person authorized to do so", i.e. chief of staff. Moltke did not conceive of any intrusions into this "one opinion", especially from below. "The projects of the chief of the general staff were previously discussed by him together with staff officers; then the king subjected them to a very detailed examination," says Moltke. Thus, after a preliminary discussion in the bowels of the headquarters, he developed a "one opinion", which was reported to the highest military authorities.

Such is the construction of "copyright" rooted in German General Staff at the time of Moltke.

Entering the struggle for the conquest of power by the general staff, his chief, Moltke, of course, would not have been able to wage continuous battles alone, of which there were no less than the hero of our story, Conrad. Assistants were needed, thoroughly imbued with the ideas of their boss. And, indeed, a circle of 18 people was formed near Moltke in 1857 - the "Large General Staff", which increased to 48 people after 10 years. With this circle of faces, Moltke makes his campaigns, which crowned the Prussian weapons with glory.

There is no doubt: in order to get into this vicious circle, it was necessary to possess the appropriate qualities that would be suitable for the activities of the General Staff that his chief wanted to develop. We noted above that the General Staff still had to win its positions both in the purely military field and in the political one. The struggle went on two fronts, and people who were primarily active and energetic were called to this struggle.

We will focus first on the political front. Coming into battle with Bismarck, first because of the proper orientation in foreign policy, and then because of the desire to create this policy, Moltke

found in his headquarters the appropriate forces for this. We know that many of Moltke's close circle delayed data for Bismarck's orientation and that the latter waged a struggle not only with Moltke himself, but also with the "demigods" surrounding him, the most malicious of whom was none other than the classic of the applied method of strategy by Verdi du Vernoy, future German minister of war.

Some of the modern historians of the German General Staff (Günther Wooler) lovingly remark that Bismarck himself valued the virtues of Moltke's assistants in the political arena, and that Bismarck's successor in office was none other than Caprivi, Moltke's former general staff officer. We must point out that indeed many of Moltke's collaborators aspired to and occupied leading positions in the political life of Germany. The fashion for the uniform of the general staff in Berlin was great, but what came of it was shown by the world war.

As for the political talents of these "demigods", Bismarck, in his Memoirs, characterizes some of them in this way. Speaking about the well-known "spiritual" brotherhood of a certain Stecker, in whose propaganda Wilhelm himself and the quartermaster general, and later the chief of the general staff Walderses, plunged headlong, Bismarck writes: "the fact that the staging (one of the organizational meetings for the Stecker brotherhood), which took place in the house of Count Waldersee, was condemned by me, restored against me this influential person in the circle of the prince (Wilhelm) to an even greater extent than it had been before. We were long-term friends with him, I managed to get to know him during the French war both as a soldier and as a political ally; later I even thought of recommending him to the sovereign for a military post of a political nature. With closer official relations with the count, I began to doubt his suitability for political activity, and when Count Moltke, who was at the head of the general staff, needed a deputy, I felt obliged to ask the military circles before I reported my opinion about Waldersee to the sovereign. "As a result, I drew His Majesty's attention to Caprivi, although the latter, as I already knew, did not have the same good opinion of me as I of him. My idea is to make Caprivi Moltke's successor

ultimately failed, I think, due to the difficulty of establishing the *modus vivendi* necessary under the dualistic leadership of the General Staff between two such independent figures. To the highest circles, this task seemed easily solved if the post of deputy Moltke was given to Waldersee: thus, the latter approached the monarch and his successor. Waldersee, of course, did not forget this incident to Bismarck and all the time led

an intrigue against him, especially in the foreign policy of the chancellor, and finally, in 1890, he reported to Wilhelm about the documents allegedly hidden from him by Bismarck, which were received at the general staff, namely : about Russia's preparations for war. Bismarck describes how on March 18, 1890, Wilhelm gathered all the commanding generals, announced to them Bismarck's resignation, since "the chief of the general staff, Waldersee, allegedly received complaints about my (Bismarck; B. Sh.) autocratic and secret relations with Russia." Waldersee, on duty made a report to His Majesty on the report of the Kyiv consul and its significance. "None of the generals," continues Bismarck, "did not answer the emperor's speech, and Count Moltke (foremen) was also silent. But, descending the stairs, the latter said: "A regrettable phenomenon, young master. more than once will call us for such advice."

We will return to this question later, and now we will only note that, speaking of the concealment of documents, Bismarck writes: "If I wanted to conceal" something from the emperor, I would probably not entrust the dishonest concealment of documents to the General Staff, not all whose leaders were my friends, and certainly not to War Minister Verdi. As for Caprivi,

Bismarck describes his merits as a political and military figure as follows: "How deeply and for a long time the various displeasures of military officials, caused by departmental pride since the war of 1866, have affected, and how they have influenced the ever-increasing hostility towards me my colleagues and former party comrades," writes Bismarck, "I could conclude, among other things, from the message of Field Marshal von Manstein; General Caprivi appeared to him quite unexpectedly, began to insistently point out the danger that I, the responsible minister,

I bring on my hostility to the army, and asked the marshal to influence the king. This and for the marshal unexpected and hostile attack on me by Caprivi and his constant treatment of persons who ... waged a closed struggle against me did not prevent me from expressing a high opinion of his military abilities, compiled on the basis of authoritative reviews.

“After the appointment of Caprivi as the head of the fleet,” the chancellor continues, “contrary to my advice held in 1883, I recommended to Emperor Wilhelm I not to deprive the army, in view of the dubious prospects for peace at that time, of the general, who enjoyed such confidence in the troops, not to interrupt that unity, which was created between them, since in the event of a war he would have to create this connection anew. I suggested that Caprivi be involved in the leadership of the general staff as soon as Count Moltke needed an assistant. The latter, however, was not inclined to use the services of Caprivi and preferred in this case to completely resign, which the emperor did not want to allow in any case. For the second time, Bismarck nominated Caprivi for the position of Moltke's deputy, when Waldersee ruined his reputation with the propaganda of Stecker's ideas, and again a decisive rebuff was received from the same Moltke (senior). In 1890, Bismarck nominated Caprivi as a candidate for the Minister of Justice, because “only a military head can, at the right moment, compensate for the weakness of the civilian part. As a suitable general, I pointed to Caprivi, who was, it is true, a stranger to politics, but for that he was a reliable soldier for the king; from politics he could, in peacetime, as minister-president without portfolio, largely abstain. There was no question of Caprivi becoming my successor in a foreign office at that time.” Bismarck notes that Caprivi doubted his strength in the political field, but reassured by Wilhelm II that the latter assumes “responsibility

for affairs”, agreed to take up the post of chancellor. “How Caprivi resolved his doubts about accepting the post of imperial chancellor, he told me about this - by the way, in the only conversation that took place on the threshold of the

room he had captured in my house: “if I, being at the head of my 10th corps,

I received an order during the battle that would have threatened the death of the corps, defeat and death to me, and if my business objections to it had not been successful, I would have had no choice but to fulfill this order and die. What's next? Man overboard!" "In this look," argues Bismarck, "is the whole essence of the officer's spirit, which constituted both the present and the last century the military strength of Prussia, and will continue to live in it in the future. But if this view is transferred to the field of legislation, politics - internal and external - then, despite all its amazing strength in this matter, it threatens with dangers here. Modern politics in the German Empire, with its free press, parliamentary direction, in the grip of European complications, cannot be conducted by means of royal orders obediently carried out by the generals, even if the abilities of the now reigning German Emperor and King of Prussia exceeded the talents of Frederick II. "In the place of Mr. Caprivi, I would not have accepted the post of chancellor," Bismarck continues, "for the position of

ministerial secretary or adjutant in an unknown field, the venerable Prussian general, who enjoys the confidence of our officers more than others, is too high a person; and politics is not a battlefield: it requires special knowledge to decide whether and when war is necessary and how to avoid it with honor. I could recognize the military field theory of Caprivi only in those cases when the fate of the monarchy and the fatherland is at stake, when, according to historical precedents, dictatorship comes into force. "My political experience has been accumulating for 40 years," says Bismarck, "and my successor, taking up a new position, was as familiar with

the political situation of the state as he was when he commanded the 10th Corps." What opinion of Verdi was the chancellor, we have already indicated above. "Verdi was appointed without my knowledge," writes Bismarck, "there was

a quarrel between us in 1870, and I treated him like a muchard'y (spy) of the emperor in the council of ministers. His appointment was already a chess move by the emperor against me."

We apologize for listening to the testimony of the "Iron Chancellor", but we considered it necessary to do this in order to: 1) find out

opinion ("demigods" of the opposite side; 2) get acquainted with the tactics of the General Staff in politics; 3) to know how the German General Staff sought to seize power in the life of the country. It is clear that

Moltke himself (senior) was in this surpassed by his assistants.

We by no means want to say that responsible members of the General Staff should stand outside politics, on the contrary, they should be constantly aware of politics) take it into account in full in all military plans, but this is far from creating their own policy, which, in fact, , and sought the "demigods" Moltke.

If the struggle on the political front did not require special efforts from the chief of staff in preparing the employees themselves for it, then in order to win on the military front, Moltke's general staff, like Moltke himself, had to endure stubborn battles. The

energy and determination of the German combatant commanders, in their general mass, could not be denied, they lacked the knowledge of "modern" military affairs and its prospects for the future. It needed to be replenished.

Moltke took on this mission, involving his general staff in it, having previously prepared the latter for such work. The Chief of the General Staff is actively engaged in this. By involving his closest collaborators in the study of modern wars, compiling their histories with the necessary conclusions for the future, by means of field trips, by individually solving tactical tasks given by the chief of the general staff, by analyzing them, Moltke prepared and educated his general staff for extensive work in the military field and established unanimity between himself and his subordinates on military matters. For practical activities, Moltke usually gave only general instructions and directives, and detailed work was carried out by

department heads already subordinate to him. Finally, they were also entrusted with the special study of certain issues.

Thus, from the employees of the Great General Staff of Germany, his chief required a broad military education,

the logicity of thought, the ability to express it briefly and clearly and without a template, the ability to make appropriate decisions, and to all this - excellent clear executive work. Along with this, Moltke's assistants had to have the appropriate energy and character in order to be "demigods", for the role of which they were trained by the chief of the general staff.

In his concepts and to everything noted above, the "demigod" should be distinguished by modesty, silence, lack of desire to stand out both in the service and outside it, but he must be firm in his actions in any situation. Moltke himself set an example in this, earning the epithet "silent man". However, not all assistants were distinguished by the indicated merits and sometimes entered into a rather passionate argument with their opponents, whether they were officers or politicians. The struggle unbalanced these representatives of the German Olympus. Everyone knows the case from the war of 1870, when the future German chancellor, and then the chief of staff of the 10th Corps, Caprivi, with a whip, created historical glory for the commander of the cavalry brigade Bredov, sending him with this weighty argument to attack. True, our contemporaries note the modesty of Caprivi, who did not advertise his act and gave all the laurels to Bredov (A. Svechin "History of military art", part III, p. 129). but for us this case is quite typical, showing what methods were used by the "silent" of the German General Staff in order to influence the command

instances.

According to other sources, Caprivi did not send Bredov with a whip to attack. and the commander of another cavalry brigade, Redern. With Bredov, in the sense of forcing him to attack, Voigt-Retz, the chief of staff of Alvensleben's III Corps, had a "big conversation". We say this only to establish a fact, but its very essence is not

is changing.

In 1870, the general staff already felt the ground under their feet and could put the whip into action for "modest" and "silent" command and control, revealing the tendencies that were laid in it by the famous Moltke. We think that, having experienced such an image of the management of the General Staff, Bredov and Redern sympathetically shook hands with Bismarck, who was not afraid of the whips of the "demigods". If

Moltke himself was distinguished by graceful manners and dances, so necessary for the salons, then his employees, in any case, did not reveal these qualities in the field, and not only in the field.

We do not at all want to accuse the “demigods” of their lack of “good tone”, on the contrary, we note in them a strong character, energy, but at the same time we cannot agree with such methods of cultivating respect for ourselves and subordinating our will.

One way or another, we must note that Moltke's employees: 1) did not shy away from politics; 2) were distinguished by a broad military education; 3) were people of character and 4) showed great efficiency and technical skill in their work.

With the death of his chief of staff, his closest assistants found themselves at the helm of not only military but also civil power. Following the precepts of their teacher, they continued to keep the military training of their assistants at the proper level, but in political independent speeches they began to fail (Waldersee, Caprivi).

The political collapse was not without consequences for the next generation of the German General Staff, which began its activities before the entry into office of the Chief of the General Staff, Schlieffen. “Our teacher and

educator for the “great modern war” was Field Marshal von Schlieffen,” our contemporary Kuhl testifies in his work “The German General Staff”.

In the preceding chapter, we partly got acquainted with Schlieffen's views on the role of a commander. It is not within our scope to give the appearance of Schlieffen himself, but we will return to his views more than once. At this time, we are interested in the requirements that they made to their closest employees. Many of the latter, while already in high positions under Schlieffen, while others, having begun service under him, revealed themselves in one way or another in the world war.

First of all, we must note that, while establishing a poor connection with politics, Schlieffen pursued his own policy, but, as they say, to himself, occasionally revealing it to his employees. Realizing from the fate of his predecessors that active intervention in politics is fraught with consequences, the chief of the general staff tried not to reveal his face, and even more so

involve your closest employees in this. Therefore, Ludendorff's statement quoted by us that he was not interested in political parties is quite understandable.

As you know, after the World War, not only the Entente, but even in Germany, many politicians accused the general staff of the world catastrophe, and he, as the recognized culprit of the war, was wiped off the face of the earth. Thus, our statement that the General Staff in Berlin turned out to be alien to politics seems to suffer from inaccuracy. We are happy to correct our mistake. Rather, it must be said that the German General Staff pursued its military policy based on militarism, without taking into account the "primary" in it, and in its political prerequisites it was unquestionably illiterate. The policy of the General Staff was of a "official" type; it was the policy of specialists in their field, but not of statesmen. The thinking of the latter was not characteristic of the representatives of the German General Staff, because it was not developed by their chief Schlieffen. Schlieffen's main aspirations were aimed at properly preparing the instrument

of war - the army, and its brain - the general staff. In the ideological part of his work, Schlieffen did not need advisers and assistants, protecting his

authority in this, but at the same time he sought to develop a broad military outlook in them, giving tasks that, according to their operational plan, went far beyond the scope of their activities. Demanding the adoption of independent decisions with a clear understanding of the entire situation

as a whole, i.e., in other words, developing the military outlook of his employees, Schlieffen made severe demands on them in the technical, detailed part of the work.

Kuhl testifies that "he (Schlieffen) demanded a lot from his subordinates, in accordance with his own extraordinary capacity for work."

"For several years, around Christmas, a bell rang in my apartment," Kuhl continues, "a special courier brought me a Christmas present from Count Schlieffen - a large outline of martial law (situation), with the task of drafting an operation. He would have been very surprised if the finished work had not

was handed to him on the evening of the first day of the holiday. On the second day of the holiday, a continuation of the problem was sent. Sundays and holidays, in his opinion, were intended for such work that can be performed without being interrupted by current affairs.

"His memory was extraordinary. As much as he himself was aware of all branches of work, he also demanded from the heads of the department accurate information at all times. Contradictions with previous reports never escaped him. In such cases, even a year later, he objected: "You told me then this and that."

"In this way, each of us has learned to be very, very alert. It was very difficult to satisfy him: he found few people diligent. He spoke harshly and sarcastically about many. A subtle observer and connoisseur of people, he was inclined to treat the masses negatively, but he definitely appreciated whoever earned his trust.

Noting Schlieffen's reticence in life, Kuhl says that "he consciously tried to be less visible. He demanded the same from the officers of the general staff: "the officer of the general staff should be more like that than he seems." Above, we have

already touched on the fact that even on holidays, the closest employees of Schlieffen were obliged to improve in military affairs, solving problems. The rest of the time, the chief of the general staff also conducted intensive training of his assistants. The same problem solving, war games, field trips with a strict and sarcastic analysis - all this led to the introduction of both one's own ideas into assistants, and the education in them of the will to win, the development of modern methods of management and work.

"We were not infallible, but we were diligent. The desecrated militarism was, in essence, only the hard work of the General Staff," says one of Schlieffen's former assistants, Kuhl, today.

Schlieffen's successor in the post of chief of the general staff, Moltke (junior), according to his contemporaries, was far from his predecessor, but nevertheless, himself differing in the qualities required from the workers of the Large General Staff, he also led his assistants, one of whom was on the position of head of the operational department was the famous Ludendorff.

Kuhl, quoted by us above, notes that Moltke's "improvement of the education of officers of the General Staff was exemplary." Although there were shortcomings in the preparation of the General Staff, clearly conceived, but "Moltke exemplarily led the large field trips of the General Staff and strategic war games." In a word, "in all areas of modern warfare, Moltke exerted his far-sighted and beneficial influence." However, all contemporaries agree that Moltke did not have a firm hand in managing his assistants. The authority that was inherent in his uncle and Schlieffen, Moltke's nephew did not possess. In short, before the World War, the Chief of the German General Staff needed appropriate "intimate" advisers.

The former crown prince in his memoirs, describing the character of Moltke, notes: "there was some kind of shyness in his character; he sometimes did not seem to feel sufficient confidence in his own strength. Thus, he soon found himself completely dependent on his employees. Personal softness and cordial, human benevolence, which he possessed, prevented him from acquiring that unconditional authority that the chief of the general staff should have. "During my service in the general staff," continues the crown prince, "I was told that in the office of the old Schlieffen, even the chief quartermasters came to report to this brilliant, sharp and merciless chief, not without some timidity, while everyone came to General Moltke with report

willingly and often.

A close "intimate" circle was formed in the German General Staff already before the World War, and then directly passed to the battlefields of the latter. Quartermaster General Stein,

and then, with his retirement, Waldersee, the chiefs of the operational department - Ludendorff and Tappen who replaced him - were the closest people to the chief of staff, with whom he considered both the political situation and all projects to strengthen and improve army and its use in a future war. What was their influence and authorship in various projects, this can be seen from those reports that were presented by the chief of the general staff, but for which

in fact, their compilers, the heads of departments, were responsible. So, the well-known report on strengthening the army by 3 corps, compiled in 1912 by Ludendorff, crashed in the Reichstag, and all the thunder for it fell not on Moltke's head, but on the author - Ludendorff, who was removed from the general staff to the ranks, although with a reward. The fact is very interesting, showing that, on the one hand, Moltke's nephew was far from his uncle, in order to take full responsibility for the report alone, and went to extradite with the head of his assistant, and on the other hand, from this episode we see how high it was "authorship" of subordinates to the chief of the general staff, if it was necessary to apply repression not to the latter, but, over his head, to the chief of the operational department.

We will not now dwell on the characterization of Chief of Staff Moltke (junior), for we will do it below. However, let us divert the attention of the reader and introduce him briefly to the intimate circle around Moltke.

For obvious reasons, we also cannot give full characteristics of all the characters of this circle here, and even without us they are quite fully outlined in the literature and, probably, are known to everyone. One of Moltke's closest collaborators was Ludendorff, a figure so familiar to everyone that, of course, it is not necessary to introduce him in detail.

A common feature characteristic of all Moltke's collaborators was their one-sidedness: political development, which did not have any preparatory work in this area, but was worked out by rotating them in a certain class circle of the German Junkers.

In his work "The Conduct of War and Politics", Ludendorff points out that, in preparing for the fight on the military field, the army and navy, in particular their command staff, turned out to be at the height of the situation, and in no space case can their upbringing be considered false, in which he convinced during his service. Reproaches are thrown that in other areas, namely, in politics, in the press and in the economy, officers turned out to be illiterate. However, according to Ludendorff, politics and the press are the business of civil officials, not officers, and if there is a failure in politics, then this is the fault of the first, and by no means proof of the wrong way of educating officers. True, in the old days